
*Pour Mounſieur de C. ſur ſon traitte de,
la politique Francoiſe.*

Sixain,

*Si donner de moyens au plus grand Roy du monde,
D'Eſtre Maiſtre abſolu ſur la terre & ſur l'onde,
C'eſt marque d'un Eſprit, & rare & merveilleux ;
Je puis dire en d'epit de toute la critique,
Que ce trainte de Politique,
Ne fut diſte que par les dieux.*

To this effect.

If that to give the Great French King in hand,
The means to ſway o're all, both Seas, and
Land ;
If this be Wit, (which none can well deny)
Then to the Teeth of all Critiques,
I'll maintain theſe Politiques
Are Wit, above the Sky.

*Pour Mounſieur de C. ſur ſon traitte de,
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W. Elder sculp.

Louis XIV. Roy de
France, et de Navarre.

THE
POLITICKS
343 OF 341
FRANCE.

By Monsieur P. H. Marquis of C.

WITH
REFLECTIONS

On the 4th and 5th Chapters;

Wherein he Censures the *Roman* Clergy,
and the *Hugonots*; by the Sr. *l'Orme-*
gregny.

The Second Edition.

L O N D O N,
Printed for *Thomas Bassët*, at the George in
Fleetstreet, 1691.



The Authors

EPISTLE

TO THE

FRENCH KING.

SIR,

ALL the Nations of the Earth wait with impatience for the Oracles which Your Majesties high Wisdom disposeth it self to Pronounce: and the whole Universe, by submitting to the Laws which you are about to give this Kingdom, will declare, That you alone deserve to Command all men. If the Delphique Priestess scrupled not to style Lycurgus a God, for his having settled the Spartans in order; what must not Fame say, when it shall publish Your Majesties August Name? Future ages, Sir, shall proclaim aloud what You perform in Yours; and report the splendor of Your Heroick Virtue. Happy the People who already find the effects of it; but a Thousand times

A 3

Happy

The Epistle.

Happy they of Your Majesties Subjects, whom You permit to offer at Your feet some token of their Admiration. You have often done me the Honour to grant me this precious Favour; and I beseech with lowest respect, that You further please to accept the Piece I now present You. It satisfies not the greatness of my Zeal, that during the course of my Life, I incessantly speak of the Passion I have for Your Service; my Writings must inform Posterity of it after my death; and the whole World ever know to what degree I am,

Sir,

*Your Majesties most humble,
most obedient, and most faith-
ful Subject and Servant,*

P.H. D.C.

The

THE PREFACE.

THE Bookseller will needs have a Preface to encourage the Sale of the Book. Now, for my part, I think there needs no other commendation than its Title; for those that will not be induced to buy it, because 'tis French, will not fail to have it for the sake of its Politick's; yet, if any should scruple laying out their Money only on the Credit of the Title Page, their Scruple (I doubt not) will be removed, when they are told that the Author of the Growth of Popery, says; That this Book is the measure of the French Kings Designs, and I'm sure there's none of us all that will be-grudge Two Shillings to be made Privy to his Councils. But if neither of these things, nor the Credit it had in its Native Language, will cause the Book to Sell, I can't imagine how a Preface should do it; for I know few (if any) that read the Preface of a Book they intend not to Read also; I have known some, indeed, Read the Book, and omit the Preface, which I doubt would be the Fate of this, should I make it long, I shall therefore on'y tell you how this Scheme of the vast Designs of the French King

The Preface:

became Publick, and so conclude. The Author was a Person bred up under Mr. Colebert, and to shew his Abilities, he writ this Treatise, and in Manuscript presented it to the French King, which was favourably received; but afterward, Vanity prompting him to Publish it in Print, the King lookt upon him as one that had discovered his Secrets, and turned his Favour into Frowns, caused him to be imprisoned in the Bastile, where he continued a long time, and was not deliver'd thence, but to Banishment, which, to those that read the Preface, affords one Encouragement more to Read the Book, since it discovers a Secret which most Men seek more after, and delight more in than Wisdom or Truth.

T H E

THE
POLITICKS
OF
France.

CHAP. I.

1. *What the Politicks are.* 2. *What their Object, End, and Means.* 3. *The different sorts of Governments.* 4. *That Monarchy is the best.*

THE Politicks are the Art of Governing States. The Ancients have call'd 'em a Royal and a most Divine Science, surpassing in excellency, and superior to all others. They have allow'd them the same precedence in practical Learning

2 *The Politicks of France.*

Learning, which the Metaphysicks and Theologie, have among the Speculative.

The means which the Politicks prescribe, are comprised under the heads of an exact Observance of Religion, a doing Justice in all cases; a providing that the People be protected in the times of Peace and War; and a preserving the State in a just and laudable mediocrity, by exterminating the extremes of Poverty and of Riches.

The Politicks have three principal branches: Namely, the three sorts of regular Governments, in which Men live under the Authority of Laws.

The First is Monarchy, in which one only Prince doth command for the Publick good.

The Second is Aristocracy; in which the honestest and wisest Persons, being elected out of all the Subjects, have the Direction and Administration of Publick Affairs.

The Third is Democracy, in which all Deliberations and Orders are held, and do pass by the Agency and Vote of the People.

The principal end to which a Democracy tendeth, is Liberty. That of an Aristocracy, is Riches and Virtue. The end of a Monarchy, is, the Glory, the Virtue, the Riches, and the Liberty of the Country.

A Tyranny, the most dangerous of all vicious and unlawful Governments, stands in direct opposition unto Monarchy.

A Tyrant commandeth meerly for his own Personal, not the Publick Profit. A King does the contrary.

Tyranny

Tyranny is destructive to the Glory, the Virtue, the Riches, and the Liberty of the People.

An Aristocracy often falls into an Oligarchy; and this happens when a determinate number of persons is no longer chosen out of the whole to Govern, and the choice is made of the Rich and Noble only; not generally out of all the Citizens.

Sometimes there riseth up Oligarchy, even within Oligarchy; and this comes to pass, when the Magistrates are chosen of the Noblest and Richest of some preferred Families, not of all the rich Gentry.

An Aristocracy is in some sort an Oligarchy, but much better than that which is simply such: Forasmuch as in an Aristocracy, Justice is administred to persons of all ranks, according to desert; which in an Oligarchique State is not done.

A well-temper'd Aristocracy is of long duration, and seldom comes into the danger of suffering any Change.

An Oligarchy, on the contrary, such as was the Government of the *Decem-viri*, or Ten, at *Rome*, and of the Thirty at *Athens*, is easily corrupted. For the persons who are in command, do frequently usurp a Sovereign Authority. Such Usurpation is not stiled a Tyranny; (for this is of one alone) but strictly a Dynastie; that is, a Potentacy or Power, violently assumed and retained, contrary to the disposition of the Laws. The *Greeks* (whose the word Dynastie is,) do

4 *The Politicks of France.*

do take it in this case, in an ill sense.

An Aristocracy and an Oligarchy are dissolved, when some one among the Rich, the Noble, or the Brave, does attain to an overgrown height. Thus *Cæsar* became Master of *Rome*. The Aristocracy is also in danger, when they that Govern, come into contempt with the multitude, or are hated by them, so that the inferiors grow factious, and mutiny against them, as hapned at *Rome*, when the Tribunes of the People were first created.

The apprehensions which the more than ordinary virtue of some excellent persons, gave the People of *Greece*, caused the introducing of Ostracisme among the *Athenians*, and of Petalisme at *Syracuse*: Punishments, but glorious for such as were condemn'd to them.

A Democracy likewise, sometimes, turns into an Oligarchy. And that is, when the dregs of the ignorant people, seduced by evil Orators, (whom the *Greeks* call *Demagogues*, or, *Leaders of the People*) do dispose of Affairs tumultuously, with uproar and violence, without respect to Law or Equity. Thus the *Athenians* seduced by their speakers, did put to death *Aristogenes*, and other Captains who had fought in company with *Thrasibulus*, and gain'd a notable Victory upon the *Lacedemonians*, their enemies.

Obligarchies are the means sometimes that People lose their liberty: and fall into servitude. *Pisistratus* became Tyrant of *Athens*
that

that way, and *Dionysius* of the *Syracusians*.

There are as various Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies, as there are different manners of men. But I have discours'd all this only cursorily; and I design not any further to engage my self in these matters, my purpose being to speak precisely of the concerns of the French Monarchy.

There are two sorts of Monarchy, unto which all Regal Governments, of whatever quality imaginable, are reduced; whether Elective, Hereditary, Barbarous, Despotical, or any other.

The first of these is entituled, *The Lacedemonian*; in which the King hath but a limited Authority. The second *Æconomical*; in which the King hath a Sovereign and Absolute power in his Kingdom, as the Father of a Family hath in his house.

'Tis no longer a question, Whether Monarchy be the best Government, the case having been often debated by Politicians, and still decided for Regality. And indeed it is of greatest Antiquity, least susceptible of change; most conform unto the Government of GOD himself; and not only represents the Authority which a Father exerciseth in his house, but it also necessarily occurs in an Aristocracy, and in Democracy it self. For, both in the one and the other of these States, the Sovereignty is entirely one; so that no single person can possess any the least parcel of it. In an Aristocracy, no one of the Senators is a Sovereign; but the whole

6 *The Politicks of France.*

whole Senate being united of one accord, is King. In a Democracy, no one of himself hath power to make the least Ordinance; the People assembled are the Monarch. Thus every where appears an indivisible Sovereignty; so conform to the Laws of Nature is Monarchy.

In fine, it may be said, that there never was Aristocracy, but founded upon the corruptions and ruins of some Monarchy: moreover, that Tyranny, it's direct contrary, is the worst of all Governments. Now from all that I have said, it follows by a necessary consequence, That the Monarchique State is better than any other.

C H A P. II.

1. *Of the true good and happiness of States.*
2. *Of the true good and happiness of a King.*
3. *How Felicity may be acquired.*

THings reckon'd under the notion of Good, are of three sorts. Corporal, as Health, Beauty, Strength, Agility, and the like. External, which we commonly call Goods of Fortune; as Birth, Riches, Dignities, Reputation, Friends, and such others. The third sort are those of the Soul: these are simply and absolutely good, that

that is, good of themselves; and so they can be no other but virtue alone.

Things accounted good are no further such indeed, than as they promote our Felicity, and bring us to it; Corporal and External things are not instruments to effect this. But the good of the Soul is the true happiness.

Felicity is not a simple habit; otherwise a man asleep would be happy: but it consisteth in action, which is the true use of Virtue.

The Soul makes us capable of living happily: for happiness is measured by virtue: nor can we be counted happy, but proportionably as we are counted good.

The intention of Political Science is, to bring to pass, that men lead their lives happily; as I have observ'd in the precedent Chapter. 'Tis therefore certain, that it requires they be actually virtuous.

All that I have been discoursing is of constant and confesseth truth. Whence clearly results, That the Politicks consider virtue in a much more noble manner than Ethicks do; for these, confining themselves to the forming of idle speculations, can produce but an imperfect felicity, which the Schools do call Theoretical. The Politicks on the contrary go further, and causing us to exercise virtue, do give us a Practical, that is, solid and perfect Felicity.

In fine, it is not doubted, but the Act is preferable to the habit. Besides, the Ethical or Moral discourses of virtue, can have

no

no other aim, but at most, the welfare of particular persons; which does not always produce that of the Publick: And the Politicks, regarding the welfare of an whole State, provide at once for that of each particular; as a good Pilot, in endeavouring the safety of his Ship, procures necessarily, the safety of all that are imbarqued in it. Also, the care of the welfare of particular persons, seems to be beneath the Politicks, except so far as it is necessary for the publick good. Yet sometimes particular Men must of force suffer for the Publick Good; as when a Malefactor is punished, and when some Houses are pull'd down to save a Town from Fire, and from Enemies.

The happiness of a State is of the same quality with that of particular persons. For as we say, a Man is happy when he hath Strength, Riches, and Virtue; in like manner we say a Common-wealth is happy when it is potent, rich, and justly governed.

A Monarch is, in reference to His State, what the Soul is to Man. There is no doubt therefore, but that the proper Goods of a King are those of the Soul: and that he can possess no other. Fortune being beneath a true Sovereign, and extrinsick to Him, cannot give him ought of that kind from Gold or Glory: All that He hath doth arise from His own Virtue, His Power, His Treasures, and the various effects of Beneficence which he holdeth in His Hand, do not constitute His Happiness: as G O D Himself is not Blessed

Blessed by external Blessings, but only confers them as a distribution made to His Creatures, and that He may cause them by sensible means to experiment His Goodness.

The Magnificence of a Man renders him considerable, if his Spirit in it be Great and Heroick.

But it is not enough to have spoken of that which constitutes Felicity, we must take some account of the means which conduce unto it.

Nature, Constancy and Reason, do contribute to endue us with Virtue. The two former do enrich the Mind; and dispose it to receive Virtue; then Reason being cleared by the light of Precepts, makes it spring up, and cultivates it.

Of all Precepts, those of greatest efficacy are the Political, which being indeed Laws, do command and oblige Men to obey, in a manner, blindly: necessitating and constraining us to live well, whether we will or no. 'Tis upon this ground it hath been said, That there lies no servitude at all in submitting to the power of the Law; and that it's the proper act of Men truly free, to reduce their inclinations, and subject their practice to the same: Forasmuch as the conforming of Life and Manners to the impulses of Virtue, which is always right, always uncorrupt, is in truth a setting our our selves at full liberty, and an enfranchisement from the Empire of importunate and irregular Passions.

But of these general Theses enough. It is time at length to enter upon the subject which occasion'd my taking up the design of this present Treatise.

CHAP. III.

1. *Of the French Monarchy.* 2. *Of the Situation and Quality of France.*
3. *Of the Nature of the French.*

THE Monarchick Government doth not more excell other Governments, than the *French* Monarchy doth all other Monarchies on Earth. It is hereditary, and for Twelve whole Ages there hath been seen Reigning from Male to Male, upon the Throne of *France*, the August Posterity of *Merone* of *Charlemagne*, and of *Hugh Capet*. For it is exactly proved, that these three Races of our Kings, are Branches issued out of the same Stock. This very Succession, so Legitimate as it hath been, and so long continued, makes at present the surest foundation of the welfare of the State; and carries in it Splendor, Reputation and Majesty. Indeed to how many Ills are Elective Kingdoms expos'd? How many Cabals? How many Complottings; and in truth, Wars, are kept on foot by so many different agitations? The one and the other *Roman* Empire, and the Kingdom of the *Poles*, do administer

minister sensible proofs of this Opinion.

If the *Spartans* heretofore did draw so great an advantage from the Honour they had to be commanded by Princes of the Blood of *Hercules*: The *French* have far greater cause to glory; since in the Catalogue of His Majesties triumphant Ancestors, there may be counted an hundred *Heroes* greater than *Hercules* himself.

Is there a Monarch in the World, whose just power is more absolute, than that of our King? and by consequent, is there a Monarchy comparable to the *French* Monarchy? It is necessary that the power of a good King be not confin'd within other bounds than Reason and Equity do prescribe: otherwise there will ever be division between Princes and People, to the ruin of them both. What a disorder would it be in Man, if the Eye or Hand should fail of following the impulses of the Soul? this disobeying and rebellious Member would prove dead, or seized with a Palsie. If then the whole Body should fall into an universal revolt against the Spirit of Man, all the Symmetry, the Order and œconomy would be utterly defaced. Thus the Subjects in a Monarchy, once ceasing to yield their King a full Obedience, and the King ceasing to exercise His Sovereign Authority over them, the Political Ligatures are broken, the Government is dissolved, by little and little all is reduced to extream calamities, and oft-times to Anarchy, and an annihilation.

Such are the inconveniencies that occur in Royalties of the *Lacedemonian* kind, where the Prince hath but a limited Authority; and if all that *England* suffer'd in the late times were pourtray'd here, it would be easie to observe of what importance it is unto the felicity of a Monarchy, that the Prince do in it command without restriction. In fine, the obedience of instrumental parts, as those of Organical Bodies, and the Subjects of a State, is of so indispensable a necessity, that the common good and conservation of that Whole, which they compose, depends upon it. In Democracies, even the most tumultuous and disorderly, all must bow under the Will of the multitude, though blind, ignorant and seduced: in like manner, the parts of the Bodies of Brutes must act by their motions, though they be in rage and madness. And the reason of this necessity is, that the Body and the Soul, which is the form thereof, are but one indivisible Whole; so a King and Subjects are together but one whole, that is, one State.

In fine, the *French* Monarchy is accompanied with all the mixture that can be desired for a compleat and perfect Government. The Counsellors of State do compose an excellent Oligarchy in it; The Parliaments, and other Officers of Judicature do form an Aristocracy; The Provosts of Merchants, the Mayors, the Consuls, and the General Estates do represent rarely well limited

limited Democracy; so that all the different modes of governing by Laws, being united in the Monarchy, do render it as excellent and consummate, as Reason can propose. The Regality of *France* is therefore of the Oeconomick kind; in which the King hath an absolute power in his State, as the Father of a Family in his House; and though he govern at His pleasure, and without contradiction, it is always for the good of His Kingdom; even as the Master of an House does Rule it with an entire Authority, and incessantly provides for the accommodating of this Family. There is nothing Despotical nor Barbarous in *France*, as in the States of the *Moscovites* and *Turks*. In short, our Laws are Holy and Equitable, to a greater degree than in any Common-wealth that ever was; and they are conceived with so much prudence and judgement, that they are apt to make the People happy in the gentle times of Peace, and enable them to triumph in the occasions of War.

The Situation and Compactness of *France* are known to all the World; so that it would be a needless labour, should I here expatiate, to shew the Beauty and Richness of our Grounds and of our Rivers: or declare how we abound in Wine, in Corn, in Silk, in Wools, in Cloth, in Wood, in Cattle, in Salt, in Mines, and in Money; how necessary we are to our neighbours, and to what degree we may forego their Succors and their Merchandise. I might
B 3 justly

justly be accus'd of a fondness for superfluous Discourse, if I should particularly consider all these great advantages; and as much, if I should speak of the pureness of the Air, and the incredible number of Inhabitants: the most ignorant having a full and an assured knowledge of 'em. I shall only say, that it need not be wondred at, if Men whom Fortune brings forth, and breeds up in so excellent a Climate, be capable of handsomely contriving, and successfully executing the haughtiest Enterprizes. In fine, its an unspeakable satisfaction to a Man that sets himself to Treat of the Politicks of *France*, that he may know the *French*, of all the People upon Earth, are the most susceptible of Learning, of Policy, and of Government. For if one consider the Situation of the Country, he may be assured, that the Constellations of Heaven are eminently favourable to it. The Experience and Skill of the Ancients do inform us, that the Situation of Regions is the prime cause of the temperature of the Men in 'em; as it is of the quality of the Plants and Fruits which they produce.

The Laws of this State being so Judicious as they are, do argue the Wisdom of those that enacted them, and of the People that accepted them; whereof the long duration of the Monarchy is a second proof.

On the other hand, the great Acts of the *French* do speak their Valour. They serve in our Age, for examples to all Nations in
matter

matter of execution; and not only so, but are as eminent likewise for their Counsels: And they have choice of the best Generals on Earth to lead Armies, as well as of the best Soldiers. That heat and impetuosity which is taken to be visible in all their attempts, is an effect of their high Courage; and the confidence they shew, with somewhat less of restraint and respect than prudence could wish, can be imputed to nothing but their fearlessness: In fine, the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth, declared with very much judgment, *That the French seem'd to be Fools, but were really wise.*

Now, since we know what *France* is, let us examine what may most conduce to the well-governing of it, to the conserving it in Plenty, and in Reputation; in what it may be augmented, and how its interests with the neighboring States ought to be secured. In a word, let us see what way may be taken to maintain the parts that compose it, in so regular an harmony, that they may all incessantly contribute to the weal of the Monarchy.

C H A P. IV.

1. *Of the Clergy.* 2. *Useful means to obstruct Frauds in Beneficiary cases.*
3. *Of the Monastick Religions of each Seu.*

OUR Ancestors have ever been great observers of Religion. Long before the coming of JESUS CHRIST, the *Druids* were their Priests, and had an entire direction, not only of affairs relating to the service of their false Gods, but of those too which concern'd distributive Justice; even in the general Assemblies held by all the *Gauls*, whether for confirmation of Peace, or for reconciliation of disagreeing parties, who might embroil the Republicques, or whether the making of some common National enterprises was in question, still there was no resolution formed, but by their advice. No wonder then, if since the Truth of the Gospel appeared, and made known the holiness of Christianity, the Prelates have conserv'd so many Prerogatives and Considerations. They have been called to the Royal Counsels; they have assisted at the decision of the most important affairs, they have every where held the first rank; much hath been attributed to their Judgments, and the respect had for their Character and
Dignity

Dignity, hath gotten them great and signal priviledges, which have exempted them from contributing to the burthens of the State; though at the same time wealth was heap'd upon them by Alms and Foundations. But as Church-men, after the mode of the Court of *Rome*, use to convert whatever is freely granted them into a point of Religion; in such manner, that by little and little, they engage the tender Consciences of the faithful in vain scruples, and possesses them with a superstitious fear of offending; they have not been wanting to assert and maintain, that these exemptions and privileges were not liberally given them; that Kings did but settle them in possession of an advantage which was by Divine Right inseperable from their Profession: that they, while Men of War fought for the Glory and Liberty of their Country, sufficiently did their part, in lifting up, as as was anciently done, their eyes and hands to G O D, to impetrate His powerful Protection: that their Arms were Prayers, Oblations, and Penitence, which they never forbore to use for the publick safety; that from the Caves and Deserts whither they retired, they sent up Meterials to the highest Heavens, which formed into Thunder there, might fall back upon, and beat down the enemies of the *French* name. In fine, That if Gentlemen gave their blood, and the People their sweat and labours for the welfare of the Kingdom, they Day and Night did pour out Tears at the feet of Altars

to

to disarm the wrath of GOD. Upon such reasonings as these the Ecclesiasticks have founded their pretences for possessing those goods, of which, publick and private Piety had made them Proprietors, without concerning themselves for what success the general affairs of the State might have.

But this is not all, they have tried by divers reiterated attempts, to make themselves Masters of all the Temporal Jurisdiction, and draw Civil causes unto their Tribunal: nor have they forgotten any pretext which they thought might promote this dangerous enterprise; sometimes they have pleaded, That the Church alone having right to judge of the Validity of Marriages, as being a Sacrament, all that depended on 'em ought to be handled before Ecclesiastick Judges. Sometimes again, That Christians binding themselves in their Contracts by an Oath, the cognisance appertain'd to them. Such Kings as perceived that these attempts did tend to the overthrow of their Authority, withstood them with a right Kingly vigour. But what difficulties were there not of necessity to be overcome for a full attainment of their end? and what resistance did not the Church-men make to maintain themselves in so unreasonable an usurpation? Our History affords us examples of it, which I cannot call to mind without grief and wonder. Their obstinacy hath gone so very far, that they have forced our Kings to grant them Declarations upon unequitable and
disad-

disadvantageous conditions ; and so capitulate with them both for the Tenths and Acknowledgments of the Lands which they possess ; as also for the Rights of Mortmain and Indemnity. I cannot tell by what name I should call these proceedings. Our Sirs of the Clergy could not doubt, but that being born Subjects of the Crown, nothing could release them of this duty ; and that the privileges which they have, or rather which they have invaded, being founded upon the holiness of their Character, could not extend to these Temporal Goods, which always are the States. Yet the old error is so potent, and their imagination so strongly prepossess'd for these Immunities, that they can scarce acknowledge the Kings Sovereignty to this day. What clamour did they not raise about the Arrest of the last Commission of Oyer in *Auvergne*? With what fervour did they charge their Deputies to remonstrate to His Majesty concerning it? Yet this Arrest innovateth nothing ; but is, in all respects, conform to the prescript, and pursuant to the use of *Charles* the VIII. his Pragmatic Sanction, Kings and Emperors, never practis'd otherwise in such cases. Nor can it be deny'd, but that Religion coming, among others, under a Political consideration ; and Kings being Protectors of the Church, of its Doctrine, and of its Canons, it's a part of their Office to notify to men the Laws of GOD. The Tables were
consigned

consigned to the hands of *Moses*, not to the hands of *Aaron*; and in the Temple of GOD, the Law of GOD was often heard by the People, from the Mouth of their Kings. 'Tis upon this account that *Melchisedec* was both King and Priest; and 'tis from this intention that the Emperors confirmed the first Synods, that They sometimes gave judgments contrary to Sydonical decisions; and that other Christian Princes have had liberty to receive, or not receive Councils, though Legitimate and Universal, Nothing is more consentaneous to perfect equity, than that the Gentlemen of the Clergy be obliged to contribute to the publick charges: They receive vast sums from the State; and what they pay to the King out of 'em, amouts not to a sixth part of what they duly ought to pay.

But to reduce them gently to reason, approaches must be made by degrees; and in ways that may be to them unperceivable. First, they may be calmly told of the right of Mortmain, which being part of the ancient inheritance of the Crown cannot be alienated. They may ever and anon be put in mind, that Residence is of Divine Right; that it is unbecoming a Prelate, or an Ecclesiastick, to keep a great Table, to have a multitude of Pages, Horses, Dogs; intimation may be made them, that the King intends to restore the ancient Law of Fiefs; by which all sorts of persons concerned, are obliged to set forth, at any time,

a certain number of Soldiers, equipped and paid at their charge. In fine, they may be required to make a new valuation of ordinary Rents. For what pretext will they have to complain, or be discontented? Can they find any fault at all in it if His Majesty doth put things in their Primitive State; which is the foundation of all publick Order and Discipline? Other insinulative means may be set on work, which shall make no shew at first, yet may prove in the sequel, of incredible advantage to the King's Affairs.

While I speak here of the Clergy, I pretend not to speak of any but Bishops, Canons, Parish-Priests, and Chappellans. I know well, that taking the word *Clerus* in its ancient latitude, it may be said to comprehend all Christians: but I extend it not so much as to Monasticks, who in truth were, at their rise, so far from having particular and conventual Churches, as now they have, that they were reckoned Laicks, that is, of the People, and had their places separate from the Priests.

Whatever care Kings hitherto could possibly take to hinder frauds in Beneficiary matters, they have not been able to find means effectual for it: Their prudence hath been still surmounted by the pravity of men, which never wanten artifice and expedients in occasions that concern their profit. However, these frauds are of such a quality, and so important, in reference to the salvation
of

of all Christians, that the charitable sagacity of the Laws ought to be indefatigably exercised about them: neither Pains nor Authority should be spared, in a design whose accomplishment is so necessary. And indeed, what mischief doth not follow; for example, when a wicked man, by intrusion, gets possession of some Benefice with Cure of Souls, all his Sacerdotal Functions are so many Sacrileges; (for he is a suspended person, *ipso facto*) all the Absolutions he gives are null; the Fruits of the Benefice cannot be his, because he is not the lawful Guardian of it; and so his appropriating them to his use, is a continued Larceny; for which he is indispensibly bound to make restitution. But be it a Bishop that commits this act of intrusion; and all the Consecrations of Priests which he shall solemnize are null, whence will result a nullity of all the Absolutions those pretended Priests shall give. What a concatenation of Crimes? what a dreadful series of Evils, Simonies, Confidences, and other bad means which are used to finger Benefices, do tend to the same Consequences. Sure, the cure of this Malady, Mortal to so many thousands of Souls, is an atchievement worthy of a King.

I am of Opinion then, that to cut up the root of all these disorders, the King might create a Secretary in his Council of Conscience; and when this Officer is in possession of his charge, a Declaration of His Majesties should come forth; by which, to obviate

viate the great abuses that have crept into Beneficiary matters, it should be ordained that all the Benefices in the Kingdom be Registered by the said Secretary of that Council, and no dispatch there made until the Deeds, upon which a Benefice is claimed, have been seen and signed, and placed in the Register by the same Secretary, upon pain of the nullity of all that may have been petition'd for, and granted; Cognizance of all causes arising in consequence of this Declaration, must be given to the Grand Council, and this addition of Jurisdiction would facilitate the verification of it.

This Declaration would produce several advantages. One is, that there could be no more fraud used, in order to demissions, or to resignations; and the Bankers of the Court of *Rome* would no longer have means to promote the cheats of pretenders to Benefices. Another is, that the King would exactly know all that the Church does possess in *France*; which is a matter of extreme necessity, both for the regulating of the Tenth, and also for other considerations. A third advantage would be, that in process of time this Secretary of Conscience might make a Bank in the *Roman* Court, which is, to the King, of unspeakable consequence: for by this means, all the Money that goes into *Italy* out of *France* would be known; and upon such knowledge it would be more easie for him to take his measures with the Pope and Colledge of Cardinals. A fourth advantage

advantage is, that the King, by degrees, might become Master of all the Benefices of the Kingdom, in the same manner as the Pope is Master of the Bishopricks and Abbies; which would augment the Royal Authority. That I may explain my self, I will resume the thing from its original. In the first Age of Christianity, the first Bishopricks were conferred without any Bulls from the Pope at all. Afterward He bethought Him, to send or write unto the Chapters, who then chose the Bishops, and recommended to them, to respect the merit of such or such a one, when they should proceed to the Election. I think that *Alexander* the III. was the first Inventer of these kind of Letters; and they were called Bulls; because they were seal'd up with the Pope's Seal, (*Bulla* being Latin for a Seal.) At the beginning, these Letters which the Pope thus sent, were but simple Letters of favour and recommendation: but it happening that the Chapters revered them, and that here and there, at least, one, who had obtained them, was chosen; all pretenders to Bishopricks came to believe, that it was necessary to obtain them. Thus, what was at first but, as hath been said, a recommendation, became at length a point of right and duty. Such was its Rise. Now this being certain, there may be use made of the example: and thus, when a considerable Benefice should be vacant, the King might order, that a Letter be written to the Patron,

Patron, and some Person recommended to his Nomination. There is no cause to doubt, but the Patron will Nominate whom His Majesty hath thus recommended; so that insensibly it will grow a Custom, to take the King's recommendations, as other-while persons did those of the Popes; and as the Bulls became at length necessary for Bishopricks and Abbies, so the King's Letters shall become necessary for all sorts of Benefices, and He render Himself Master of all Church-men. The King, in this, will have sufficient reason, because He being Protector of Religion, which is the prime Pillar of every State, it is His interest to know whether they that shall be provided of Benefices, be Orthodox, and of good Life; lest they spread some bad Doctrine among the people; for Heresies and Scandals do cause division in the Common-wealth, as well as Schisms in the Church. Besides, it concerns the tranquillity of the State, that Curates, who have the direction of Consciences, be well-inclin'd for the good of the Kingdom, and ready to keep particulr Persons in their duty.

To descend now unto the case of the Monastick Religious, and find out a way (for rendring them useful to the State) to take them off from that laziness and loathsom beggery in which they live, as also reduce them to such a number as may be proportionate to other ranks of men in the Kingdom. It is to be noted, that there are three

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sorts

sorts of Monasticks. The first is made up of the Orders of *S. Augustin*, *S. Benedict*, *S. Bernard*, and *Premonstrey*. These are they that possess the bulkie riches of the Church; I mean the Abbies and Priories. The second sort comprehends the *Carthusians*, the *Minimes*, the *Celestins*, the *Feuillans*, and some others, who possess Goods with propriety, and beg not but by Toleration. The third kind is that of the meer *Mendicants*, who subsist by Alms, as do the *Jacobins*, the *Cordeliers*, the *Carmelites*, and their branches, that is, the Reform'd, as they term 'em, who are issued from them. These, notwithstanding their Vow of Monastick Poverty, yet are not destitute of some foundations: but they plead for themselves, that the Pope is Proprietor of the Goods, they do but take the Profits; which certainly is a vain and frivolous subtilty. The Female Religious being comprised under these three kinds, there is no need to make of them a separate Article.

There are too to many Monks. Its an abuse so prejudicial to the Kingdom, that the King can no longer dissemble it: it is time to take it seriously and effectually in hand. For Monks live in single state, they raise no Families, get no Children, and so are barren grounds that bring forth no fruit to the Crown. Beside, the blind obedience by which they are tyed to the pleasure of the Pope, doth form a foreign Monarchy in the very bowels of *France*; and into it they

they train along the credulous people, which is a thing of very great consequence. This Politie is founded on the abusive and pernicious Maxims of *Rome*; which too are purely Political. For, that the obedience which Monasticks give the Pope, is Religious, there is no colour to pretend: nor is there a Christian but sees what his duty binds him to in this case; and is altogether subject to his Holiness in Doctrinals, without need of making particular vows to oblige him. The name of Religion in the matter, is but a phantasm, and a false pretext which the Court of *Rome* assumeth, to augment its Temporal Power, and to have its creatures in all quarters. By consequence the abuses ought to be retrenched, as was done by *Charlemagne* in his time, and sundry other great Kings.

But for the effecting of this I should not at all advise, that the attempt be openly made. For that would be to draw upon the undertakers, the importune clamours of all the Monks, and their Zealots; nay, to draw *Rome* upon their backs, which might cost them some trouble. In fine, it would be to draw on them the People; who are ever fond of Novelties that surprise them, or are prejudicial to them, and always averse to those which they have foreseen, and are profitable for them. 'Tis therefore by-ways that must be taken. The first which seems to me fit to be pitcht upon, would be, to require of the Monastick Communities, that

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they

they dispatch Missions unto *America*, and the *Indies*, to convert the Salvages, and administer the Holy Sacraments to Christians. The Monks, who are commonly imprudent, will strain to set forth the greatest number of their fraternity they possibly may, in hope to make considerable Establishments; thus there will be forwardness enough to embarque. The present juncture is advantageous for this design. For they are charged with more Persons than they are able to maintain; Charity being evidently cooled toward them. A second means may be, to debar them the conversation of Women. It is scandalous to see Religious Men receive visits from them in Churches; and there, in presence of the Holy Sacrament, spend whole Afternoons with them. For remedy it might be ordained, that they should have Parlours, where Women might go to consult them. The thing is a point of decency; and Parlours, the *Carthusian* Friars, and all Nuns, generally have. The third means might be, that the Fathers of such as enter into Religion, should pay an Annual Pension to the Order, by way of Alms, during their Sons life; which is the practice in *Spain*. This Pension, some will say, causeth in *Spain* an huge multiplication of Monks. But 'tis not the Pension that fills the Cloisters in that Country; 'tis the licence the Monks have to do what they please. In *France* they are not upon such Terms. A fourth means, is to oblige

oblige the Monasticks to abide in their Convents, and not go abroad but very rarely, and for urgent affairs : so do the *Carthusians*. A fifth, to embroil the Monks with the Bishops ; for which they are sufficiently disposed. A sixth, to prohibit that Children of Sixteen (when as yet they know not what they do) bind not themselves by Vows, which engage them for the whole remainder of their lives : but remit that Ceremony till their 22^d. year of Age. The seventh means would be to suppress that Congregation, as they call it, among Monastick persons, (as for instance, there are the Congregations of *S. Maur*,) and command, that the Religious who make profession in an house, do there fix ; not courting from Lower *Britannie*, for example, unto *Paris* ; nor incessantly changing, as their wont is, unless some indispensable necessity does oblige to such changes. The *Carthusians* keep in their houses, and run not from place to place : Nuns do the same. The Voyages of Monks, and all their transmigrations, have no other end, but to get an universal acquaintance. Beyond all this, it may be declared to the Monks, (at least its a thing that should be done in its season) how that the King understands not their Monastick Profession does Exempt them from his Jurisdiction. Thus the Orders being purged from their impurities, will resume their ancient lustre, and be true Seminaries of Doctrine and Sanctity. In fine,

no person will doubt, but the King may take cognisance of all that concerns the external Policy of the Church ; because this is in such sort annexed to the Government of States, that not a Patriarch, nor even the Pope himself, can make any regulation of it without His Majesties consent.

That reason of State which presseth for a retrenching of the number of Monks, does also reflect upon Nuns ; and that with the more Justice, because the greatest part of young Women, who become Votaries, are driven thereunto by the violence of their kindred. There will never want just means to hinder this abuse from having a longer course. As for instance, Young Women may be declared incapable of making Vows before 22 years of age at the least. It may be enacted, that they never shall be Professed, [*i. e.* settled of the Order] in the Convent where they have had their Education, either as Pensionaries or Novices. This would be well enacted. For oft-times the Nuns, in hope to be gainers by their Portions, do flatter the silly Maidens, and persuade 'em to live with them. All kind of humane inducements must be remov'd, and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost, left to their full operation. It may again be ordained, that Recluses do take no Money, as a Portion, but only simple Pensions yearly for life, and those likewise cautiously limited. A Law too may be made, that the Goods which might fall to a Daughter from
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her Parents, and her collateral Kindred, should at their Decease, fall to the State, and the King by representation, be invested with the same Right to the Goods of the deceased as this Daughter had had, to recompence the Publick for the loss sustained by a Recluse, being incapacitated to raise a Family. Further, a general Regulation might be made of all Marriages of young Women, with due respect had to the quality of each of 'em in particular; and it might be ordered, that in case any of them would take up a Religious life, they should carry as much with them into Religion, as into the Married state. For if the Order was, that Daughters becoming Votaries, should have less Portions than those that Married, Fathers, so hugely covetous they are, would compell them to the Cloister. But when they shall find no profit in taking this course, they will rather chuse to dispose of them in Marriage, and make Alliances by that means.

This subject inclines me to say summarily, that the moderating of Portions is a piece of the ancient Civil Law of the *French*, and of divers other Nations, in which Daughters had nothing at all. Thence it is, as we see in the Customs, that a Nobleman is licensed to Marry his Daughter with a Nose-gay of Roses, and she becomes disabled to pretend to any other Portion, provided the Match be suitable and fitting. This moderation is necessary: Forasmuch, as the vast wealth which is given to Daughters in Marriage,

does incommode the richest Houses. Moreover, Gentlemen themselves would no more contract undue Alliances; and so the Nobility recover their ancient esteem. Young Womens Birth, their Beauty, their Discretion, their Virtue, and their Ability in the management of Domestick Affairs, would be to them instead of Wealth. They would make it their care to lay up a rich Stock of so many precious things, that perhaps it may one day come to pass, that Men will, as heretofore they did, give Money to have Wives; whereas at present, Women do so to purchase Husbands. I have spoken here of Marriages occasionally; I am well aware, that the Matter ought to be reserved for another Chapter. To conclude, its a great ingredient of the Glory of a King, to honour the Holy See; to love and protect the Bishops, to maintain the *Gallican* Church in its Liberties; never suffer that any propositions be advanced any way, that may wound the Authority of the Canons; and employ all the rigor of his Ordinances against persons, who shall have the rashness to publish a suspected or erroneous Doctrine.

Additions

Additions to CHAP. IV.

1. That Bishops ought to be near the King.
2. Of the Pension to be paid the Order for a Monk enter'd.
3. Monasticks cannot Alienate; therefore neither sell a Rent-charge.
4. They shall not have power to purchase.

I Have affirmed Chap. 4. That Bishops are obliged by Command of GOD, unto residence. This is true: yet forasmuch as they are also the Kings Subjects, and Royal Dignity requireth, that his Majesty have Bishops about him, as the *Roman* Emperors after *Constantine* had; it is fit to ordain, That each Bishop be at Court Three Months every year, attending His Majesty, to Honour Him; during which time they may negotiate their Affairs; and the rest of the year abide fix'd in their Diocesses; the King assigning to each of them the Months in which their presence will be needful.

In the same Chapter, I have said, That to prevent the vast number of Monks it should be ordained, that the Parents of such as enter into an Order, should pay
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an annual Pension to that Order during the persons Lives. The effect of this Law would be, that such a Pension being a Monachal Right in form of Clericature given by Act of State; they that would have Revenue enough to be Monasticks, would have enough to be Secular Priests. And so persons, whose Devotion should incline them to take Orders, and Consecrate themselves unto GOD, would rather chuse to remain Seculars, than shut themselves up in a Cloister all the remainder of their Lives. Now the more to fortifie this Law, it should be added, That Bishops make no more Priests upon the Title of Poverty, upon Penalty of maintaining them; The reason against it, as to Secular Priests, being as strong in reference to Regulars; because it is no less a disparagement to the Clergy, that a Priest Monk do beg, and fall into extream poverty, (which may happen) than that one of the other rank do so.

It is manifest, that Monastick communities have no power to Alienate any thing; and that Monks do daily re-enter into their Estates, which they possessed heretofore. Hence it follows, that neither can they charge them with any Rents for Money taken up: Forasmuch as by these kind of Contracts, they Mortgage their Lands: but to engage an Estate in such a manner, is to make a kind of Alienation.

'Tis a fetch of the Benedictine Monks to take up Money for Rent to be paid by them;

them; that so they may appear always poor, and have pretexts to sollicit the liberality of devout People: also that they may have Protectors, for the greater number of their Creditors is, the greater is the number of persons interested in their conservation.

Yet there is nothing more unjust than this Custom: For there are Monastick Communities that owe more than all their Goods, moveable and immoveable are worth. The Monks care not though their House be ruin'd, nor though they ruine some of their Creditors, provided themselves subsist. For by passing from one Convent to another, they are quitted of all the Debts they have created.

It greatly concerns the Publick to Prohibit these kind of Contracts, that Monasticks may be kept from defrauding any Man for the future; and to decree, that the Contractor shall pay the Rents Contracted for, and they bound to do it, both all in common, and each of them in particular: then, that the Notaries be Fined and Declared incapable of bearing any Office: Or if insolvent, condemned to the Gallies for 101 years: Moreover, that the Purchasers of such Rents shall, for their part, pay a Mult of 3000 Livres to His Majesty, and the principal Money be converted to His use.

Besides, it would be very fit to require all Notaries, all Creditors of Monasticks and the Monasticks themselves to make Declaration of the Sums and Rents charged upon

upon them, bring in the Contracts for the same before Commissioners nominated by the King to be Registred, and this within a time expressly limited: which being once pass'd, no more shall be received; and all Contracts not Registred, remain null, and as if they were cleared. This course would be very severe, but excellent to reduce the folk of the Cloister to Reason.

There is an important Observation to be made too, namely, That all the Contracts which Church men have made, are utterly null, unless their Creditors can make it appear, that the Money they lent did turn to the profit of the Church, and that there was an authentick permission to make such Contracts. This Doctrine is a point of Law; for the Church is ever a Minor, and all that it possesseth hath come from the liberality of particular persons; without whose consent, or at least the Magistrates, and such as are capable of it, the Ecclesiasticks can make no alterations in the Estates they have received. So that the King may not only forbid Contracts for the future; but also Declare those to be dissolved, which have been made heretofore, and discharge the Monasteries of them. Debts have been annulled for less reasons often. It must likewise be prohibited to Monks, and to the Church, to purchase any Estate in Land, or High-rents, upon pain of such Contracts being null and void in Law; and the Sellers and Notaries incurring the fore-mentioned penalties.

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Our Lords the Prelates have lately be-
thought them, and resolved to compell
such Gentlemen as have Chappels in their
Houses, where the Sacrifice of the Mass
hath been at any time performed, to pro-
fane the said Chappels, or endow them
with Land for the maintenance of a Priest.
This would be a means to gain the Church
more than Two hundred thousand Livres
of Rent at one blow; wherefore it will be
fit to Ordain, that this enterprize of the Bi-
shops do not take effect; except in case of
Chapels built hereafter, and built for other
persons.

C H A P. V.

1. *Of the Hugonots; and whether
it be for the good of the State to put
them out of France.*
2. *Politick
means to extirpate their Heresie.*
3. *Of their ancient Confession of
Faith.*

A King cannot have a more Illustrious
Object of his Cares and Applicati-
on, than the preserving of that Religion
which he hath received from his Ancestors
in the States he governs: because diversity
of Belief of Divine Service, and of Cere-
mony, doth divide his Subjects, and breeds
Animosities

Animosities among them: Whence arise Contentions, War, and in the end an universal defiance. Unity of belief, on the contrary, knits Men together; and 'tis seldom seen, but that Fellow-subjects who call upon GOD in one and the same Temple, and offer at the same Altars, do also fight with the same Arms, or under the same Banners. If this Maxim be generally true in Christian Politicks, and the Religion we profess the only one, as it is, that we can savingly embrace, the Princes are obliged to maintain it with all their Might, and employ that Sovereign Power for the Glory of the true GOD, which they hold of his Goodness. The *Pagans*, whose particular conduct was so prudent and just, and who have left us so many Examples of wisdom and virtue, made it their principle, not to suffer in their Republicks any novelty that thwarted the common and popular belief; and they adher'd so peremptorily unto it, that they would not so much as permit any man to undeceive them of their Errors. The Books of *Numa Pompilius*, which had been found near his Grave, and contained the ancient Religion of *Rome*, the Senate caused to be burnt; because the Prætor *Rutilius*, who had been commission'd to read them, affirmed upon Oath, That the Contents of e'm tended to subvert the Religion which the People observed at that time. They refus'd, even to open their eyes unto the light of truth, though known

to them, when they apprehended it would be novel to the people. They rather chose to stick to Fables, which length of years had consecrated among them, and the multitude was through custom addicted to. Thus too the *Athenians* thought they did an act of necessary Justice in condemning *Socrates* to death, for having taken on him to persuade the people that there was but one only GOD. They knew however, that in truth this Philosopher was the Wonder of his time, the Honour of the City, and of all *Greece*: the discerning men amongst them were convinc'd of the solidity of this Doctrine, and the Sect of the *Stoicks* made profession of it; so that it must be confess'd, the fall of *Gentilism*, and subversion of Idols, is an effect of the hand of GOD, who alone can work miracles of Grace and Omnipotence.

The Kings, His Majesties Predecessors, have set themselves with unwearied diligence to preserve the Catholick Religion inviolable: They have never failed to be Protectors of the Apostolick See, and the Church. They expelled the *Arrians*; they turned their Arms, and exposed their lives against the *Albigenses*; they vanquish'd e'm; they destroy'd e'm; they punish'd the Poor men of *Lions*: In fine, they have provided that Christianity receive no harm in any places unto which their Authority extended. The last Age produced a new Monster to oppose the Church. *France* saw him born in her bo-
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fom, and unhappily bred him up, with feveral complices of his Impiety and Revolt. History will tell Posterity how much Blood was shed during the course of well nigh Fourscore years to quell this dangerous Sect: and the world well know, that the Zeal there was to reduce Hereticks to their duty, did take up the Reigns of Six of our Kings; the glory of cutting off the last head of this *Hydra*, being reserved for his present Majesty. But it is expedient to see what weapons must be used for an execution so long expected.

There is no cause to doubt, but that upon the Principles of Christianity, and Maxims of Policy, its necessary to reduce all the Kings Subjects to one and the same Belief: And though they that make Profession of the pretended Reformed Religion, be now without Arms, without Strong-holds, without Treasure, without an Head, and without Allies; yet they are not out of case to be feared. They still retain a remembrance of their boldness, and by-pass'd Rebellions: they look back on the Towns they once seized, and out of which they could not be driven but by force of Arms, as if they were their proper Inheritance, and had been unjustly pluck'd out of their hands; they bear in their hearts the same aversion for Order and Discipline, that they ever had; and their minds are always inclining to revolt, and to Confusion and Anarchy. It disquiets them not to think who shall
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head them ; they have Soldiers of their own number, whom they can advance to be Captains by giving them Authority to command e'm. They persuade themselves, that if they were in Arms, they should want neither Money nor Friends. They believe, that the Glory of the King attracts as much Envy on him as Admiration ; and that his Virtue raiseth in his Neighbours no less Anger than Terror. In short, there is ground to think, that he will have more than an Hundred Thousand Men of his Enemies in the heart of his State, while there are *Huguenots* in *France* ; they too, perhaps, do but wait an occasion to make their Musters. Thus they are perpetual Obstacles to the Designs that might be formed ; and though weak, may notwithstanding be dreaded. 'Tis true, the honest men of their Communion do well know, that they cannot be in a calmer repose than they now enjoy by the Grace of the King, and under the security of his Edicts ; but in these matters the multitude carries it. These are a Torrent, that by its Rapidity, overturns Rocks which seems unmoveable.

It will be said, that the good treatment which the *Huguenots* receive, doth preserve the friendship of the *German* Princes for *France* ; and if favourable Justice should be no longer done them, the King would lose the most potent and most considerable of his Allies. This discourse is but a sound, and void of all substance of reason : for, beside that the Princes of *Germany* are not of the Religion of our Hereticks ; They need not the Kings Protection for maintaining the *Hu-*

Huguenots in their pretended liberty of Conscience; but the *French* Arms securing them against the power of *Austria*, and principally of the Emperor, who hath divers pretensions upon them; they cannot recede from the Alliance they have made with his Majesty; nor will they do it, though the last man of the *Huguenots* was brought to the Scaffold: nay, forasmuch as the Kings Forces are so useful to all those Protestants, it will would be their interest not at all to Arm themselves for the *Huguenots* preservation, but far otherwise, even to promote their expulsion out of *France*: and the reason is, because if this party were in a condition to raise stirs, the King would have his hands full of work to repress them: and so his Forces being dissipated, the Emperor might take his time to enlarge his Domination: the thing that *Charles* the Fifth did, when *Francis* the First was not in a possibility to succour the Princes. It being therefore certain, that the Liberty of *Germany* hath its support and prop in the Arms of the King; they are not solicitous there for the affairs of the *Huguenots* in *France*: and since the Protestants of the Empire are knit to his Majesty by other engagements than those of Religion, they will continue the same Department; and his Majesty on his part, will always have the same reasons to succour them, though the time should come that he should have no more *Huguenots* in his Kingdom. No succour neither may they hope for from *England*; that's a State too weak to make any trial of strength against *France*: all the *English* there are must pass the

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Sea ; and the Isle be disfurish'd of Soldiers and Provisions ; yet this all would be nothing to purpose : mean time their affairs would lie expos'd to the Levity and Lunacy of the people. *Holland* and *Swedeland* are of like consideration ; and they both have other Interests to Negotiate with the King, than those of the *Huguenots*. *Denmark* is defective in power. The *Calvinists* mount unto a strain of Policy above ordinary, when they would have us believe, That whatever is not of the *Roman* Communion is of the Opinion of *Charpentan* : the *Lutherans* of *Germany*, notwithstanding, sympathize with them less than with us. Thus the King hath nothing to be afraid of from the pretended Allies of the *Huguenots*. Yet these men, as I have already said, are to be feared ; and they would be seen stoutly to bestir themselves, if some extraordinary Commotion should happen in *France*, as a Civil War, or some great Invasion by Foreign Enemies ; in such a Juncture they would do as they did in the War of *Paris* : they took up Arms, and respectively protested they were for the Kings Service ; but if the Peace had not been soon made, they would not have forbore to think themselves necessary ; and to make all the Propositions that they could imagine advantageous to their party. They would have re-demanded their places of Security ; they would have press'd for a restoring of their Temples, for an augmentation of their pretended Priviledges, and for a free exercise of their Religion : and, according to their good old custom, have uttered Complaints

and Menaces. But if by ill chance a Victorious Army of Strangers, whether Catholicks or Religionaries, should enter the Kingdom, the King must resolve to see the Hereticks declare against him, or else content them in all their pretensions, which would prove an engaging of his State in like Calamities, as our Fathers in their time saw.

It ought to be ordained, that they shall exactly follow their ancient Confession of Faith which was permitted them in *France*; and that such as vary from it, shall be no longer reckon'd in the number of those of the Protestant Reformed Religion, who have Liberty of Conscience given them.

These *Huguenots* have no ground at all to plead the Edict of *Nantes* so loudly and bravely as they do: they extorted it by violence, and with Sword in hand: yet was it but an *Interim*, an Order taken, until they should inform themselves of the truth; which they have had time enough to do. But did they not violate it themselves by the War of *Languedock*, that other of *Sevennes*; and again by that of *Rochelle*? nay, they call'd the Enemies of the State unto their Succour, and took a course to bring Fire and Sword into all parts of the Kingdom. Shortly, in matter of Government, that which is good at one time, is frequently not so at another; all things must be accommodated to the general rule of Policy, which is, that the good of States be incessantly procured. When the Edict of Pacification was accorded, there was provision made for the welfare of *France*: if that welfare does

now require that the Edict be revoked, there is no remedy, revoked it must be, or neglected.

From all this which I have said it follows, that the King hath most just cause to secure himself from the Professors of the Protestant Reformed Religion, and put them into such a state, as he may have nothing to apprehend from their particular. Perhaps it will be said, that 'tis expedient there be *Huguenots* in *France*, because they oblige the Church-men to study, and to live with the greater circumspection, and a more exact observance of the rules of their Profession. But this consideration is not worth the considering. The Church of GOD will never be supported by these humane means. He is in the midst of it, and governs it Himself by His Holy Spirit, which animateth and filleth it. At whatever time there shall be no more *Huguenots* in *France*, there will be fewer bad, and a greater number of good men; which the King should particularly desire; since States are always sustained by people that love Virtue, &c. It passeth therefore for certain, that it is fit the King do disable the Religionaries, as to their doing any harm, and as to their giving cause of suspicion.

It remaineth to examine what way may most readily and most commodiously lead unto this end. I would not advise that these People of the other Religion should be compell'd to depart out of *France*, as the *Moors* were out of *Spain*; which proved in the sequel, so prejudicial to the whole Country. 'Twould be a piece of inhumanity to drive the *Huguenots* in

that manner : they are Christians, though separated from the Body of the Church : besides, this course would deprive the State of not a few good Families, and put the unhappy numbers of e'm out of all hope of Conversion and Salvation : so that the King, in this concern, should do well as seems to me, to imitate the Church, the common parent of all Christians ; who, in the Remedies She prepareth, ever mingleth mildness and Mercy, with Justice, and Compassion with Correction.

The first means then which the King might employ, should be to provide, that the *Huguenots* might frequent the conversation of the Catholics with more familiarity than they do. For by this conversation they would, in time, be undeceiv'd of the Opinion with which they are pre-possess'd, that we hate them ; they would put off the Aversion they have for us ; they would know our Deportment ; and be informed of our Doctrine in the points that offend them ; because they understand not the Mysteries of them ; which would induce them to confess, as St. *Augustin* did on the like occasion, That the Church does not teach things as they once thought it did. Nothing is to my Understanding, or can be, more effectual for the Conversion of the Hereticks, than this frequent Conversation ; it is not possible, but that at length, the spirit of Men should yield unto impression ; the plumage of the Eagle, 'tis said, consumes that of other Birds ; Light dissipates Darkness, Truth triumphs over Falshood.

The second means should be, to confer a recom-

compence of Honour upon Converts; and to make a Stock for this purpose, which might never fail. I should think it would be none of the best course to exclude the *Huguenots* from all Employments; they must enter into lesser Offices, though not at all into the greater. The reason is, because if they be put off from all kind of publick business, they will accustom themselves to tarry at home idle, and their ambition will be extinguish'd in such sort, as perhaps they will make it a point of Religion to do nothing; whereas being taken to ordinary Offices, they will habituate themselves to a living among Catholicks, and their Ambition will awaken, when they shall compare themselves with their Superiours.

The third means I offer is, to select some particular Men, and create them such business referring to Religion, as may constrain them to attend the Council, and keep following the Court. Business of that kind may be started to Gentlemen, upon the Exercise they have in their Houses. There is not one of them but is obnoxious to a Process in that case; and the Bishops will, with joy, be the Prosecutors. Besides, the King's Procureur (or Attorney) General is concern'd to know, whether Marriages, Baptisms, and Burials, be solemniz'd with due accurateness in these private houses; and whether good and faithful Registers of them be kept or no: Great defects herein being easily supposeable, the same will be just matter of complaint against the Owners, as negligent in observing the concession made them, of having Exercise in their Castles. The like may

be done, if others, contrary to the Edict, be admitted to these *Preachings* beside the *Domesticks*.

A Fourth means would be, to oblige the Religionists to put again in due state the ancient Chappels of their Houses, which they have demolish'd or prophan'd; the pursuance whereof ought to be by the diligence of each Bishop in his *Diocess*. There must not be made a common affair of it to all the *Huguenots* in general, but divers particulars only be fix'd upon. And the thing it self is as reasonable as any. For they had no right to destroy Temples that had been all along destin'd to Divine Service, according to the Religion of the King, receiv'd by all the Kingdom, and also profess'd by our Progenitors.

The Fifth means is, that when an Affair of such quality as I mention'd, comes before the Council, the Deputies which the *Huguenots* have at Court in the name of them all, be not permitted to intervene in it. There are 3 Reasons for the putting by of these interventions: The First is, that the *Huguenots* cannot constitute a Body in *France*, nor assemble without the Kings express permission. The Second, that Private and Particular affairs ought not to be set up in the rank of those that are general and publick. The Third, that the King will do Justice without their intervention. The Deputation should not be all at once abrogated out-right; but no regard must be had to what the Deputies represent in the name of all the party.

The sixth means should be, that the King do
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take effectual order the *Huguenots* may no longer have their dwellings, nor their Exercise in places not Royal; at least such as have any Lords of the Protestant Reformed Religion for Proprietors. As for Example, *Vitrey* in *Bretagne*, belongs to *Monsieur* the Prince de Tarante, who is of that Religion; and it belongs to him by a Demise made him of it by *Monsieur de la Tremouille*. The *Huguenots* have there a Temple and a Religious Exercise: this Town they must exchange, and have another for it given them; reasons will not be wanting to colour such permutations: there is nothing that may contribute more to their Conversion. For it will be an incredible displeasure to them to live among people with whom they have no Acquaintance, nor any Union, either by Interest or Blood.

A Seventh means is, to suppress by natural death, all *Huguenot* Counsellors. The Chambers of the Edict are now of no more use.

The Eighth is, to give them for their Synods Catholick Commissaries; such as are somewhat vers'd in the Controversies, and have the skill to favour the Wranglings that are continually among them. These Commissaries were heretofore all of them Catholicks. Particular Synods, when Petition'd for, must not be deny'd them; but National ones should never be granted: and at the close of all their Synodal Assemblies, Money should be demanded of the Ministers for the King's Affairs, by way of Loan or of Tenths, or under some other pretexts.

The Ninth means is, to get them prosecuted for

for their common Debts, and so cause them to sell, by Decree, some of their Temples, which sure cannot be judged to be in Mortmain, or Un-alienable.

A Tenth is, to Prohibit that any Subject go out of the Kingdom without the King's Permission. For the *Huguenots* must not depart out of *France*; and they will be compris'd under a general Prohibition.

The Eleventh is, to take order the Confessors may intimate to the poorer sort of Catholicks, that it is a point of Conscience to serve *Huguenots*.

The Twelfth is, to oblige them on a Political account, unto an Abstinence from Flesh, upon those days which the Catholicks do so observe, in like manner as they are already obliged to heed the Festivals, out of respect to the Publick Religion: then hereupon, severely punish such as shall transgress in the one or the other of these two things.

The Thirteenth means is, to endeavour the Marrying of Catholicks to the *Huguenots*, and cause the Children issuing from such Marriages, to be Educated in the *Roman* Religion.

A Fourteenth may be, to hinder the *Huguenots* from selling any Estate they have in Land: for this kind of possession does tye them to the Interests of the State.

The Fifteenth and last, is, to change the place of that Academy which they have at *Saumur*, and fix it in some other Town, as *Vange*, or *Beaufort*. There is a President for such a change in the Translation of the like Academy from *Montauban* to *Puilaurens*. The pretext for

for drawing them out of *Saumur* is, that this Town being a Pass on the *Loire*, and maintaining the Communication of divers great Provinces, the King cannot be too well secured of it: beside, this planting an Academy at *Saumur*, is an Usurpation; the *Huguenots* having never had a Patent for it. It would signifie nothing, should the *Huguenots* alledge, that they have it for a place of security: For they are now as the King's other Subjects be, who do not at all demand any. What would come of it, if all Collective Bodies should demand places of Security? 'Tis a madness.

Further yet, it might be declared, That Proponents, who aspire to the Office of Ministers, should be obliged to teach a course of Philosophy, or two years in Theology. Thus there would be fewer Ministers than there are; and at length, their number being diminished, the number of *Huguenots* would infallibly diminish also. The King might likewise ordain, That the Proponents should be examin'd in presence of such Commissioners as he should please to appoint; to the end they might undergo a rigorous Trial. For His Majesty is concern'd, that these Ministers be perfectly well studied, lest they prove promoters of Sedition, and not Pastors. At the time of their Examination, the same Proponents should be oblig'd to answer all the Catholick Doctors in any controversial questions they should think fit to move. The *Huguenots* cannot refuse this Proposition; because their Proponents ought to be prepared in all matters: and since the *Huguenots* affirm, that their Ministers are their Bishops, there
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must no person be a Minister who hath not attained to the Age of Twenty seven years at least. These are summarily the humane means that seem to me most conducive to the Conversion of the Professors of the Protestant Reformed Religion.

C H A P. VI.

1. *What Nobility is.* 2. *Of the Nobles of France, of their Degrees, and the Ranks of Gentlemen.* 3. *Of the Orders of Knighthood.* 4. *In what respects Gentlemen may be useful to the King.*

HAVING examined what relates to the Clergy, the First of the Three Orders that compose the Body Politick of *France*; it is time to speak of the Second, which is that of the Nobility: Nobility is a Quality that renders the Possessors of it Generous, and secretly disposes their Soul unto an affection for Honourable things. The Virtue of Ancestors does make this excellent impression of Nobility upon persons; and there is in feminal matter, I know not what spirituous and energetical Principle, that transmitteth and propagateth the inclinations of Parents unto their descendants: as is obvious to remark; not only in Men, and in all the Animals, which have a natural Generation; but also in Plants, and in things evidently most inanimate. This Ancestral Virtue, verily, gives us the first tincture in order to a right Noble Accomplishment; and

and every Man issued from great and illustrious Personages, does continually feel a kind of elastick impulse in the secret recesses of his Heart, which thrusts him on to imitate them; and their Memory spurs him on to Glory, and brave Actions: but if through negligence, or the degeneracy of an ill nature, it so comes to pass, that he answers not the hope which the Grandeur of his Progenitors gave ground to conceive of his Deportment; in this case, all the Lustre of their Ancient Reputation which environ'd him from the instant of his Birth, and whether he will or no, accompany'd him all along the course of his life, it does, I say, by making him be noted, for (*Nobilitas a noscendo dicitur*) but promote his shame, and the more conspicuously shew his defects unto the augmenting and justifying a contempt of his Person. Thus an actual Virtue is necessary for Gentlemen, that they may be able to bear up the weight of their condition, which otherwise presseth them quite down. The greater the Rank and Honor of their House is, the greater their Dishonor; and so much the deeper that Precipice into which their dissoluteness doth cast them.

There are usually noted three kinds of Nobility. The First is a Nobleness of Blood: when the source of a great extraction is hidden in the obscurity of a long succession of years, and cannot now be discovered. This kind is in greatest esteem among Men: and indeed we call things that are left us of this quality, Venerable, and do bear a sort of Religious Respect to them: we are generally possess'd too with

a perswasion, that whatever is unknown, is full full of Mysteries; hence Objects of such a nature are apt to surprise us; and we here-upon are awed at them, and do admire them. Such effects, the greatness of an unsearchable high-descending Pedigree does produce. Nor need we much scruple to affirm, that this kind is the only proper and genuine Nobility; and that the Two others are only Nobilitations. What difference is made between a person Noble, and one Ennobled, is familiarly known. This first kind of Nobility is thought to require a possession of the Virtue of Ancestors; and withal, a possession of their wealth; this too in so essential a manner, that if each of them be not joyntly possess'd, the Nobility is extinct. We daily see proofs that evince the Justice and the Truth of this Notion. Be it intimated by the way, that the Virtue here mention'd is the Military Art.

The Second kind of Nobility, is that which takes its rise from Offices and eminent Employments, unto which the Laws have annexed this mark of Honour.

The Third is acquir'd by the Prince's Letters, which are called *Letters of Nobilitation*. It is a right peculiar to the King to give such Letters; as the *Roman Panegyrist* once said to the Emperor *Trajan*. It belongs not but to *Cæsar* to create a Nobility. It is for none but the King to Honour brave and valiant Subjects with this Quality. This Third and last kind is least considered: because the Person who acquires it, hath not the Virtue of Ancestors for a foundation and caution of his own. Yet it
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is sometimes more considerable than either of the two others; and *Marius* in *Salust* had great reason to tell the Gentlemen of *Rome*; that he had rather begin the Nobility of his Race, than faintly continue it, or unworthily lose it; and that it was more Glorious for him to transmit to his Posterity a sparkling Virtue, hard to be follow'd, than plod slowly on upon the slight, and almost effaced tracks of a common Virtue which his Ancestors had left him. In all these three kinds of Nobility, there must be the personal Virtue of the Person invested with 'em: for when all is done, it is but Virtue that confers effective worth.

No All Nations have had a particular esteem for Nobility, nor can any well-order'd Commonwealth be named, which hath not invented some singular mark of Honour to make it conspicuous. The *French* in this point, have surpass'd and out-done all People upon Earth; as for the first, Antiquity, *Cesar* observes, that the Nobles, that is, the Gentlemen, had among the *Gauls*, as much power over the *Plebsians*, as Masters at *Rome* had over their Slaves. After *Gaul* was reduced to the State of a Province, Nobility preserved its ancient Prerogatives; and the Emperors knowing, that the Nobles loved Glory, and sought it above all things, stiled them *Honorati*, and gave them an absolute precedency in all Assemblies of the *Gauls*. For the *Romans* had thought it necessary to weaken the Authority of the *Druids*. In the time of Christianity the same Order was continued; and the Nobility gave their Suffrage apart in the Election of Bishops, expressly before

fore the People; yea, even before the Clergy themselves. Upon the declining of the Empire, the Gentlemen did, in *France*, judge the Causes of their equals; and hence, without doubt, came into use the Parliaments, Courts and Assemblies, which our Kings held of their Peers and Barons; that is, of the qualify'd Gentlemen of their Kingdom, when a Case of some Peer or Grandee of the State was to be Tried. The Nobles were distinguish'd anciently from *Plébeians*, by their Hair, which they wore long, for a mark of their ancient Liberty; and when any one of them committed a fault that was unbeseeming his Birth, the rest Sentenc'd him to depart the Country, or cut off his Hair; This was therefore a no less punishment than Exile. In *Charlemagne's* time, the Gentlemen of *France* named themselves *Franks*, by way of Excellence. In fine, the *French* Nobility hath always had such an high degree of Excellency, and so great a pre-eminence, that it was preferr'd in all Cases; as when vacant Bishopricks or Abbies were to be provided for; or when the principal Magistracy and Seats of Judicature were to be fill'd up, or the Government of important Places, Warlike employment, and the Leading of Armies, were to be disposed of. To conclude this Matter, it may be affirm'd, that Kings did take the Gentlemen into a partnership with themselves, as I may term it, in the Regality; they honour'd them with part of their Power, by conferring on them Fiefs, and by entrusting them with the charge of doing Justice, and of Commissioning Officers to that end.

Hereupon

Hereupon it was necessary to put a gradual difference between Gentlemen themselves: nor is it indeed sufficient that they all have so many excellent Prerogatives above the vulgar, or common sort, as we call them. For Nature is alike in every Man, and all Men are Born equal. Fortune on the contrary, and Virtue, distinguish one from another. But natural Reason requires there be Order in all things. 'Tis Order that makes the Beauty and Symmetry of the Universe. Now as a Musical Consort doth not make a perfect harmony, but by a diversity of Notes; so a Political State can be neither comely nor compleat, unless there be a difference between the parts that compose it. I know that Nobility, being as Philosophers call it, an Inherent Quality, does lodge with its whole Essence, in each of its Subjects: As the quality of a Soldier is, for its Essence, in the person of a Corporal, as well as of a Captain or General Officer. Yet there is a great distance, and many intervening degrees, between a General and the meanest Musquetier in an Army. Thus the meanest Gentleman in the Kingdom is Noble; and to speak after the common Proverb, is Noble as well as the King; but the one is severed from the other by an immense graduation. So, though all Gentlemen be equal in Nobility, yet they are not so in Riches, in Lands, in Alliance, in Friends, in Offices, in Authority, in Age, and in Reputation. Again, they are not equal in Spirit, in Knowledge, in Experience, nor in Wisdom; therefore it hath been with much prudence ordered, that they

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should have some external marks of these differences; and for this end, there have been created Princes, Dukes, Counts, Marquesses, Barons, Knights, Batchelers, Esquires; leave hath been given them to bear Helmets and Crowns upon their Armories: In short, no pains have been spared to find out things that might any way adorn their Quality; and their Valour hath been publicly rewarded, for an excitement of others to a generous emulation.

Here, I cannot forbear to blame those Gentlemen who give themselves the Title of Knights, of Marquesses, or of Counts, by their own private Authority. This is a shameful Usurpation; and so far from heightening the Luster of Nobility, that it injures them. For a Gentleman who takes upon him the quality of a Marquess, and well knows he is none, makes a perpetual Lye, a thing directly contrary to his Honour, and to the profession he makes, of being a devoted constant defender of Truth. Beside, this huge number of Marquesses, Lords and Knights, does bring those Qualities into contempt; and is a cause, that true Marquesses are not considered now, as they of right ought to be. 'Tis therefore extremely important, that provision be speedily made in the case. For this confusion destroys the usefulness of those Dignities, they being such as his Majesty should keep in his own hand, and Husband them with deliberation and frugality; that they might be distributed on occasion, to Men of Honour, and such as have evidenced a Zeal for his Service, and for the good of his Kingdom; that the persons alle

to whom they are Granted, might fully enjoy them, with all the advantages and Prerogatives that are by custom annexed to them. I will not omit, that it is necessary to give the Nobility the greatest respect that may be; to the end, that Citizens may conceive the greater desire to become Gentlemen; which should be granted them, when they have rais'd themselves to a Worthiness of it, either by just acquiring a remarkable Estate, or doing some illustrious exploit in War.

The whole Constitution of the Nobility is Military: Nevertheless there have been instituted in *France*, particular Orders of Knighthood, of which, the King is Grand Master Himself; and into which He admitteth such Gentlemen as He accounts most worthy of it. Such are the Orders of the Holy Ghost, and of *St. Michael*. There are others, of which the King is barely Protector; The Order of *S. Lazarus* is of that nature. But this is of no great advantage to the State: Because all Beneficences, all Favours, all Honours and Employments, should come directly and immediately from the Hand and Bounty of the King. For the continuation therefore of this Order of *S. Lazarus*, His Majesty might unite the Grand Mastership of it to the Regality, as the King of *Spain* does.

C H A P. VII.

1. *Of the Third Estate.* 2. *Of the Husbandmen.* 3. *Of Artificers.* 4. *Of Merchants.*

MY beginning to Treat of the Three Orders of the Body Politick of *France*, as the Clergy and the Nobility, leaving the Third Estate to be last spoken of, is a method like theirs, who having some Edifice to examine, do begin at the top; and settle to consider the upper Stories, before they look on the Foundations. In truth, the People are the Basis upon which all Republicques have their standing. 'Tis they that manure the Ground, and cause it to bear Fruit. 'Tis they that pay the Subsidies; that breed Workmen, and furnish the Merchants. Yet that which we call the Third Estate, does not consist of Peasants, or the meer rural sort; 'Tis principally the Freemen, and Communalities of Towns, and Officers of Justice, that compose it. This Third Estate was not called to the General Assemblies of the *Gauls*, either in the time of the *Romans*, or during the First and Second Race of our Kings; it was well forward in the Third before they had that privilege. I believe, not until the Reign of *Philip the Fair*. But it is not upon this matter that I am now to insist.

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However, in speaking of the Third Estate, the whole Popular body is to be consider'd ; and it may be divided into three parties of men ; namely, Husbandmen, Artificers, and Merchants. Of the Officers of Justice we will speak in the next Chapter. The least-infected, and best party of the People, is the Husband-men that daily labour ; which takes up their Heads and Hands, all the year long without intermission, keeps them in simplicity and obedience. There cannot be too great a number of 'em ; especially not in *France*, by reason of the Fertility of the Country ; and our Corn being Transported into Foreign parts, we ought to make great Stores of it, and have as much as may be in a readiness. Exact care must be taken, that these Men may always be in a condition to take pains : and that they have but little converse with Townsmen, whose little labour, and other manners, might corrupt their innocence. And, that Ease and Plenty do not render them insolent. For there is nothing more dangerous and insufferable, than a sort of rich Peasants. No less care must be taken, that an extream penury do not reduce them to extream misery. For too great Poverty lying on them, they no longer have either Men or Cattle : they are ty'd up to ill Diet, lodge on the ground : suffer Hunger and Cold : their Children perish for want of Food ; there are Epidemical Diseases bred among them ; they are not succour'd ; they dye away : by this means the Country is dispeopled ; and being void of Inhabitants, the Grounds are unhusbanded, and abandoned. When I shall come to discourse of the Finances,

I will point out a way to preserve Country-people in a moderately-commodious Estate: at present I will only say, that it would be to very good purpose to create a Superintendant of Husbandry; who should have his Eye on those affairs, and see, that the Grounds be cultivated, Vineyards well kept, and Meadows fitly ordered: in like manner as there are Masters of Waters, and Forests, who take care that the Woods be not damni^d; and Surveyors for the High-ways; and in fine, Jurats for every Craft.

The Second party of the Popular order, is the Handicrafts-men, or Artificers; these are no less useful to the State than any other. For, besides that Manufactures do keep men at work, and engage them; they are the cause that the Silk, the Wool, the Skins, the Flax, the Timber, and the other Commodities that grow in *France*, are made use of; and that Country People have the means to barter these things, and put them off; especially being wrought into Wares not made in Foreign parts, we shall grow to be further principal Manufacturers, as we already are of Hats for *Spain*, and Stuffs for all *Europe*: which is a matter of exceeding great consequence: and in process of time, when the work is once on foot, things will pass from hand to hand, and oft-times go out of the Kingdom. All this quickens Trade, and makes Money pass to and fro: which promoteth the Publick, and therewithall at once, every ones private welfare.

'Tis not enough to have Husband-men and Artificers in a Kingdom; there must of necessity

be Merchants also : for without their Industry, the Artificers Shops would be Stores never emptied; the Granaries would remain full of Corn; and the Cellars, of Wines; and nothing be gone. We will more largely treat of this, when we come to the Article of Commerce.

C H A P. VIII.

1. *Of Officers of Justice.* 2. *Of Parliaments, and other Supreme Courts.* 3. *Of Presidial Courts.* 4. *Of the King's Council.* 5. *Useful means for the good of the State, in relation to Officers of Justice.* 6. *Of Sollicitations.*

IF men were entirely just to one another, and each of 'em (in the phrase of one of the greatest *Greek* Philosophers) a Law unto himself; there would need neither Law nor Magistrate to keep them in perfect tranquility. But Nature being corrupted, we no longer consult that Original Righteousness, which is inseparable from reason, and which without intermission, inwardly presseth us to render to all their due, as exactly, as we would should be done to our selves. Always self-love, often necessity, sometimes hatred, avarice, or one passion or other, does blind us, and induce us to violate this eminently holy and equitable Law; in such sort also, that we suffer our selves to be transported unto excesses hard to be believed.

We equally use fraud and force to content our injustice and irregular desires. Whereupon it hath been commodiously done by wise Men, to form, as may be said, a new reason, which they called Law. But because Laws are of no use, except they be armed with Correction to punish such as despise them; and have some soul, and living principle; therefore Magistrates have been created, who are to pronounce the Oracles which those Laws inspire, to put the Laws in Execution, and maintain the Authority of them. These Officers are chosen of the best and most intelligent Men in a State; and if Common-wealths be duly regulated; ordinarily the Rich are preferred before the Poor, and Nobles before *Plebeians*; because 'tis supposed they have a greater measure of knowledge and virtue; and by consequence are less capable of certain mean things, in which a necessitous condition, and a mean extraction, might engage them. Thus Ministers of Justice in *France*, call'd *Men of the Robe*, are in truth necessary in Publick Society. For if there was no evil-doer, Laws and Magistrates would be of no more use, than Joyners, and the Doors they make for the security of Houses, if there were no Thieves: whereas, should not a Man in a whole Kingdom ever swerve from right reason and pure equity; there must nevertheless be Priests for Religion; Soldiers for defence against Foreign Invasions that might happen; and People who may some of 'em Till the Ground; others apply themselves to Trades and Manufactures, that Men cannot be without. So that these three sorts of Persons are
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inseparable from a Common-wealth; and they make up the Three Estates we have spoken of, which have been receiv'd without any contest.

Yet it seems, that of late, the Parliaments have sought to infuse into some green heads, that they compos'd a Fourth Order in the Kingdom; and the same, not only distinct from the other Three, but altogether superiour to them, by reason of their Sovereignty, and of the Power they have to deliberate upon the pleasure and Edicts of the King. If they should not be brought off from this opinion, perhaps they would draw the other Sovereign Courts and Officers of Judicature into the same Error; an Union of them all not being deniable: because otherwise the affair of Justice would in *France*, form two bodies; which may not be. But from allowing this Fourth Body in the State, namely that of Justice, a ridiculous inconvenience would follow; to wit, that a Sergeant (or Catchpole) of a Village, would be a member of a body superior to that of the Nobility; and by consequence, in some sort, superior to a Marquis. For in matter of Hierarchy, the last of a more excellent Order, is greater than the first of a less excellent one: as the lowest of the Arch-Angels, is greater than the highest of the Angels.

But to clear the difficulty before us, it must be remembred, that heretofore in *France*, the Estates which were called Parliaments, did assemble twice a year for two considerations: one was, to judge of Appeals, that were made from judgments pass'd by inferior Officers. The other, to give the King Counsel when
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He demanded their Opinion about Government of the State. For alway, during the first and second Race, the King's did dispose of Publick Affairs, as of Peace and War; and this is so much a truth, that if those ancient Parliaments had had the disposing of the State, they would never have suffered, that the Children of *Lewis*, when they had divided the Kingdom among them, should have fallen to make War one upon another; which could tend to nothing but a publick desolation. They would as little have permitted the enmities of *Brize*, *Haudet*, and *Fredegonde*. In like manner under the Second Race, they would not have endured that the Sons of *Lewis* the Mild, should act such outrages on their Father, that *Charles* the Bald should have given *Neustria* to the *Normans*. In the Third Race, that *Lewis* the Gross should have ruin'd so many great Lords; who made up the greatest part of the Parliaments: that *Lewis* the Younger should have yielded up *Gnienne* by the Divorce of *Eleanore*: that the Count of *Burgundy*, and the Duke of *Britaunie*, and some others, should have leagu'd together against Queen *Blanche*. In fine, there are thousand and a thousand examples in History, which do evidence that these Kings always had the free and Sovereign administration of their State: nor will there one be found to prove, that the Parliaments ever contradicted them. They presented themselves at the feet of their Princes, with Petitions, and humble Remonstrances: they made no resistance, nor exercis'd Authority. So that our King's have been King's indeed, always absolute Masters: and

and for proof hereof, it will be sufficient to look into all the Statutes; there it may be seen how they spake, and what part the Estates had in them. The principal end of Parliaments therefore was, to the end the Law-suits of particular Persons; and people perceiving that Appeals brought to them were received, and sentences invalidated; many, to try Opinions in their cases once again, became Appellants: by this means affairs were multiply'd; and that contesting parties might not have the trouble to come up from the remotest parts of the Kingdom, Deputies of the General Parliament were appointed, they also stiled Parliaments, and to be ambulatory. The Commission they had, was sometimes for three Months, sometimes for six, according to exigence of State; but alway by the Command and Letters of the King. These Parliaments went into the Provinces, to judge the causes that were brought them; almost in like manner as we now see done at the Extraordinary Sessions: which instead of diminishing the number of Causes to be dispatch'd, as had been conceiv'd, really augmented them. *Philip the Fair* saw cause to make such a Parliament sedentary at *Paris*, another at *Rouen*, a third at *Toulouse*; and succeeding Kings establish'd others in other Cities, as they are at present. From this faithful account it resulteth, that the Parliaments are not a Fourth Body in the State; but be extracted out of the Three ancient Orders; at first they were taken out of the Clergy and Nobility only: because the Commons at that time were not considerable; afterwards, These
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also were received in. Other Sovereign Societies are but Images of these Parliaments. As to the Sovereignty of the Parliaments themselves, it neither is, nor ever was other, than an emanation of the Sovereignty of the King, in whom that Quality is natural, and indivisible. The Parliaments can pretend to no more than His Majesty may please to impart to them.

The Sale of Offices of Judicature having been introduc'd, there follow'd divers creations of new Officers, both in matter of the Revenue, and also in that of Justice: among others, those of Presidial Courts were instituted: which perhaps was done, only out of a pecuniary interest; a needless degree of Jurisdiction being thereby set up, and such a one as tendeth to the involving and oppression of the Kings Subjects. These Courts are so many petty Parliaments, in judging supremely, and finally in some cases: yet by the trick of Petty-fogging Practice, ways are found to get Appeals from judgment pass'd, to be received, and new processes begun, to the vexation and undoing of the parties concern'd. There have been in all times, chief Judges in Towns; as Bailiffs and Seneschals; a thing of indispensable necessity for keeping the People in order: all the fault that can be found in it, is by reason of their number, which certainly is excessive.

'Tis not enough that the King hath Parliaments and other Officers to determinate differences among His Subjects: there must also be a Counsel about His Majesty; by whose Advice, He may correct all ill Administration of Justice;
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may reverse all Sentences given against the Mind and Intention of the Statutes; and maintain Order through the whole extent of His State. This Counsel is the *Sacrarium* of the Monarchy: and the persons admitted into it, who may justly be stiled the Eyes, the Ears and Hands of the Prince) ought to have a profound Knowledge in Affairs, acquired by long and approved Experiences: They must love the Kingdom, the Kingly Power, and the King's Person. They are the Seminary, whence are taken Intendants of Provinces, Ambassadors and Ministers for Negotiations with Strangers. The Counsel is compos'd at present of Gownmen only. It would not be much amiss, nay, on the contrary, it would be very well done: if the King pleased to communicate this Honour unto other Professions, when there were found Persons capable of it: Because this Preference gives the Gentlemen of the Long Robe too much Authority; whereas there is need of retrenching what they have already; much rather, than of conferring any new advantage upon them, as we shall shew hereafter. As for the Royal Privy Council, in which Secret Affairs are debated, and which ought to be of very few Persons, that Matters may be kept in silence, and not untimously divulged; I will not speak of it in this place; nor say, in what manner it ought to be composed: because this depends upon the pleasure of the Master of it; and each King takes a different course in it. There have been Princes who committed the principal Care of all Affairs to one single person: and *France* hath
seen

seen, for instance, the Cardinals of *Amboise* and *Richlieu*. Others have parted Employments, and shared them among as many persons as there were different Affairs. So did King *Henry* the Fourth. This, in my Opinion, was the more wisely done; for that in matter of Government, the great Secret is to divide Authority, and hold the ballance even between a plurality of Persons. History teacheth us of what consequence it was to our Kings of the first Race; that they had but one Maire of the Palace; and how dear it cost their Posterity. Upon a like reason of State the *Roman* Emperors divided the charge of the *Pratorian* Prefect. But Ministers, whatever for number, must for qualification, be Men of Virtue and approved sufficiency: They likewise, after the manner of the *Ægyptians*, ought to be reprehended and punish'd for all that the King does amiss, and contrary to Law.

The incredible number of the Ministers of Justices in *France*, is in truth, somewhat monstrous; Neither is there any disorder in the State, more pressing, or requiring a more speedy Application of the Royal Authority. The truth is, if a Man consider this multitude of Magistrates, will he not have ground to say, that the *French* are extream hard to be governed, seeing so many great Personages are employed in Governing them? Again, it may be said, That this Nation, so illustrious by the Glory of its Actions, and by so many Victories wherewith its Arms have been honoured, is yet incapable of virtuous Inclinations; since there is need of force to reduce them to the
rule

rule of the Laws: though GOD never gave Men a more precious Present. On the other hand, can it be affirmed, that our Legislators wanted Wisdom, or did not sufficiently shew it in making the Laws? Yet if reflection be made upon the multitude of Law-suits, whereof the vexation is a grievance to the Kingdom, may not a Man perswade himself, that Equity is banish'd thence, and Upright dealing utterly discarded? Should it then hereupon be taken for granted, that the private sort in *France* are not good condition'd People; can it be imagin'd that the Publick Government is any thing reasonable and proper for its due ends? But if a Man proceed to penetrate further into the Internals of the State, and there behold what a desolation the corrupting of Justice hath made, loosning and breaking the most Sacred ties of Friendship; in fine, if he observe how the Monarchy hath often been in danger of subversion, will he not wonder that the Publick Fortune hath held out, and Families been born up in the Storms that have so many times turmoil'd them?

The excessively great multitude of Officers, being the principal cause whence so many mischiefs take their rise; the remedy must be first apply'd thereto. And this remedy is nothing else, but such a retrenchment as is expedient, or, to say better, necessary to be made. The fewer Officers of Justice there are, the more Soldiers and Artificers, and Merchants, and the fewer litigious Actions will be. For it is manifest that business of that kind has ever multiply'd, as the number of Officers hath been augmented:

augmented : in like manner, as the more Physicians, the more Patients. To arrive at the end propos'd, it would be convenient, that after mature deliberation upon the estate of *France*, the number of its Inhabitants, and the quantity of Law-business, it be advisedly stated in the King's Council, what number of Officers were fit to be reserved, and of what quality they should be; then that the rest be suppress'd gradually, as the persons dye away, or at once by a Declaration. What, in my opinion, might particularly be done, is as follows.

First, The Presidial Courts being compos'd of Officers that are needless to the State, a charge unto the People; having also but a novel interloping Jurisdiction, the fruit of an evil Counsel given to King *Henry II.* and a mere invention to get Money; the extinction of them is not to be doubted of; but effected by a subtraction of the Officers Annuities. By this means the King will save that Pay, which amounts unto a Sum considerable to the State; and the Royal Jurisdictions, each in its Precinct, may do what those Presidials, upon which they depend, are wont to do. The Presidial Clerks place, its being engaged, (or bound for security to one or other) as is usual, should not hinder the execution of this Affair: And when by decease there are no more Officers left, care shall be taken of the concern of those to whom the places were engaged, the regulating whereof will by that time have no difficulty in it.

Secondly,

Secondly, Of Sergeants, Two Thirds wholly must be suppress'd.

In the Third place, all Proctors, that are not Advocates; and a certain number of Advocates should be appointed in each Parliament and Jurisdiction, who might do the Office of Proctors. This is not incompatible. For the thing is already in use many parts of *France*. The benefit of this regulation is manifest; in that the Proctors are very ignorant that have but a slight tincture of practice, yet out of Covetousness they often draw up Writings for their Clients, and make them pay as dear for 'em, as if the best Advocate had taken the pains. Mean time these Writings, for the most part, are nothing worth; and the poor Suitors frequently lose good Causes, through the naughtiness of their Proctors, and for want of being well defended. Again, such an order taken, another advantage would accrue, namely, that Advocates being Proctors, they will be obliged to follow what the Judges shall prescribe them; whereas at present they make a jest of it, and will not Plead but when they please. There cannot be a regulation made in *France* more profitable in matter of Justice; and if the King, in a necessity of State, would make a Money matter of it, which might at any time be done, there would be rais'd out of it, for all *France*, more than 20 Millions. But it had need be gone about with a great deal of Address. A Third advantage by this regulation is, That all Advocates being Proctors, there would no more slip into the Court a sort of young Men, who shelter their Ignorance

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and

and Idleness under a Lawyers Gown and a square Cap.

In the Fourth place, All the Masters of Requests belonging to the Palace, or Court (of Justice) of *France*, should be suppress'd. And the Truth is, it seems to me a contradiction, that these Officers should be Counsellors of Supreme Courts, yet not impowred to judge any thing supremely. But that the Commoners of the King's Household and other privileged persons, may not be depriv'd of the benefit of the *Committimus*, Power must be given them by special privilege, to commence their Actions, and prosecute them in a Chamber of Enquests. I say, by special privilege, because I know the Parliaments take no cognizance ordinarily, save of Appeals: but in the case now expres'd, this special privilege shall superadd to them this new kind of Jurisdiction. And it will be highly advantageous to those Commoners and Priviledg'd persons; for by this Expedient they would get a decree speedily upon one Trial, and finally end their business. It is to be noted here, that the first stating of Cases, in order to an Hearing, is not so incompetent to Parliaments, but that they do the thing for substance, upon demands incidentally made. Yet this is meant only in behalf of privileged persons, and all such as claim the right of a *Committimus*.

Fifthly, The Judges Provosts of Towns are to be suppress'd, and they laid to the Seneschallies and Bayliwicks. For, what are so many different Officers in one and the same Town good for?

In a Sixth place, All the Courts of the Aids should be united to the Parliaments; and this done, when the Officers of the Supream Court in each kind, have been reduc'd to the number which its judged meet to retain. I will say more of this in the Chapter of the *Finances*.

Seventhly, All the Elections are to be suppress'd, and the Assessing of Parishes, done by the Treasurers of *France*; of the Seneschalties, by the Lieutenant of the Province. I shall speak more plainly of it in the Chapter of the *Finances* and *Taxes*. Where also the Suppression of Store-houses of Salt, and of the Gabells, shall be treated of in the Article of Gabells. Besides, the Chamber of the Treasury, and the Court of Moneys, should be joyned to the Chamber of Accompts; and half of all the Chambers be suppress'd likewise. For thirty Officers may do all that the Chamber of Accompts, the Treasury, and the Court of Monies now do. In fine, it is for the King's Service, and the good of the State, that all the Presidents Places be suppress'd, as well those of Superior Courts, as of others: and the Office of Presidents be discharged by Commission. 'Tis to be consider'd, that this new Order would much augment the King's Authority. For what will not Counsellors do to obtain a Commission to preside? and having obtained it, what will they not further do to keep and confirm themselves in it? 'Tis pertinent to recall to mind here, that the Mighty Prince *Philip the Fair*, at his making the Parliament Sedentary, made the Count of *Burgundy* first President of it. And that anciently, the first President of the Cham-

ber of Accompts was the chief Butler of *France*: Likewise, that at that time, and long after, the Chancellors of *France* were of the Church, or of the Sword; and great Dignities not given to Men of the Robe privatively. Which being done since, without doubt gives them too much credit, and leaves the Nobility too little. It is important that the thing be not continued, but on the contrary, all restored to Primitive Order. As for Country Courts, 'tis fit they be narrowly limited, and brought to be meerly predial and dominial; that is, for Rents and the Fealties of Lordships: not capable of determining an Inventory, or receiving a suit between parties, for more than three Livres. To conclude, the shortning of proceedings in Law, would much conduce to the reduction of Officers.

Let it not be objected, that this reduction of Officers, and such a multitude of Suppressions, will ruin a multitude of Families. For though it were so, yet should not the thing be stuck at; the Reformation of a State being concern'd: nor is the ill of particular persons to be put to accompt, when the Weal of the Publick is in question, GOD Himself, who is King of Kings, and Eternally Just, how many men did He destroy by that universal deluge for the Reformation of the Universe? How many *Israelites* did He cut off in the Wilderness, to save the gross of the People? There is plenty of examples in this kind; and Sovereigns have a right to do like things with like Justice, when the general welfare of their Subjects is concern'd. Kings are Eagles, to whom GOD gives

gives His Thunder-bolts to carry: the strokes that come from their hands do come from the hand of GOD, whose Images and Instruments they are.

To conclude, it's a thing which cannot be dissembled, that the Parliaments, constituting an Aristocratick Government in part, as they do, are quite contrary to Monarchick Government. Aristocracy is adverse to Regality; because of all Governments it comes nearest to it. As, to use the very terms of *Hesiod*, a Potter envies, and is against a Potter. Be it remembered here briefly, that *Theopompus* King of *Sparta* having created the *Ephori*, at last after a great deal of time, *Cleomenes* was fain to put them to death; when they had slain King *Agis*. The Senate becoming too potent, overthrew the first *Roman* Monarchy, and in one word, what hath our Age seen in the trial of *Chenailles*? and what did a former in that of Chancellor *Poyet*?

A second source from which the Evils of litigious suits do arise, is the sale of Magistracies. The Emperor *Alexander Severus* found this mischief in his Empire; it having been introduced by *Domician*. *S. Lewis* saw cause to weed the abuse out of His Kingdom; it having got in through the confusion and trouble of some precedent Reigns. It will be glorious for the King to do in His State what the Emperour *Severus* and *S. Lewis* did in theirs, with greatest glory to their Memory. But as Policy requires, that in such enterprises, way be made by degrees, and greatest events brought on by small beginnings: so it is necessary here, to

proceed leifurely, and with meafured fteps. The fixation of Offices hath been much advanced already: for though what hath been done feemed to fignifie an authorizing the fale of them: yet in truth, there hath been ground gotten. To continue the work, and bring it to perfection, there muft a Decree pafs, or a Declaration be made, and publifh'd at the Seal, by which the King declares, that he purpofeth no longer to admit any oppofition in matter of Title to Offices. This is juft; for the King ought to be ever Mafter, and have the liberty to beftow the charges of His Kingdom on whom he pleafeth, and thinks worthy of 'em. Thus no one will be alarm'd: but this Declaration will extend unto the price it felf, by a confequence eafily deducible; namely, fince the principal and effential right to Offices confifteth in the Title, and the price is but an acceffory, as they term it: 'tis reasonable, that the price alway follow the Law of the Title; as the Title to a Benefice brings in the Revenue of it; And as in Marriage, the Validity of the Sacrament makes the Validity of the Contract, and of the civil effects. Thus receiving no more oppofition at the Seal for the Title; there neither will be any in reference to the price: and hence it will come to pafs, in tract of time, that Offices will be no longer fecurity for Money; which will diminifh the price of them, and infenfibly bring it to nothing. But it is very juft too, that the Mortgaging of Offices, as hath been done hitherto, be obftructed for the future. For the Officer may dye before he hath paid the *Paulette*; whereby his

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Office is extinct ; or if of Grace the King receives it, the value of what ariseth from the casualty, is much less than the sum for which the thing was engag'd : so that there must loss certainly accrue. But if the King make a new creation of an Officer, all engagements are gone : for 'tis then no longer the Office that formerly it was.

Let it not be said, that without the Sale of Offices, the Casualties will be worth the King nothing. For the contrary is true : and if the Casualties be worth Him Two Millions, by reason of that sale of them, His Majesty will make Four Millions of 'em, if they be no longer saleable. Forasmuch as in this Case, they will be no longer Hereditary ; and being no more Hereditary, they will revert to the King upon the decease of every Titulary : and so the King may dispose of 'em in favour of the Person that is most acceptable to Him, and if it please His Majesty, the new admitted Officer may fine to the Coffers of His Treasury Royal, as the Officers of Gentlemen do to the profit of the Monasticks. As to the Objection, that by such suppression of Officers and Jurisdictions, and taking away the sale of Offices, the King will lose the Revenue of many of His Clerks places, and of the *Paulette* ; The Answer is easie ; for as to the Clerks places suppress'd, the King will be recompenc'd by the greater value of those that shall remain ; and as for the *Paulette*, the retrenchment of the wages of the Officers suppress'd, will be much more considerable.

A third cause of vexatious Law-driving is, that Offices of Judicature are gainful to those

that execute them. An evil this, the dangerousest of any that can affect a State; for all becomes suspected, all becomes corrupt where profit is to be made; Avarice and Ambition creep in; Justice, Uprightness, and Truth, depart: whereupon we may conclude with the ancient Proverb, *That Money doth many things which the Devil cannot do.* For an entrance upon a Reformation in this matter, it would be good to ordain, First, That Judges not the Kings, should take no more Spices. Secondly, That Judges in the Royal Courts should not decree Executions for their attendance against the parties that are in contest. Thirdly, That if Spices, (or Fees upon sentence obtained) be allowed, the parties shall give what they will, as the former custom was, and not be compelled. Fourthly, That there be no more transacting by Commissaries in Sovereign Courts.

Judges should be forbidden to admit any solicitation from parties at Law, even though it be but to let them know the difficulties of their Affairs, and put them in a way to clear the same. For a Judge ought not to be prayed to do his Office, in favour of a man whose case is good, much less of one whose case is bad.

C H A P. IX.

1. *Of some general Orders in Government.*
2. *Of punishment and recompence.*
3. *Of Royal Virtues.*

IN the Chapters now dispatch'd, I have inserted many things which may be of use for the Kings service, for the general good of His State, and of every of His Subjects in particular. In the Chapters that are to follow, others very considerable shall be added. However, I judge it not amiss to make here a distinct Chapter of some important points, which I cannot easily rank any other where.

It hath been long in dispute, whether it be good to alter Publick Laws? and upon debate of the Question to and fro, 'tis concluded, that there is oft-times so pressing a necessity, that it cannot be forborn: but withal, that such alterations must be insensible to the People, who hardly come off from old Customs; and cannot be brought to any new observance, but by a long circumference, and ways to them unknown. Legislators are Physicians of Common-wealths, and in this case ought to imitate the ordinary Artists of that Profession, who seeing the whole habit of a body out of order, and that to preserve the Patient from Perishing, 'tis necessary to change it, do prescribe remedies, which the more slowly they operate, the surer their effect.

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Now the first Law, which in my Opinion might be made, or rather renewed in *France*, is to banish thence all Usuries, of whatever quality, except among Merchants; and those should be expressly prohibited, which arise from personal Obligations, under pretence of damages and interests; even interests adjudged by sentence not excluded; this pretence being but a means to authorize Usury, and defraud the Law, which forbids it. Usury was strictly prohibited among the ancient Inhabitants of *Candie*; but the coveting of Riches, to elude the severity of this Statute, disposed the borrower, that he should seem to have stolen the Money he had need of, and which in reality was lent him. By this Artifice the Debtor was constrained to pay the Interests; which were not adjudged to the Creditor on the account of any Loan, but in hatred of Robbery, which he said had been committed upon him. This means cannot be used in *France*; for that Theft is there a capital Crime, both in Religion and in Policy. But the Spirit of Man being unbounded, and having more craft when bent to transgress, than the Law hath prudence to hinder evil doing, the taking of damages and interests hath been introduced amongst us; which is an equivalent to the *Cretan* expedient. For the feigning a detention of Money against the owners will, as is done in *France*, and the Debtor thereupon condemn'd to pay the Interests, can be no other thing for substance, than the feigning a Robbery, as was done in *Candie*.

There is not any Nation of note, in which Usurious Contracts have not been prohibited
among

among the Subjects. 'Tis known what the Law of the Church in this behalf is; and what that of the Old Testament, so often repeated in Scripture, was. Usury sure, hath caused the greatest disorders that have hitherto troubled the tranquility of States. The *Athenians*, the *Spartans*, and the *Romans*, did not forbid it only; but were also forced to abolish Debts contracted; and for publick benefit, rescin'd the compacts and promises that private Men had made, though they seem'd inviolable, as having been made under the Authority of the Laws, and upon the security of general custom, which they were not wont to over-rule. An act of very particular consequence All Usurious Contracts should be annulled, yea the culpable and complices as to the crime of Usury, put to death; the Usurer in *Plato's* opinion, being worse than the Thief.

The second Law should be, to permit Contracts for annual Rent out of Land: yet with charge, that they be publish'd for publick security; as I have said elsewhere, when I treated of the shortning of Law-suits. Withall, regulating to a denier, the Arrearages, which are a kind of Usury, but the most tolerable of any, seeing there is an Alienation of the Land; and it is a fiction prudently hit upon by the Popes *Calixtus* the Third, and *Martin* the Fifth. As for the Declaration in form of an Edict which is to be made herein; Contracts, even the formerly made, should be reduced to the Thirtieth denier. The *Romans* limited Use to the hundredth, afterwards to the Two hundredth, and at length abolish'd it altogether.

A third Law should be, that no sum lent to any Son of a Family, or to others under 25 years of age, without the consent and authority of their Relations, do produce any action; no not though the Contracts be ratified by the Debtors, after they come of age. *Vespasian* made a like Ordinance; and there is nothing more effectual to repress the greediness of Usurers, or the debauch of young people: whereupon they would set themselves to labour, to exercises and study. The profit which these Laws would yield the State, beside their stopping the course of great Evils, would be, that persons who are alway concern'd, and impatient to be getting, seeing they could not put out their Money at Interest easily, and that the Interest of their Contracts would be at too low a rate, must of force apply themselves to two things, each of which is eminently advantageous to the Kingdom. For they would addict themselves to Trades and Husbandry; or put their Money in the hands of Merchants to make benefit of it, if not enter into partnership with them, which they should be permitted to do. For Usury in matter of Commerce, was never forbidden, and is the Secret that the *Hollanders* have found, to make all their people Merchants. On the other hand, the *Genoeses* have engaged themselves in Traffick, upon observing the profit it yielded.

The fourth Law might be, that Gentlemen be disabled to sell their Fiefs or Inheritances, until they have made declaration of their Poverty in open Court. Among the *Israelites*, Lands engaged reverted to their ancient owners

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ers at the Jubilee. The *Spartans* Lands were not divided at all; I mean those 7000 portions which *Lycurgus* had lotted out. The *Locrians* in like manner sold not their Estates: the same is observed in *Flanders*. The Fiefs of the great Houses of *Bretanie* are never parted out. Substitution of Heirs in *France* doth hinder the Alienation of Lands. In *Spain* Gentlemen cannot sell their Estates: And Lastly, the Demesne of the Crown in *France*, is inalienable, which may prescribe a Law for all Noble Families. This Ordinance would make Gentlemen good Husbands. When the *Jews*, the *Lacedemonians*, the *Syracusans*, the *Romans*, and all civilized-People, made a partition of their Lands, they consider'd the benefit that might thence redound to their States, and very wisely provided, that all such as possess'd Inheritances should fix in the Country: having an Estate there which they could not carry away, they would love the places where they had their subsistence; and every one defending his own Possession, all would jointly defend the Common-wealth, and fight for the Publick Interests.

The Fifth Law should be, that a Gentleman being ruin'd, and having acknowledged his Poverty in Court, should be no longer Noble; there being no Estate so shameful, as that of a Man of Quality reduc'd to an extream Misery. On the contrary, that a *Plebeian*, when he hath rais'd himself an advantageous Fortune, which might be limited at 50000 Crowns, should be ennobled; provided always, that the profit had been made by laudable and lawful means.

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A sixth Law should be, to hinder the publick begging of the Poor, by appointing the greatest penalties upon it ; and ordain, for that end, that every Parish both in Town and Country, do maintain their own Poor, not suffering them to wander ; punish all that make a Trade of it ; send the stoutest of them to the Gallies, and set all the rest on work according to their ability. This is a means to fetch out that idleness which is among the meaner sort.

The seventh Law might be, to render Fathers responsible, as to Civil Interests, for all the Faults and Crimes their Children should commit while they depend on them, and under 25 years of age ; or, however, whilst they dwell in their Fathers House. The Mulct to be allowed for afterwards in the Patrimony of those faulty Children ; This Law is in force in *Bretagne*, and was so at *Rome*. Masters, in like manner, for the faults of their Household-servants ; and paying an Arbitrary Fine besides, because they ought to correct them. In the Third place, Provost Marshals and their Officers, for all Robberies and Murthers committed on the High-ways, Burglaries, Counterfeit Coin, and other the like Crimes within their district, if they took not up the Malefactors, and brought them to their Trial. This Law would hinder well-nigh all mischiefs of this nature ; it being, as may be said, of publick Notoriety, that Provosts hold Intelligence with all persons of ill Life. Again, all Lieutenants criminal and Judges, for the Crimes committed in their Towns, by the same reason. Masters of Inns, and Houses of Entertainment, for the

the Crimes committed by their Guests, while they are in their Houses. Owners of Houses, for the Crimes committed by their Tenants during their term ; because they ought to know, and answer for the good abearing of such as they entertain. Captains and Officers for the Crimes of their Soldiers ; the Inhabitants of an House for those committed in it. This is done in *Spain*. In the *Turkish* Towns, the Townsmen of each Street are responsible for what is done there ; And if a Man be slain, the Townsman before whose door he falls, is sentenced to pay for his Blood. This Order is excellent. For as soon as there is a noise in the Street, all run thither, and the Authors of the Fact, whatever it be, are seized, brought before the Judge, and forthwith punish'd according to the quality of the Crime. In paralel to this Rule of Govenment in *Turkie*, severest penalties must be imposed upon such as transgress the Laws, and especially the Laws that relate to Publick Order and Policy ; those Penalties also speedily inflicted ; otherwise the said Laws will be of no use. For example, 'Tis ordained in *France*, that no Lackey wear a Sword ; that no Towns-man have Arms ; or that Bakers make their Bread of a certain Weight, or other things of like nature. They that obey not, must be instantly punished, the Rich by pecuniary Fines, the Poor by Corporal Penalties. The *Turks* cause Offenders who have not Money to pay their Fines, to be beaten with a Lath.

An Eighth Law, All Printers and Booksellers must be forbidden, and that upon pain of death,

to Print, Sell, Disperse, set to Sale, or keep any Book of what Quality or Subject soever, without its having been Approved, and Licence given them under Seal in due manner; after which may nothing be added to the Book.

But as it is just to punish bad Subjects, so it is reasonable to reward the good: and them that out of love to their Country, employ themselves in advancing its Reputation and Glory. The King ought to be the sole Master and Arbitrer of all Rewards; and confer them himself, so as they that receive any Beneficence of His, may be convinc'd they owe it to His Bounty. This would be an infallible means to attract to Him the hope of His Subjects, and together with it, their Respect, whereupon every one would strive to please Him, in doing of his Duty, and no body promise himself any Grace or Advantage, but by his Merit, his Services and Diligence. There are several kinds of Rewards with which His Majesty may Honour His Subjects; I say, Honour them; because a Subject, in receiving a benefit from the hand of the King, receives withal, a mark of the Esteem which is had of his Person, and of the satisfaction he hath given in his Conduct. Nothing can be more glorious to a Man of Worth; nothing can yield him a truer Contentment. A Gift from an ordinary hand is many times somewhat shameful to him that takes it; and hence comes the adage, That it is better to Give than to Receive. But when a King is the Donor, the Dignity of the Royal Hand doth add to the Gift a new quality, which augmenteth the Worth and Excellency of it: whence

whence it is, in such a case no less praise to receive than to give.

This now which I have affirmed, cannot be doubted of: yet it may be taken for evident, that of these rewards, there are some purely Honourable, others only Profitable; and a last sort, both Honourable and Profitable too. The reward purely Honorary is, when the King confers upon a Subject some Dignity which he had not afore; as upon a *Plebeian*, the quality of Gentleman, upon a Gentleman that of Knight, or Marquess, &c. and permits him to carry *Fleurdelizes* in his Coat of Arms, or some other Memorial of a great Action: Or grants him the privilege to wear a Crown in his Crest, or the like. This kind of reward is unlimited, because Sovereignty is a source from whence new Honours and Dignities incessantly flow; as projections of Light do every moment issue from the Sun, without exhausting its fecundity; and on the contrary, the more rays that it emitteth, the more resplendent is it in it self; so the more Honours a King confers, the greater Lustre He adds to His own Royal Majesty. The *Romans*, of any People upon Earth, did most abound in conferring rewards of this nature: and on that account, brought into use Crowns, Triumphs, Statues, Rings, Inscriptions, Publick Praises; and stuck not to grant Deifications, Temples and Sacrifices: such a love they had for Virtue; and so ingenious were they to inhance the merit of their Fellow-Citizens: thus inciting them to worthy Performances, and principally to an advancing the power of the Common-wealth. For any

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man that hath a Noble Spirit, and is Virtuouſly dispos'd, does more to merit a juſt reward, than he would to gain the Empire of the World: becauſe in the iſſue, 'tis always Virtue that triumphs; and oft-times but Fortune that rules. In conformity to this example, which both Antiquity, and the Authors of it, and Experience, do render Illuſtrious, the King may Honour ſuch as ſerve Him beſt, with Honourable Titles; but ought to puniſh all thoſe, who, without His Permiſſion, dare aſſume and uſurp them. 'Tis neceſſary that there be a difference of rank between Perſons; and the diſtinguiſhing of them by their merit, is to be preferr'd far before all diſcrimination made by their Wealth.

It would alſo be very commodious, that as the Honour of Knighthood is purely Perſonal, ſo the King ſhould make the Dignity of Baron, of Marqueſs, of Count, &c. Perſonal likewiſe; not real, or annexed to Eſtates; the ſaid Dignities to become extinct by deceaſe of the perſons inveſted with them. This Expedient, to recompence Men of worth, being well managed, would produce a marvellous effect; and an whole race, thereby become Men of Merit. For, what would not the Son of one of theſe perſonal Marqueſſes do, to prevent falling from that degree of Honour which his Father had? and how could he chooſe but preſs vigorously on in the Court of Honour that has been thus mark'd out to him? But in this caſe, there is one thing to be further done, which might much profit the State, by laying a more Expres Obligation on the Nobility to ſerve the King: and that is, that the King do give His Letters

for personal Marquessates, in such form as they may be verified in the *Parisian* Chamber of Accounts, and the Persons Honoured with them, do homage to His Majesty thereupon. Such kind of Homages have been done heretofore for Officers, and even for Pensions, though but of two hundred *Livres*. The Emperour in *Germany* hath, in this manner, made Gentlemen, and Counts of the Empire, as for example, the late *Count de Guimene*; who had not a foot of Land within the Emperours Jurisdiction. The King of *England* creates a Gentleman, Baron, and Earl of a Barony, or County, in which the Gentleman possesseth Nothing.

The second kind of Gratifications and Rewards, is of those that are purely gainful and pecuniary; as Pensions, Tickets for Money, Acquittances by Patent, Ransoms, Confiscations of deceasing Strangers goods, and the like. These however, carry a great deal of honour with them, as I said afore. The third kind, is of those that are at once both gainful and honourable, as Great Offices, Governments, &c.

Upon this matter of Rewards, there is this further Reflection to be made; namely, that a King never be inform'd of a good Action, but He gratifie the Actor, either with Praises, or with Benefits. In fine, all these favours must be regulated by consideration of His Service, and the welfare of His State. GOD, in giving Princes a Sovereign Power, inspires into them Affection for their People. But His will is, that it be a Paternal Affection; that a King do open His Bosom to His Subjects, as His very Children; and that all His Counsels and Designs be levell'd

at their Felicity; without which, Himself cannot be happy. 'Tis principally for this great and glorious effect, that Kings are Images of GOD, and be fortified with His Spirit.

I have said, that Monarchs are in their Kingdoms, what the Soul is in the Body of Man, that external Goods cannot enrich them; that Virtue alone is their proper Portion, as it is of GOD Himself. It now remaineth I should say what kind of Virtue it ought to be.

'Tis necessary that a Great Prince have Piety, to give His Subjects an Example of it; and bettering of them in this, is the security of His State. He must be just to govern them. A Government never is of long duration without Justice. This Queen of Virtues comprehends, (as *Aristotle* judiciously noted) all the rest. A King I say must be Just, to render unto every one, and unto Himself, what is respectively due. The third Virtue of a Prince, is Prudence, to foresee of Himself what may betide His States. Thus a wise Pilot hath the skill to foresee Calms and Storms: he knows by secret notices, whether the Winds will be favourable, or contrary to his Voyage. The fourth Virtue is Magnanimity; a weight this, that keeps the Soul always in the same position, and gives it so settled a firmness, that neither good nor bad successes can put it out of place; and a King appears unalterable: He thus bears up the hope of His Subjects; they look upon Him as an assured succour against Fortune, and persuade themselves, there is somewhat of Divine Quality in His Person. Of Royal Virtues, a fifth is Clemency; It pertains to the greatness of a King,

King, that He be benign, and do commiserate the weaknesſes of His Subjects; who are Men as He is. Miſchances are pardonable, and it ſeems to me, 'tis too much rigor to puniſh a poor wretch for a Crime committed out of imprudence, or by neceſſity; and of which he is leſs guilty, if I may ſay it, than his ill deſtiny. 'Tis to Criminals of this kind, that Grace ſhould not be deny'd: and when a King gives one of His Subjects his Life, who hath been condemn'd to death, he ſhould rejoyce more at the feeling in the Secret of his Heart a Will to Pardon: than at the having in His hand the power to puniſh. To give a Man his Life, is in ſome ſort to create him; and the preſerving of his Being, is a giving of it. It would be, 'tis true, a great fault, to ſtop the courſe of Juſtice, in caſe of publick Crimes, and ſuch as have diſturb'd the Peoples Peace: Yet in ſum it is Noble, that a King be inclin'd to compaſſion and Mercy. 'Tis an action appropriated unto GOD, to diſarm His Anger: Upon this ground the *Roman* Poet ſaid, That thoſe Thunderbolts which *Jupiter* throws, might be diverted.

The ſixth Royal Virtue is Liberality. One of the Ancients pronounced, that it was leſs diſadvantageous for a King to be overcome by Arms, than by Liberality. A Poet introduceth *Mark Anthony* excellently ſaying, That he had nothing left him but the Benefits he had conferred. And to ſay true, A Great Prince never enjoys His Wealth, but when He hath given it. Liberality enricheth Him, and makes Him Purchaſes of ineffimable

ble value. For thereby 'tis, that He wins the love of his own People, and becomes admired of all others. When I say Liberality, I mean a judicious Liberality, such as is a Virtue, not an exorbitant profuseness; a Liberality alway exercis'd with Advantage, and with Glory.

To conclude in short; when I consider other Virtues, I do not find any one of them all improper for a King; but it is impossible a King should have those which I have mention'd, without having every one of the rest; since they are inseparable Companions, and must be united to make a Virtuous Man.

C H A P. X.

1. *Of Finances, or a Princes Treasure.*
2. *Means to make the Subjects more numerous.*
3. *Of the Officers that manage the King's Treasure.*
4. *Of the King's Demesnes.*
5. *Means to recover the Demesnes.*
6. *Of Taxes.*
7. *Means to ease the People.*
8. *Of the Free Cities.*
9. *Of the Gabells.*
10. *Means to augment the Receipt of the Gabells, and ease the People.*
11. *Of the Salt-free Country.*
12. *Of the Countries of State, and Free Gifts.*
13. *Of the expending of Money.*
14. *Of the reserving it.*

THE Art of Finances, or the Treasury, is a principal part of the Politicks; and
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so much the more necessary in a State, in that Money is the Soul of all Affairs. A Commonwealth is no further powerful, than proportionably to the richness of its publick Treasury, and the greatness of the yearly Income that maintain it. This the *French* Name plainly importeth; for *Finance* is an old Word, signifying Power, and comes from the ancient Verb *Finer*, which is to be able, to may or can.

Three particulars are here to be considered. First, Just and easie means to make Money. Secondly, the prudent expending it. Thirdly, the keeping it in, and laying it up for necessities that may happen; as Famine, Pestilence, War, Fire, Shipwrack, and such like.

We have in *France* three general means to make Money; The King's Demesnes. Impositions on the People, Merchandises, &c. Of this last I will speak in the Chapter of Commerce. I will say nothing here of Conquests; which may come in for a Fourth means of Getting; I will treat of them elsewhere.

Before any further advance into this matter, it will be pertinent to observe, that the fundamental Wealth of a State consists in the Multitude and Plenty of Subjects. For 'tis Men that Till the Ground; that produce Manufactures; that manage Trade; that go to War; that People Colonies; and in one word, that bring in Money. To make way in *France* for multiplying of Men, and oblige them to Marry, the King may at once do two things, after the example of the Emperor *Augustus*. First, He may decree Priviledges and Advan-

tages in favour of such as shall have divers Children; exempting them from Guardianships, from being Collectors, from Commissions to look to the Fruits of Sequestred Lands, and other burthensom Offices: He may discharge them from Subsidies, and even give them some Estate. Secondly, He might impose penalties upon those that Marry not before a certain Age: and take part in the Successions of all sorts of persons, who in contempt of Law and Wedlock, live single, not having impediment by any natural infirmity. 'Tis upon a like consideration, that I said in a former Chapter, the King, to restrain Parents from compelling their Daughters into Cloisters, might Declare, that the right of all Recluses in any Succession, was vested in Himself: And 'tis for the very same reason that the Ancient Earls of *Flanders* were Heirs to all the Priests that were their Subjects.

Now to that which *Augustus* did for the inducing of his Subjects to Marry, the King might add Two particulars: One is, That the First Year a Man Taxable did Marry the first time, being under 26 years of age, he should be exempt from all Subsidies and Impositions, and publick Charges, even quartering of Soldiers, in case he kept House apart, and was settled in a Dwelling of his own. If the newly Married be the King's Officer, his Office should not fall into the King's hand, if he died within the year. Commanders also, and Soldiers should be dispens'd with, as to their serving for that time, unless on urgent necessity, or some important occasion. The other particular

lar which in *France* had need to be added to *Augustus's* Ordinances, is, to take effectual Order, that persons once Married, be not so easily separated again as they are. For 'tis to no purpose to contract Marriages, if they be not stuck to, and the coupled Parties cohabit not.

A strange abuse in this matter of separation hath crept in of late, nor know I how the Officials have become so favourable in it, or how the Parliaments have suffer'd it. Now-a-days, a Woman that would have, as they say, her swing, and without controul, practice all that her giddy, witless, and oft times wanton humour prompts her to, raiseth stirrs in the House, at length tires out her Husbands patience; hereupon, she complains of his Vices, hath Servants suborned for her purpose; a Divorce comes to be adjudged upon their Depositions, the Husband is sentenced to yield her up her Goods, and not only do that, but also to let her have possession of her Dower, or of a good part of it; at least to allow her a great Pension. Then this Woman reties, takes an House, and lives after her own fashion, which is not alway the most commendable in the World; her Husband the while, sinking under the whole weight of his Household Affairs. Had she counted upon nothing else, but that of necessity she must live with her Husband, and in his House, she would have formed her self to it, and not have play'd her vexatious pranks; so she had promoted the happiness of her Husband, and of the Children, and together with it, her own. For application therefore
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of a remedy in this case, it must be a Law That a Wife shall not sue for a Separation, as to Person or Habitation, but by the advice of four of her nearest Kindred; Men of known Integrity: and that a Separation being ordered, either by Sentence in Court, or by Accommodation between the parties, she shall be bound to enter a Monastery, without egress again; nor suffered to admit a visit from any man there; it being contrary to Publick decency, that a Woman who hath lost her Husband, (for to be separated from him, is to lose him) should appear openly, and maintain commerce with other Men. On the other hand, her Sex, and all seemliness requiring, that in this estate she hide her self, and hide withal her ill fortune, and her grief for it. I would too that a very slender Pension be adjudged her. And since Husbands will be found in fault on their part likewise, and discover their ill husbandry, it would be very just, that the disposal of their Estates be not left to them, nor the possession of more than a part of 'em: as is the case of Wives: and that supposing they have Children, the Money arising from the remainder, should be received, employed, and administred by a Guardian: He to account for it to the said Children in due time. If there be none, the Revenue exceeding the Pension should be laid out on Hospitals, and other necessities of the State. This Law should extend to Separations already made. And such rigour being practis'd in matter of Divorces, there would be no more of 'em. Husbands and Wives would be under a reciprocal

cal Obligation, to live together, and to live together discreetly: so they would breed up a Family that might prove the contentment of their Life, the comfort of their elder years; and be beneficial to the whole Kingdom.

There is a further consideration to be made in the matter of the Finances; and it is this, namely, that it is expedient the King should declare, that for the future He will be Creditor, and Donotary to His Receivers and accountable Officers, for their Wives dotal Money, and Marriage settlements, and for their Childrens Portions and Donatives: then explaining the late Ordinances to take away all difficulty, declare further, the crime of misemploying the publick Money to be punishable by death; and ordain, that the Interests, Amends, and civil Reparations adjudged against Criminals of that kind, should fall upon their Heirs or Legatees. This Law is rigorous; yet it is just and necessary: forasmuch as it will strike terror on the Financiers: who having no hope to escape Justice, could not entertain a Thought of committing a fault that would ruine all that is dearest to them. Beside, the *Romans* punish'd even with death, the very friends of those whom they condemn'd for Crimes against the State; the History of *Sejanus* affords unquestionable proof of it.

That which we call the Demesne of the King, and of the Crown, cannot be Alienated, nor is it liable to any charge or encumbrance. This Law is Fundamental in all kind of Commonwealths, as well as in *France*. But here things

things are judged to belong to the Crown three manner of ways from all Antiquity: As the Sovereignty, the power of War, Subsidies, and the like. By Declaration; when the King, by His Letters, declares some particular united to the Crown. By Confession, when for the continued space of ten years, the Receivers have accompted for it to the Chamber. There are many questions propoſable in reference to the Demefne; but it is not our buſineſs to State them. *Chopin* may be conſulted, who hath learnedly written of this Subject.

In neceſſities of the State, divers things have been engaged by the King to the uſe of private perſons, who have paid in Sums thereupon. Yet theſe perſons cannot hinder, but that the things may be recovered. And there are two equitable ways to effect this. The Firſt is, by making a Principal of what is due to thoſe Creditors, and aſſigning them Rents upon the Town Hall of *Paris*, or ſome other place; of which there are examples. For when the King had Sold, or rather engaged ſome Rights of His unto particular Men, they have been reſum'd by Contracts for a Rent-charge. Now thoſe Rights were Demefne, upon which, to recover the Demefne, Rents were charged. The ſame courſe then may be taken again. Nor could the Engagees have any cauſe to complain; for the engagements made to 'em, are but to ſecure their due, and give them not any propriety: their ſecurity therefore will be as great when they have Contracts for Rent. For the one and the other pertains to the Demefne ſtill. And ſuch
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kind of Impositions in like manner, the power to impose them being Royal and Dominical, the Engagees concerned will by this means have security for security, and Rent for Rent. But that the King may reap advantage from this exchange, it is necessary to settle a Stock for the raising of these new Rents; and to that end, a new Imposition must be laid upon the Clergy, the Countries of State, Cities, Commonalties, Companies, Colledges, Merchants, and other Members of the Kingdom, the Engagees themselves paying their proportions. There is in this no inconvenience at all: because the Demesne having been engaged for the preservation and defence of all the Corporations in the Kingdom, it is natural, that they all contribute to free it again.

The second way to disengage the Demesne, would be, by giving ready Money instead of Rents, and making an Imposition for this end, which might be more easie. A reimbursement should be compleated in five or six years. Mean time, and before all things, the Engagees must be put out of Possession, and order given, that the Receivers of the Demesne do take up the profits. For if any condition be propos'd while the said Engagees are in possession, they will make a thousand difficulties at it; and on the contrary, if they no longer possess, they will readily consent. But that the matter may be transacted with less noise, it ought to be expedited in each Parliament apart: or at least the Receivers commanded, by virtue of a Decree of the Kings Council, to receive all the profits, and even those of the engaged Demesnes.

mesnes. If there be not made a new imposition, in order to recover those Demesnes, the affair will not be of advantage to the King; and there may one be very justly made for the reasons now alledged, and for the putting of things again in order, Let us pass unto the art of the Tallies.

The Imposition of the Tallies [or Taxes] is a kind of Subsidy or Aid laid upon the people. Under it, (in *France*) are comprehended the Tallion, and the Subsistence; as they term them. The Tallie is hugely equitable; it is ancient; it is necessary; and in use all the world over. For there never was People that paid not to defray the publick Expences. In *France* it is so moderate, and may be so easily paid, that it hath been known to be higher than now it is: because the sums that make it up are receiv'd without much trouble: Yet at present, though it be considerably diminish'd, the People are scarce able to pay it, and the Country extreamly incommodated by it. The prime cause of this is, that the ratable persons considered, the rates are not duely proportion'd; the rich Peasants, the Justicers of the Villages, the Gentlemens Farmers, the Eleus, and other Persons of Power, are so eased, that they pay almost nothing, and the poorest of all do bear all. A second cause of the mischief is, that they who are Commission'd to receive the Tallies, do so run up the charges, that they far exceed the principal, and thus draw Money out of the Peoples hands, which they can part with but once. When the Sergeants of Villages need a Cow, or Corn,
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or some piece of Houſhold-ſtuff, they go to the Peaſants houſes where they know the ſame is to be had; there they make Seizures, and then Sales at what price they pleaſe. They ſeize and ſell whatever they find, to the very Houſehold-loaf of Bread that hath been cut, and is in uſe: upon this, the poor Ruſtick hath nothing left to help himſelf, but is utterly diſtreſſed, and can no longer do his work. The greateſt part of theſe Officers muſt be ſuppreſſ'd; the more there are of them in the matter of the Finances, the more diſorder and oppreſſion there is. For all of them look for profit; and they ſpoil all by their avarice and ignorance.

To remedy the two Evils that have been mention'd, effectual order muſt be taken that the Peaſants may pay equally; that is, in proportion to the eſtate they have; and pay without charges ſuperadded. Firſt, all the Taxes ſhould be made real, as they are in *Languedoc*, that every one may pay. Secondly, The Tax ſhould be levied in kind of the fruits that are receiv'd from the Lands and Tenements, as Wine, Sider, Beer, Corn, Cattle, and the like; the quantity that is to be taken being ſtinted and fix'd, for example, to a Tenth part. A Peaſant that might have ten Buſhels of Corn, would very willingly pay one to the King, and might do it without inconvenience. But when for payment of Forty Sous in Money, which he hath not, the Sergeants and Collectors ſeize upon, and ſell the ten Buſhels of Corn, which too are priz'd at an extream low rate, and all is ſpent in charges, doth he not really, inſtead
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of Forty Sous, pay Twenty Livres? This turns not at all to the profit of the King, and tends to the undoing of his People.

Under the name of Lands and Tenements this Tenth might be extended unto Houses in Cities, Towns and Villages, and they ordered to pay a Tenth part of the Money they might be let out for; which should be very low rated. In like manner a Tenth or Twentieth part might be taken upon Contracts for a Rent-charge. For these are stocks, and a real Estate. The Ecclesiasticks, who have sure been wary men, have taken their Rents in kind, and these sorts of Rents are now infinitely augmented. The greatest part of the Revenues of the *Romans* and *Ægyptians* themselves, was paid in Fruits. They paid their Armies and Officers with them. Many Kings have taken a Tenth of Estates, oft-times a Fifth, sometimes a Third. It is not necessary that the People have Money; but they must have Fruits for sustenance of life. The King might have Farmers of this Tenth in each Parish, or in each Election, who might let out under Farms of it to the Peasants, as is done in the Tyths of the Church.

If it be thought fit to take things in kind, there must be Magazines in Cities, as there are Store-houses for Salt: in them the Receivers should sell the Fruits, or reserve them, as *Joseph* did in *Ægypt*. The King will need them for Armies, for Fleets, for Victualling places of strength, for Transportation into Foreign parts; especially in case of a Famine. This is practis'd in many Countries abroad, and particularly in *Italy*. What is done in a petty State,

State, may be done in a great Kingdom. It is not to be doubted, but that if the Tallie were thus rais'd, it would go further than it does, and the People suffer no incommodity by it at all. But one thing which presseth more at present, is, the putting of the Country in case again. For this end, the rich must be permitted to give Cows, Sheep, and other Cattle, upon terms, to the poor Peasants. This is done in very many places, yea, in the greatest part of the Kingdom. The too severe, and over-scrupulous Parish Priests prohibit it; but they will not any longer be able to do so, when the thing is publickly permitted.

It seems unreasonable, that some certain Cities should, upon imaginary Privileges, be for ever exempted from the charges of the State; and mean time, the Country bear the whole weight of them. The pretext of these Franchises hath induced divers of the Peasants to retire to these places. Order must be taken in the case, and all these Cities obliged to contribute to the expences of the Kingdom, which they are so considerable a part of. They may then be brought to pay, under colour of Subsistence or Loan. There should be Garisons sent them, or Soldiers quartered upon them: that all the Beams of the State may bear their part in publick affairs, and so the weight be more easie to them, whereas one alone would be over-charg'd, and break under it.

The third means the King hath to bring Him in Money, consists in the Gabells. Some have said, that the Gabells are not of the nature of the Kings Demesne: and their reason is,

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because the Ordinances for the first imposition of them do import, that it was not the Kings intention they should so be. The contrary might be true. For, beside that the Salt-pits did heretofore belong to the Emperour, as goods of the Empire, the sums that are raised out of them, are raised by publick Authority, and turn to the profit of the whole Kingdom: as hath been done for many Ages. But however that be, not to enter into a dispute, which can be of no consequence here, I will consider the Gabells according to the present state of things. I will not say when this kind of Imposition did commence in *France*; nor upon what examples of Antiquity our Kings did ground themselves. Nor will I explain, how, beside the Gabells of *France*, which are call'd *The grand party*, there are the Gabells of *Provence*, *Dauphine*, *Languedoc*, and *Lionnois*; because the thing is known, and makes not to our purpose.

The Gabells are paid in *France* by two different means. First by Impositions; so in places neighbouring on the Salt-free Countries. There, for fear the Subjects would not take Salt at the Kings Garners, the Officers lee how many Minots each Parish ought to take: then a rate is made in the Parishes, for it, as for the Tallie. The second means is without Imposition: this is the use in places remote from the Salt-free Countries. There, because prohibited Salt cannot be brought in, every one fetcheth from the Garners at the price currant.

The King receives a great deal of Money from these Gaballs; but the People pay excessively

sively beyond what comes into His Coſſers. The infinite number of Officers belonging to a Store-houſe, the Receivers, the Commiſſioners, the Archers, the Charges, the Portage, the Fees of Officers, to whom Preſents are alſo made, do ſwallow up huge ſums, which the King ſingers not, and the People do pay. For there is not a petty Gabeller but lives handsomely by his Employment: not a Commiſſioner but makes him a Fortune, and grows rich upon it, making good chear, and great expences. 'Tis of very much importance that a remedy be apply'd to the malady; and in truth, the vexations which the King's Subjects do ſuffer under pretext of the Gabelle, are not to be comprehended. The Archers enter into Houſes, to ſearch (they ſay) for concealed Salt: in obedience to Authority the doors are open'd to them; mean time themſelves covertly convey in ſome Bags: hereupon they form a Proceſs; and the Matter of the Houſe is exceſſively fin'd: nor do they depart till they have pillag'd all they can lay hands on. If entrance be deny'd them, they force the Houſe, and act all Hoſtilities: nor dares any one complain; all are at their Mercy; and thus they ruine the poor Perſons whom they ſingle out. This is no way beneficial to the King's affairs, nor is it His intention, that His Subjects ſhould be ſo ill treated. But it is eaſie to break them of this courſe.

Fiſt of all, it muſt be debated in the Kings Council of the Finances, what ſum is fit to be taken for the Salt; this ſum being determin'd at ten or twelve Millions; for example, two ſeveral parts of it ſhall be ſet out, to be yearly paid:

paid: one for the Country-Parishes, another for the Cities. Each of these allotted parts shall be sent into each Generality, and thence to the places where there is a Store-house of Salt. The allotment for the Country shall be divided by the Parishes, as is now done for the Tallie, the Subjects among themselves rating every one's proportion. The Gentlemen, the Church-men, the Monasticks, and others, must be engaged in it, and bear their part: because they are charged by reason Salt is so dear as now it is; and by consequence, the King making a change to the profit of all, all ought to be taxed, to recompence the diminution that will follow in the Finances.

The second Sum allotted for the Cities, shall in like manner be sent to the Generalities, and Salt-Garners, that such Rents as the Towns are to pay the King may be divided; The houses may be measured by the Perch, and the Rents assessed accordingly; much like to what is done for cleansing the Streets at *Paris*. The Cities that claim a Freedom, as *Angers*, *Orleans*, and *Paris*, shall enter into this contribution, for the same reason that the Ecclesiasticks and Gentlemen do; inasmuch as they will notably profit by the suppression of the Gabells, and abatement of the price of Salt. For it is to be observed, that that measure which now costs at *Paris* five and forty Livres, might amount not to two Crowns, and so proportionably in other Cities.

Now the number of Perches in each City being known, (having been taken by Commissioners of the Kings, who might be Citizens)

zens,) it will be very easie, on any necessity, to raise an aid from the City, upon the proportion of the said Perches, by way of Loan or Subvention, or under some other title. And that the Citizens may not oppose the Kings intentions in the matter, permission must be given to each City, to treat every year with what Merchants they please; and agree a price for the Salt that shall be there sold through the whole year; He to sell it, who will oblige himself to afford it best cheap; (except the Citizens had rather leave it free for all Merchants that would, to bring in,) always understood, that there be no power to compell any one to buy. The like may be done in every Village; the Gentleman causing Salt to be Sold in a Servant's name, and making the profit of it. This course, will, without doubt, be gain to the People; and Salt being sold in such manner, it may be brought to pass, that the Commodity it self shall pay the Rents which shall be due to the King, and they the while, buy it at much a lower rate than they do. So that clearly, all sorts will receive such a proposal with applause. To augment the cheapness of Salt, it should be ordained, that it be free from paying to Lordships, and by the Load, and from Imposts.

The thing being resolved in the Council, the King shall make a Declaration in form of an Edict, by which His Majesty shall take off the Impositions upon Salt, on condition the Towns and Parishes will pay Him yearly the Sums He shall resolve upon in His Council; and that until the Declaration be executed,

ted, the Gabell shall continue its course. It would be needful to ordain, that these Sums be paid into the hands of the Receivers of the Tallies. For there would be no more need of a Receiver of a Salt-garner. What are so many Receivers good for, but to consume all? In this case, the Receivers of Salt must be otherwise dispos'd of. This Declaration would include a suppression of all the Officers of the Gabells; for when Salt should be freely Sold, the King would have no more use of 'em. As for their re-imbursment, provision might be made, either by continuing their wages during their Lives, or by assigning them Rents, which might be redeemed for little and little; or by giving them ready Money. The People too might be charged with this re-imbursment, in favour of the suppression of the Gabells. This Affair might be worth the King a great deal, and can never fail of being beneficial: the People will gain six Millions by it, beside the quiet it will yield them. It being put in execution, the King may purchase the Salt-pits, upon the greatest part of which, He would - previously have the Tenth part of the Salt, if He took the Tenth of all Revenues, as I said afore. Again, in doing as hath been shewed, He would have an Army ready raised; for all the Gabellers must be led into the Field. There are in their Companies notable stout Men, who also have been in action.

As for the Salt-free Countries which have bought out their freedom, no one durst touch them hitherto, by reason of the strength of the *Huguenots*, the Civil and Forraign Wars, and other

other Considerations, as the Minority of Kings, &c. But now that the King is Master, and in a condition to make Himself be obeyed; 'tis reasonable, that he do oblige so many great and rich Provinces to bear a part of the burthens of the State, in proportion to their ability, for the easing the rest of *France*. And to this end, one of the three following Propositions may be made them. First, to take a re-imbursment of the Sums paid by them; which re-imbursment shall be made, by granting them a diminution of the Tallies, without putting hand in Purse other ways. Hereto may be subjoyn'd, that the King may not wholly discharge them: because such a discharge tendeth to the oppressing of his other Subjects: that a King may indeed augment and diminish Subsidies, as seemeth him good, but not extinguish them; it not being possible, that a Kingdom should subsist without publick Incoms: that it must be remembred on this occasion, how *Nero* proposing to take off all the Imposts that were paid at *Rome*, the Senate oppos'd it, as a thing that would be the ruine of the Empire. The Second Proposition might be, that these Provinces be obliged to pay the King a yearly Rent, by way of Supplement, and in confirmation of their ancient Treaty. The Third, that the Tallie, and other Impositions on them, be augmented, to even the ballance, which cannot be done any other way.

There are certain means to maintain the Finances; among others, the Free Gifts that are presented to the King by the People of those Provinces, which are called *Countries of*

State. No other Order need be taken with them, but to hinder as much as may be, that the principal Members of these States be not in the Offices they bear, unjust at the Publick cost. Yet they must make their advantages in them, otherwise the States would come to nothing; which would occasion no small confusion, and a retardment of the King's Affairs. His Majesty might make Himself Master of the Deputations, and gainful Commissions, which are given to the States: As for example, in *Bretannie*, *Monsieur* the late *Mareschal de la Milleray*, nominated alone, or rather, caus'd to be nominated whom he pleas'd, and there was no more deliberating after he had given order; 'twas one way he had to gratifie his Friends. *Monsieur* the Duke *Mazarin*, does the same still; which may, in His person, succeed well: but the King may cause whom he will to be nominated, and the liberty of the States will not suffer by it any prejudice, or innovation at all: for such is the condition of things in these places. I will not speak here of the Farms of Iron, nor of others of like value. These things run in ordinary course.

But having spoken of the bringing in of Money, I must speak of a due laying out, and a like due laying up thereof. The advantage of an Exchequer doth not consist in the bare getting in of Money; but also in a meet expending of it: and there is no less profit in giving of it forth, than in receiving of it. 'Tis necessary the King should spend to maintain his Revenues. For if all the Sums that come into His Coffers should not issue thence again,

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no one, in the end, would be able to pay Him any thing. The Kings of *Ægypt*, who took a third part of their Subjects Estates, caus'd the Labyrinth to be built, the Pyramids to be erected, the Lake of *Meotis* to be dug up, and other Fabricks rais'd, which are incredible to Posterity. Their design was to disperse among People, the Treasure they received from them; and withal, banish sloth and idleness out of their States. These two Vices, so dangerous in Kingdoms, the *Ægyptian* Laws did so strictly provide against, that there were particular Magistrates appointed, unto whom every private Man was obliged to give an account every year of all that he had done throughout the year; which was executed with so much exactness and rigor, that if any one had taken an ill course to live, or not preserv'd his Estate, he was severely punish'd for it. The same thing was done at *Athens*, and the *Romans* had Censors, who took the like care; they had it in charge, to make a review of all the people every fifth year, and inform the Senate of all that was amiss in the Commonwealth. I have often wondred, that there is no such Officer in *France*: and that each ones Estate is not precisely known, which 'tis hugely important, it should be; because in difficult times, when the Kingdom perceives it self involv'd in urgent necessities, succor must be drawn from every one in proportion to his Interest in the Publick Fortune, that is, in proportion to what he possesseth in the Kingdom.

Expence must be made with good Husbandry; and a judicious parcimony observed in it;

it; that it run not out to a profusion on one hand, nor sink into a sordid avarice on the other: If Measure and Rule be not kept in the issuing out of Money, all the Gold of *Asia* will be but a small matter. *Caligula* found the way to consume in his debauches in one year, the immense Treasures which his Predecessor had been heaping up all along the whole course of his Empire. Thus it is expedient, that a King do cause the sums to be paid which are charged upon the Receipt of his Finances; and also that He give liberally; but always so order the matter by his Prudence, that nothing go out of, or be kept in his hand, but for the preservation and prosperity of His Subjects.

I said in a former Chapter, that there were too many Officers in *France*; that the wages they draw from the King were unprofitable, nay, prejudicial to the State. Since the Sale of Offices was introduced, divers new Creations have been made. All these Edicts were meerly to get Money in some pressing Occurrences; and nothing but the conjunctures of the time rendred them tolerable. Now that those occurrences are over, and the conjunctures pass'd, things must be reduc'd to due order, by suppressing all those new Officers.

I noted, that wherever Magistracy brought gain, disorders would creep in; the reason of which is very clear, and very natural. For it is infallibly certain, that Judges will augment the number of Suits, while those Suits will bring them in profit. Consequently, useless Officers being suppress'd, and provision made
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in the case by a due reduction, sufficient Salaries must be allowed them, and they forbidden to take any thing of the Plaintiff or Defendant, upon the Penalties express'd in the ancient Statutes. And that the King might make a stock to raise those Salaries, without charging His Finances, it should be ordained, that such as go to Law shall, when they commence their Suit, deposite a certain sum into the hands of the Clerks: this, to be done in all the Royal Jurisdictions. As for other Judges, they ought to take nothing at all: the proprietary Lords must defray the charge of their Courts, if they will keep up the Power to hold them: they having it of the King upon this condition, from the first Grant of the Fiefs.

In matter of the Finances, it is not sufficient to have the Secret of getting Money, and the skill of duly expending it: but there must be also a right course taken to make reserves of it. The *Romans* had a publick Treasury, where every year they laid up certain sums for the necessities of the Commonwealth. Other Nations were no less provident. History tells us of the Stores of *David*, of *Cresus*, of *Midas*, and many others. The King having settled an Order in His Finances, both as to Expences and Receipt, it will be very prudently done of Him, to limit what he shall think fit to reserve: and this reservation should make the first Article in his Finances, and be continued until he hath in his Coffers, in some secret place, the fourth part at least of all the Coin in the Kingdom: the rest (if well us'd) may be sufficient for all the People to maintain Commerce,
and

and pay the King's Revenues I say, this reserve should be in a secret place, and known only to persons of approved Fidelity. For if many had notice of it, such a store might occasion Seditions, and Civil Wars. Now a fourth part of the Money being once laid up apart in the King's Coffers, some addition to it shall be made continually from year to year, in proportion to what comes in anew.

Yet liberty must be left to Persons, for some time, to have Gold and Silver Plate: yea, it would do well, to augment the use and mode of having it, if it may be; and that for three reasons. First, because the Goldsmiths perceiving hope of gain, will not want inventions and industries to get into *France* as much Metal as possibly they may, either in ingots, or barrs, or coyned pieces. Secondly, because by this means Riches will be kept in the Kingdom, and when a season for it comes, all they that are owners of such Plate, may be commanded to carry it to the Mint, and there receive the price of it. The third reason is, because the Goldsmiths having wrought up, and made Plate, contrary to the direction of the Statute, (which undoubtedly they will do) a search may be made in the case, if affairs require; a search highly just, and no less advantageous.

Two regulations must be made for the Goldsmiths, and they enjoyned to observe them, upon pain of forfeiting Life and Goods; and so strict an hand held over them, that of all who transgress, not a Man be pardoned. The first is, to prohibit their working upon any piece of Gold, or Silver Coyn. The second,
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that they do not change the form of any prohibited Plate: rectifie and mend it they may. At the same time, all Persons that have any such and would put it off, must be commanded upon great penalties, to carry it to the Mint, where ready Money shall be paid them for it, at the currant price; they making proof that they are the true owners; and this to avoid Thieveries which may have been committed. These two regulations will oblige the Goldsmiths to make use of new Silver, or Foreign Coyns, and thus they would cause a very considerable quantity of either to enter into *France*.

The State would receive no small profit by taking a due order in matter of Coyn. It should be ordained therefore in the first place; that no more be made any where but at *Paris*; and all other Mints, and their Officers, suppress'd as useles. The *Romans*, who had so much Money, had but one place to make it in, which was a Temple of *Juno's* at *Rome*. *Charlemain* forbad any Money to be made elsewhere than in His Palace. And the truth is, should all the Money of *France* pass through *Paris*, the King would much better know what quantity of it was in His Kingdom. Secondly, the *Court des Monnoyes* must be suppress'd, and united to the Chamber of Accompts, as I have said heretofore. In the third place, the value of Brass Money must be abated; this kind of Coyn being the ruine of the State. It cannot be believ'd how many Liarts and Sous the *Hollanders* have brought into *France*. It would be convenient to set the Sous at two Liarts a-piece, the Liarts at a Denier, and the Doubles at an Obole,

Obole, (half a Denier:) but this should be done by little and little, and the fall made by degrees, that the people be not ruin'd: mean time, Silver pieces of six blanks, others of a Sous in value, and of twelve Deniers, are to be stamped. Brasiers, and workers in Mettal, must be forbidden to melt up any Sous, Liarts, or Doubles; or otherwise use them in work. For after the Reduction, a Sous, a Liart, and a Double, would be worth more in work than in Money; and that quantity of them which is in the Kingdom being preserv'd, would suffice for Commerce in small wares; they also being less worth in Money than otherwise, Foreigners would bring in no more of them. In the fourth place, 'tis fit that a Gold-coyn be made of the value of the *Levis's*; this Coyn to have on the front a Sun, the face thereof representing the King, with these words about it, *Nec pluribus impar*, and the year it is made in: On the reverse, a Cross charged or cantoned with Fleurdelizes; and the ordinary Motto, *CHRISTUS vincit, regnat & imperat*. Of this Coyn there should be half and quarter pieces made, as there are half Crowns of Gold. This new Money should be called *Suns*, and all Gold Louises made in *France*, forbidden. As likewise all cravens of Or Sol, and Crowns of the Queen. New Silver-coyn also should be made; the pieces called *Monarques*, or *Dieudannes*, or some other names; in them the Figure of the King crowned after the manner of Antiquity, with the Title *Ludovicus XIV. Francia Rex*: on the reverse, a Cross with Fleurdelizes, and the ordinary Inscription. Of these

these pieces there must be some of twelve Deniers, others of two Sous, six Deniers: others of five Sous, of ten Sous, of twenty, of forty. And to have matter for them, all Loueses of sixty must be forthwith prohibited: because a multitude of false ones go abroad. Afterward, the Loueses of thirty Sous, made any where but at *Paris*, shall be call'd in; and there must the new Coyns be also made. They will be well received by the People; for that every one hath an extream affection for the King; and because in *France* we account by Livres, or Franks, and have no such Money; the Quardecues being no longer current. This new Coyning of Money is likely to bring a great deal into the Kings Coffers.

Gold and Silver must be held in *France* at an higher rate than they bear among Strangers; that we may draw it hither: nothing hath brought us so much Gold from *Spain*, *Italy*, and other Countries, as the permission sometime granted, that light pieces should pass. The same thing should be done awhile, for once again: it would cause all Foreigners to come and take off our Wines, our Linnen, and our Corn.

I should not forget to say, as I put an end to this Chapter, that the Masters of Accompts, the Correctors and Auditors, having wages of the King, ought not to take any other Salary for any thing they do, that directly refers to His Majesties service; I mean, for the Accompts of the Treasurers of the Reserve, and other Accomptable Officers: for they are paid for this by their wages: practising in the manner they

they do, they take, as the saying is, two Tolls of one grift.

I said, that it was not at all just, that the Masters of Accounts, Auditors, and Correctors, take Fees for the Accounts they examine, forasmuch as they receive Wages and Privileges from the King: also this Custom was anciently practis'd, and this would be to reduce things to the primitive State. I well know, that the pretence of these Fees is founded upon the creation of some Chamber of Accouuts, where those payments are made that never go to the Chamber; but this pretext is frivolous; for the Chambers of Accompts in *Montpellier*, and elsewhere, ought not in like manner to take any Money for examining the Accounts of the King: so these new Chambers take away no Money from that at *Paris*, that peradventure takes from them the homages, and the verification of gifts; but in this the Clerks only are the loosers, and the Master Auditors and Correctors are not concern'd.

Addition.

Of the fine gross Farms.

I said but a word by the way of fine gross Farms, which is one of the projects to raise Money by; the fine gross Farms are let upon the Merchandise, and upon the receipt of the Kings Rights; to avoid the charge of all these, an agreement might be concluded with all the Merchants, to pay every year a certain sum to the King at *Paris*; and upon their doing this, they

they should not be molested in their passage on the Rivers, or by Land, for any Toll or Custom.

C H A P. XI.

1. *Of Peace and War. Of Sciences, of Arts, of Laws, of Publick Edifices, and Shews.*
2. *Of Arms, of Arsenals, Artilleries, of Fortified places and Governors.*
3. *Of Armies, of Conquests; how a Conquered Country should be preserved.*

Either Calm or Storm, if perpetual, would alike unfit the Sea for Navigation. The Waves must not rage, and swallow up the Vessels they should bear: but there must be Wind enough to fill the Sails, and give convenient motion; nay some little Tempests are of use to quicken the Pilots skill; whom continual fair weather would entice into a dangerous idleness. Just so is it necessary, that there still be, in a great State, especially in Nations of the *French* temper, some moderate agitation, and that the noise of Arms produce an effect upon them, like that of the Winds upon the Sea. Peace, by general consent, is that at which all Politicians do aim; nor can it be deny'd to be preferable to War, being natural, as Liberty is. Yet War hath its peculiar advantages; and those to such a degree, that we

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may account it to be of Divine Right. To say true, what other right did GOD give His People against the Kings of *Canaan*? In short, War makes the Peace of Kingdoms the more firm, as a Storm causeth the Air to resume a more settled serenity. The prudence of Laws therefore should have provided Expedients for the preservation of States in each of these seasons: and the Wisdom of Legislators hath been justly taxed, in that they have not sufficiently thought upon this provision. The Poet, upon this ground, gives his *Ulysses* all along, the company of *Minerva*, and disguiseth her a great many ways, that she might not be parted from him. In sum, the Mythologists representing this Goddess armed, and bearing both the Shield and Thunder-bolt of *Jupiter* her Father, do therein let us know, that the Wisdom of a good King ought to serve Him both for Peace and War. And such was the manner of teaching, in deepest and most remote Antiquity: Philosophy then but growing up, and bashful, durst not shew her full lustre unto deprav'd and ignorant men, to whom She was yet very much a Stranger. She accosted them veiled with the shadows of Fable; and went softly and secretly about the preparing of their reason to receive her illuminations and instructions. But to return to our similitude; A Storm doth not reach to the whole extent of the Ocean; and whatever Tumults be in some part of a Kingdom, yet the whole doth not so feel the shock of War, but that in others, Peace subsists; so as the Glory of Arms, and the Contentments of a full Tranquility, may be

be had together. Nevertheless, since these two different times do require like different cares; each of which were enough to take up the whole application of an excellent King; it is expedient to consider them severally.

Peace is undoubtedly proper for the Cultivation of Arts and Sciences. Knowing Men there must be in a Common-wealth; it being necessary that there should be good Men. For knowledge 'tis that enlightens our Soul, shews us Virtue, and inflames us with desire to possess it. I joyn Sciences here and Arts; it being impossible that Men should have the one without the other. For as they are Images of GOD, they are mov'd by a natural propension, to produce one thing or other; so that having acquired general Speculative Principles, they necessarily descend to Practical operations, which are perform'd by particular Rules, from whence Arts take their rise. This is done during a Calm; then the Soul, not interrupted by any violent agitation, enjoys, and by reflections, which by its leisure and repose permit it to make, views its self. 'Tis in these precious hours that it may come to know the Dignity of its Original, and be assured of its Immortality. At such a time, having and keeping its faculties united, it gathers the fruit of a solid Wisdom; which is unto the Soul, as the Sun is to the Eyes of the body; and being of all goods the greatest, communicates its self in precepts; whereof Law is the abstract and consummation, giving the same spirit to all the People.

To proceed: it is important, that Cities be enrich'd with publick Buildings, as Temples, Palaces, and other sumptuous Edifices; because People have, by that means, the more affection for their Country. The *Trojans* regretting their defeat, were griev'd more for the ruine of *Troy*, than the subversion of its Empire. And the *Jews* in *Babylon* lamented the demolishing of the Temple, where they had offered their sacrifices, more than they did the loss of their Liberty. This affection of People for their Country, is likewise augmented by the contentment they receive in it; and this Maxim was a principal reason why the *Greeks* and *Romans* exhibited to their Subjects publick shews.

'Tis in a time of Peace that a Prince should prepare His Forces for War: yea, He ought to be always in Arms, they being the Ornament of His Royal Majesty, and support of the Laws. A People not armed does degenerate; and we see, that Nations heretofore eminently redoubtable, are now bankrupt as to Valour and Reputation. *Cræsus* after his defeat, counselled *Cyrus* His Conqueror, in recompence for the Favour which had been shewed him, to disarm the *Lydians*, and promote among them Musick, good Cheer, and Pleasures: so they would never revolt, nor fail of obeying His Command. This Counsel of *Cræsus* was really good: For by that means the Inhabitants of *Lydia* lost their former love for War, and forgot their ancient virtue. Yet it is not expedient that Arms, which are the Kings, (for He hath the power of the Sword) should be

in the hands of all private Persons alike: and the difference between a Citizen and a Gentleman, a Soldier and a Country-Labourer, not be discern'd: Arms therefore must be in their hands whom the King intends for that employment: and He being every ones Protector, securing all by His Authority, all others must be expressly forbidden to bear any, without His permission, upon pretence of Hunting, or Journey, or Enemies: and this upon pain of being Fined, and in case of reiterated Offence, sent to the Gallies. These Penalties too must not be meerly comminatory, but as they term it, *Legal*, and of indispenfible necessity. Not that Gentlemen should all be depriv'd of the liberty to wear a Sword: on the contrary, 'tis fit to be enjoyn'd them, that they never neglect to do it; because it is the mark of their Quality, and continually minds them of the Virtue of their Ancestors. It may be prohibited them to carry Fire-arms; yet 'tis convenient to permit them to keep in their Houses Musquets, Fire-locks, Pistols, and other Arms; for that they naturally are Defenders of the State, and by consequence ought to be furnish'd for any occasion that may be offered. For the same reason 'tis meet that Gentlemen be enjoyn'd to keep their Stables stor'd with good Horses, to breed up and manage a number of them for their Service in War. But to this end, the use of *German* Horses for the Coach, must be forbidden, and none of them suffered to come into *France*: but Mares only for breed,

Lawyers, Ecclesiasticks, Citizens, Merchants, Artificers, Husbandmen, should never wear a Sword, because 'tis not their Profession; and I would as much approve a Gentleman's fancying to wear a Lawyers Gown, or a Priests Caslock. But that no such person do abuse this Honourable mark, it must be ordained as a fundamental Law of Honour, that whoever strikes with a Sword, a Man, who, (not being of such profession) has none, shall be declared actually fallen from all Honour, and as a very *Plebeian*, yea Villain, (to use the old word) deprav'd from all Gentility, and reduc'd to the rank of a Labourer.

Since Arms are the Kings, as I said, it is expedient that there be Magazines in divers parts of the Kingdom: they, committed to the custody of safe Hands, and persons of unquestionable Fidelity: in them a store of all sorts of Arms Offensive and Defensive; ready fix'd, to Arm 40000 Men. There should be Equipage for Horses, Boots, Spurs; One of these Magazines should be plac'd at *Paris*, to cover *Picardy*, *Champagne* and *Normandy*. One at *Lion*, for any occasion that might happen on the side of the *Mediterranean* of *Italy*, of *Switzerland*, or the *Franche Comte*. One at *Toulouse*, or some other City of *Languedoc*, for all that might be apprehended from *Spain*, or the Sea of *Guyenne*. And one at *Angers*, to secure the Coasts of *Bretagne*, and *Poitou*. There need be beside these, two Arsenals for the Sea; which I shall speak of in their place. It will be necessary to have in the Magazines a good number of Cannon for Battery, and of Field-

pieces

pieces ready mounted with Powder, Ball, and Equipage for the Horses of the Train,

The King should have, for the security of his State, several Fortified Places in his Kingdom. 'Tis an ill piece of Policy to neglect them; and good heed had need be taken, that he that may chance to win a Battel, and become Master of the Field, do not at the same time become Master of the Cities also. It is known what Revolutions *England* hath suffer'd by it. And on the contrary, *Flanders* clearly shews what a Countrey thick set with Fortresses is. Yet Excess being every where vicious. I would observe a mediocrity here. But, above all, there must be left no Fortifications in Towns or Castles, which belong to particular Lords: except the King places in them other Governors than the Proprietors. These kind of Places embolden Persons of Quality that possess them, to Declare themselves, and make Parties in a time of Civil War: what pass'd at *Tailebourg* in the last Troubles, is an example fully authorizing what I have propos'd. I will say more of strong Places and Garisons in the Chapter of the Education of Children.

It is not sufficient to have such strong places, and them well furnished with Garisons and brave Soldiers; unless there be given them Captains fit to Command them, and to be their Governors. In each place then there must be four sorts of Officers. The Governor, the King's Lieutenant, the Governor's Lieutenant, and the Major. These all having their Commissions from His Majesty, it is expedient,

that, as far as is possible, their bearing Office be limited to a certain time; to the end, that the continuing of 'em longer may be in nature of a recompence for their Services. And they thus attending with the greater diligence to their Duty; I should also wish, that being continued in employment, they should change place. As for example, That a person who hath been the King's Lieutenant three years at *Dunkirk*, should go serve as Lieutenant-Governor at *Peronne*, or elsewhere. Not that such a Change were fit to pass upon all the Officers of a place at the same time. But let their Commissions last three Years, and every Year one be changed, that they may serve together one Year only. It is meet to, after the manner of the *Turks*, that their Commissions expired, they be kept a Year without employment, to see whether there be any complaint against them. These alterations would work two effects equally advantagious to the King's Service. The First is, that every one would stick to his Duty. The Second, that the King always having such kind of Employments to give, there would be more persons to hope for them; which would much more strongly engage them to well-doing. The same usage should be introduc'd, if it be possible, in reference to Governors, the King's Lieutenants. There is a concluding observation to be made; namely, that it being the Custom for Governors to have some Companies of Carabines, which they call their Guards; they give them Cassocks of their own Livery. I would have this Order changed; and that the King should
every

every year send each Governor a Troop of Horse to serve about him for a Guard ; they having the King's Cassocks as a Badge of their Commission; and their Officers carrying the Staff in presence of their Governor during their year of service. This would be a means to augment the Authority of the King, and not diminish that of the Governors.

As to Armies, it cannot be precisely said of what number of Men they should consist ; nor whether they ought to be strongest in Horse or in Foot. This wholly depends upon the enterprizes that are made, upon the quality of the Country, and nature of the Enemy. I should advise, that a Great King do keep Troops on foot, even during Peace, nothing is so necessary to a State as old Soldiers. *Augustus*, after his Victories, did not cashier the Forty *Roman* Legions ; which prov'd to be the safety of the Empire. *Constantine*, on the contrary, disbanded them ; and thence came, in the issue, the dissolution of the Power of the *Romans*. *Augustus* however, and the other *Cæsars*, committed a great fault in keeping the *Pretorians* in a Body, for the Grandeur of their Persons; and History tells us what lamentable changes they made in the succession of the Emperors. The *Turks* have fallen into like disasters by following the like usage. I should therefore judge it expedient to divide the Troops into several Quarters, and keep them in far distant Garisons. The ancient Kings of *Ægypt* had a great many Soldiers perpetually in Pay, and were always apprehensive of their Instructions : but found a way to secure themselves from all
such

such Seditions of their Armies. Dividing them into Bodies, according to the diversity of Nations, they gave them different Ensigns; as for instance, to some a Crocodile; to others a Dog; to a third sort a Cat; and so the rest. Now the *Egyptians* being hugely Superstitious, they were easily induced to believe, that their Tutelary Deities were included in the figure of those Beasts which were given them for Ensigns; and that they had the same Antipathies among them in Heaven, which those Beasts that represented them, had to one another upon Earth. Thus under a Veil of Religion, those People were possess'd with an aversion for each other, like those Animals which they had been ordered to carry in their Banners; yet all were close united, and perfectly at accord for the common defence of the State: so nothing could be executed against the intentions of the Prince; because as soon as any should begin to stir, the rest would immediately have opposed them. Upon this example the King might divide all his Troops by Provinces; and though there should be no engaging of Religion in the case, yet much advantage would, without fail, be drawn from thence. For the Nations would strive to out-vie one another, with more zeal and ardor than the Regiments now do. These Regiments themselves might have names given them from the Arms of their Provinces; as that of the *Bretons* might be called the Regiment of the *Ermine*; that of the *Normans* the Regiment of the *Leopards*, &c. *Julius Caesar* raised a new Legion among the *Gauls*, and gave it the name of the *Lark*.

Lark. But what I say in this particular, is but the giving my Opinion. For I am not of the mind, that the order of the Militia should be changed, or Regiments disbanded, which consist of the best and most War-like Troops that are in the World.

'Tis ordinarily a great question ; of what Soldiers an Army should be composed. We have Subjects and Forreigners. The Subjects are Gentlemen and *Plebeians*. The *Plebeians* are Citizens and Rusticks. On the other hand, of Forreigners, some are the Auxiliary Troops of Allies, which serve at the cost of their own Princes : as when the King sent succors into *Germany*, and unto the *Hollanders* : Others are Troops that serve at the cost of the State which employs them. The Ancients termed them *Mercinaries*. Such at this time are the *Suissers*, and not a few *Germans*. All these different sorts of Soldiers may be used, as necessity and the conjuncture of Affairs requires. The *Romans* did so. It is true, by their Treaties of Alliance they always obliged their Allies to send them a certain number of Soldiers ; but these were not incorporated with their Legions ; and it is clear, that Subjects are ever best ; of Subjects, Gentlemen have ordinarily more courage than others. Of *Plebeians*, those of the Country are to be preferred before the Inhabitants of Cities ; because Peasants are more accustomed to Labour and Hardship than Townsmen are. Auxiliary Troops serve but for a time ; and often, when some continuance of service is demanded of them, they impose hard conditions. Mercenaries will have
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Money, and care not if a State be ruin'd, so themselves are paid. In fine, Strangers may on the suddain change Interests and Party ; so of Friends becoming Enemies ; and that in occasions of greatest importance. Mercenaries above all, do serve without affection, and seldom stand it out in Fight unto the utmost. They push on a Victory indeed, but scarce ever win a Battel. In short, Strangers should be as little made use of as possible : and scarce for any other cause, but that Enemies might be deprived of their Aid. When Strangers only are taken into Service, the Subjects grow less War-like, and the most considerable of them despise War, as is done in *Spain*; and extreemly ill done. The *Carthaginians* were ruined principally by the fault they committed in employing *Numidian* Troops and other Strangers ; and not sending out their own Citizens in their Armies.

I will not here speak of the Art of War ; 'tis a matter that deserves a Chapter apart. Yet I will say cursorily, that the Rules of it change as Time and Seasons do. We neither attack Places nor defend them, in the very manner that the Ancients did. There is also a great deal of difference between their way of fighting and ours ; so that they had not the Arms which we now use. All of precept for the leading of an Army, that faileth not nor changeth, is, that Discipline be exercised ; wherein Commanders should never be remiss.

The only School of War, is War it self : and twenty Years experience will better make a great Captain than an hundred Years Reading.

ing. Not but that we have examples of General Command given to persons, who never were in Armies afore. There are elevated Spirits, to whom nothing is impossible; but the instances are rare; and 'tis too too hazardous a course to rely upon them. For a Captain must have, not only spirit and courage, but also credit with his Soldiers; which cannot be gotten but by service. In fine, it is necessary for a great State to keep War on foot, and Men of Quality must be employed in it: to the end there may always be a stock of good Soldiers, and a breed of Generals. These two things give a Nation marvellous advantages and esteem among Foreigners.

Though *France* now be a most powerful Monarchy, by means of its Extent, of its Situation, the Fruitfulness of the Soil, the Number of its Inhabitants; and though greatest States have not always most strength, as biggest Men are not always stoutest; yet were it to be wish'd, that the King did add unto his Kingdom, First all the Low-Countrys to the *Rhine*. This Conquest would re-settle Him in possession of the ancient domain of His Predecessors, giving *France* gain its primitive limits. It would make him Master of the Northern Seas, and by consequence, Arbitrator between the Crowns of *Sweden* and *Denmark*, *Poland*, &c. Conquest must be aspired to out of a thirst of Empire, being an unjust thing, (if we believe *Aristotle*: for I would not determine, but that the right of War were a very lawful right, consonant to what I have said in the beginning of this Chapter;) but the desire of Conquest should

should principally be for the doing of good to all Men; which is the end why GOD gave them Laws. The more Subjects and Power a just Prince hath, the better will it be for the World. Secondly, It were convenient that the King had *Strasbourg*, to keep all *Germany* quiet. In the third place, He need have the *Franche County*, to lay a restraint upon the *Suisses*, least dividing themselves between the Empire and *France*, or serving *Spain* in a War there, they strengthen his Enemies. In the fourth place, *Milan* is necessary in respect of *Italy*, to give the lesser Sovereigns and Republics protection, and ballance the Power which the King of *Spain* hath usurp'd there. In the fifth place, *Genoa* and all its Territory, pertains to the King: nor would the *Genoese* have revolted, had it not been for the bad counsel given to *Francis the First*, to discontent *Doria*. *Genoa* would make the King Master of the *Mediterranean Sea*; beside, those two Acquisitions would keep the Duke of *Savoy* lock'd up within *French Territories*: So he would never depart from the King's Service, being entirely His dependant. We must re-enter the Isle of *Elba*, and into *Portolongone*, and *Piombino*, on the continent, to drive the *Spaniards* out of *Italy*. Here our nearness would keep the Duke of *Florence*, the Dukes of *Parma*, of *Modena*, and of *Mantua*, and even the State of the Pope, in a submission for *France*. *Corsica* would not stand out after the reduction of *Genoa*; and then *Sardinia* would be no difficult Conquest. This would strongly favour any stirs on the account of Liberty or Discontent that might be raised
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in the Kingdoms of *Sicily* and *Naples*: nor would it be an hard matter to raise them in time.

On the Coast of *Bayonne* there would be need of *Fuentaravia*; and those parts of the Kingdom of *Navarr* which the *Spaniards* have in possession, might be justly re-demanded. The King might also carry His Arms into *Catalonia*: we have ancient pretensions there; and the Conquests of it would be no less easily atchieved than it was in the time of the last War. *Majorca* and *Minorca* would follow without trouble. Thus the King would be absolute Umpire of the Mediterranean, and of all the fortune of the *Spaniards*. If it should happen one day that the Queen, or Her Descendants, should have an Hereditary Right there, the King would be in a condition to do Himself reason in these matters. The means of making these Conquests severally, cannot be shewed without particular discourses.

Mean time, what I have said is not, in truth; to be done in a day: it would be an enterprise of many years. Yet there is nothing of meer fancy it it. I propose no Conquest to be made but what hath really been made, except that of the Isles of the Mediterranean, which our Kings never minded; for that before *Charles* the Eighth they never were in case to strengthen themselves at Sea. *Bretagne* was separated from the Kingdom, the Wars of *Italy* took up every Reign unto *Henry* the Second. Then follow'd the affairs of Religion, which put a stop to all the designs that might have been formed in this behalf.

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Here one thing I suggested in the precedent Chapter, is to be remembred; namely, That Conquests do afford a State one expedient to get Money. In this the *Roman* Captains are to be imitated; who made it a point of Glory to lay up extraordinary sums in the Publick Treasury; and their Triumphs were as illustrious by the wealth they brought home with them, as by the Enemies they had defeated in their Expeditions. It would be very material therefore, that Generals should account it a Glory to them, to bring the Spoils of their Enemies unto the profit of the King and Kingdom; or at least make the Conquered Countrys maintain and pay their Armies. But the difficulty is not to make Conquests; the Arms of the *French* will be Victorious wherever they appear. All the trouble is to find out the secret how to keep what hath been gotten. It is fit to say something on this particular.

The means to preserve Conquer'd Countrys which the Ancients used, and that with good success, are in a manner these. Transportations, and shiftings of the People. As when the *Chaldeans* led away the *Jews* to *Babylon*. The taking away of their Money, of their richest Goods, their Antiquities, their Holy Things and things of Religion; as was done with the ancient Idol-gods, and as the Ark of the Covenant, the Tables of *Moses*, and the *Israelites* holy Writings, were dealt withall. The same for substance might be done among us, by shifting of Saints Reliques and Consecrated Images. The leading away of the ablest Men, and such as have greatest credit with the People.

People: So did the *Romans* when they carried some of the *Greeks* out of their Country to *Rome*, and treated them there with all possible kindness and civility. In like manner as to Artificers: the *Turks* drew at one time 30000 Work-men out of *Persia*. The *Romans*, out of their Enemies whom they had vanquish'd and taken in War, reserved those whom they thought stoutest, and made them fight on the Theatre, the People being Spectators, destroying them by that means. Christianity suffers not such inhumanity. Slavery was always practis'd in the case of Prisoners of War, and the ransom we make them pay, is an Image of that old Custom. Some People to this day slay their Prisoners, or send them away to punishment, after the fashion of the Ancients.

To proceed, other means in reference to conquer'd Countrys are, the mixing of the old and new Subjects by Marriage, the Conquerors accommodating themselves to the manners of the Conquered, taking up their modes, eating with them, as *Alexander* demeaned himself towards the *Persians*. Then again, the ruining the Fortifications of their Towns; the taking Hostages of them: the taking away their Arms, and keeping them weak; the abstaining from their Wives; the giving them no jealousy in matter of Love. To have little converse with them, especially in their Houses; and when any is, to see it be with seriousness and decency; to honour them; to do them a pleasure on occasion; not play with them; not pick any quarrel with them: not touch their Liberty, nor the Goods that have been

left them: not disquiet them for matters of Religion. To do them Justice, maintain them in their Laws and Customs, and in their manner of Government, as the Romans did; who permitted the People whom they had subdued, to have their accustomed Laws. To be diffident of them, and shew a confidence in them. To appear not desirous of their secrets: not interrupt them in their pleasures: make them pay the Tribute agreed upon with them exactly, not at all augmenting it. To keep word with them in all things, seldom meddle in their affairs, except it be to accord them: to lend them no Money; but owe them some, and punctually pay the Interests of it: not let them know the true State of affairs; not give them entrance into strong holds; which must always be well furnish'd with Men and Provisions. That the Governor never come among them without being strongest, or having Hostages. To prevent their assembling, and hinder as much as may be their having Commerce with Neighbours that are under another Prince's Dominion: to keep off all kind Strangers from Houses, and severely punish such of 'em as shall cause the least trouble, or any motion that may tend to Sedition. If our Conquerors had practis'd in this manner, *Italy* and *Sicily* would have been *French* to this day.

C H A P. XII.

Of the Sea, and its usefulness. 2. Means to augment the Kings Power there. 3. Of Commerce. 4. Of Colonies.

THE Water of the Sea are wholly obnoxious to the humorousness of Fortune; and the Wind that governs them turneth and changeth with as much inconstancy as that blind Goddess. Yet it is certain, that those States whose renown is greatest in Story, did not establish their supreme Dominion, but upon the power they attained to at Sea: as if Virtue, stout and undaunted, had resolv'd to Combat and Conquer her Enemy in the very seat of her Empire. The *Romans* are one instance, (whose example is ever to be follow'd with as peculiar a diligence, as their conduct of matters was with singular wisdom, and hard to be imitated:) They impos'd not upon the World their Laws, till they had forced the Seas to receive and acknowledge them. Had they not set out War-like Fleets, they had never accomplished their glorious Designs; they had never extended their Frontier beyond *Italy*; never brought down the Pride of *Carthage*; nor Triumphed over all the Crowns on Earth. The *Egyptians*, the *Persians*, and the *Grecians*, considered the Sea as the principal support of their Domination. *Xerxes* having caus'd the *Hell-spout* to be to punish'd (as he

termed it) with Stripes, accounted his Vanity satisfy'd in the sight of all *Asia*, which he drew after him into *Greece*, with so much Magnificence and Pomp, that it seemed as if *Jupiter* Himself was come down from Heaven. The *Venetians* still renew every year their Alliance with this Element, by an old fond superstitious Custom, casting into the Sea a Ring, as if they espoused it: perhaps by this use they would inform all the particular Subjects of their Common wealth, that they should be content with the inconstancy and infidelity of their Women, since the State of espousing the Sea, espouseth inconstancy and infidelity it self. The Riches of *Tunis*, of *Algier*, of *Holland*, and *England*, plainly prove the necessity there is for Princes to be Strong at Sea, and do shew the Profit which does thence accrue. These are petty States, yet dare measure their Forces with those of the Greatest Monarchs. The former of them are *Turkish* Slaves, the others revolted Burghers; and how insolent soever the *English* are, they must confess, that all the British Isles laid together, do not equal the half of our Continent, either in Extent, or in Fruitfulness of Ground, or for Commodiousness of Scituation, or in number of Men; in Wealth, in Valour, Industry, and Understanding; yet they fear not to affirm themselves Sovereigns of the Sea. Had they cast up the Wracks they have suffered, and the Battles they have lost; had they well examin'd our Ports and Havens: in fine, had they compar'd the Coasts of *France* with those of *England*, they would condemn their Vanity;

as *Cannus*, one of their ancient Kings, did.

'Tis true, all States are not disposed unto Navigation: either because they are too far up in Midland Countries; or because the temper of the People suits not with it; or because they want Subjects: but 'tis so far, that any of these Obstacles should hinder the *French* from addicting themselves unto it; that on the contrary, all things conspire to raise a fire of it in them; and to give them hope of advantageous success. The work however is such as must be leisurably carried on, and perfected by little and little; so great a design continually allarming *Europe, Asia, Africa, and America*, Friends and Foes. A precipitation of it would be its ruine. I say not what number of Vessels would be fit for *France* to put to Sea. But I affirm that the King may keep an hundred Gallies, and an hundred Ships on the *Mediterranean*; and a Fleet of Two hundred Sail upon the Ocean. The more Vessels He shall have, the more enabled He will be to recover the expence made about 'em. As to the building of such numbers, six or ten years of time may be allotted for it: and there is Timber in *France*, there is Cordage, there are Sails; there is Iron and Brass; there are Victuals and Workmen; so that the King's Subjects will gain the Money which is laid out in 'em. Is it not far better for the King of *France* to build Ships for the employing and enriching of His Subjects, than it was for the Kings of *Egypt* to build their useless Pyramids? There need be no anxious enquiry whence a Stock should rise for this advance; every year will

bring in Money; and the Vessels once made, and their Guns mounted, it will not cost the King a Quardeck for other Equippings. 'Twill be but to give the Captains Places in the Ships and Gallies, on condition to fit them out; and there will more persons come to take them, than there will be Offices and Places to be bestowed. 'Tis true, Fleets being out, there will need vast Sums to maintain them: but the Sea will yield a maintenance for the Sea, either by Commerce or by War. Neither will it be always proper to keep so many Vessels in service. On the other hand, it will not be necessary to have so many Troops at Land as are at present. For *Spain* or *Italy* will not dare to dis-furnish themselves of their Men; so there will be no need of a Land-Army but towards *Germany*. The number of Rowers will be made up by bringing Men from *Canada*, and the *American* Islands: or by buying Negroes at *Cape Verde*: or by sending all Malefactors to the Gallies. And when things have taken their course, Seamen will be had; time, and the profit that will accrue, will afford store, and bring them in from all parts of the World.

Hereupon the Corsairs of *Algiers*, *Tunis* and *Tripoli*; will not be able to keep at Sea; and the *French* being continually on their Coasts, they will be constrain'd to tarry at home for the guarding of their Towns: so not in a condition to send out Troops for collecting the Tribute which they exact of the *Arabs*, and Princes who lye further up in *Africa*; the Tributaries will, without fail, revolt: and the King may in the sequel, Treat with them

them for their recovering their Liberty, and take them into his Protection. There is no cause to fear the Power of the *Ottoman Port* in this particular. For beside that the *Turks* are no good Seamen, the Grand Signior doth make no such account of the *Pyrats of Algier*, as that their fortune is considerable to Him. The Friendship of the *French* is more necessary for Him, both in point of Commerce, and in reference to other Interests.

The Fleets which the King might keep upon the Ocean, would make Him Master of all the Powers and Trade of the North. Yea, though the *English* and *Hollanders* should unite against *France*, they could not avoid their ruin in the end. For how should the one and the other make good their Commerce, which is all they have to trust to, if they were forced to maintain great Armada's to continue it? The point of *Bretannie* is the Gate to enter into, and go out of the *Channel*. Fifty Ships of War at *Brest* would keep this Gate fast shut; and they should not open it but by the King's Command. *Spain* and *Portugal* would not be able to attempt any thing but by His permission, if there were kept a Fleet on the Coast of *Guyenne*. Thus there would need no War almost to be made for all these things; nor His Majesties Forces hazarded. It would be sufficient to give his Order to *Forreiners*. Nor will it be difficult to cut them out work in their own Countries, and by this means stay their Arms at home, and make them spend their strength there. I shall something of this in its place hereafter.

* There is one further excellent means to strengthen the King at Sea : and it is the taking Order that no more of His Subjects go to *Malta*. To do this, there must be given in Fee to the *French Knights of St. John of Jerusalem*, some Isle in the *Mediterranean*, as for Instance, the *Isle du Levant*, for which they should pay an acknowledgment to the King, as they do for *Malta* to the King of *Spain*. There might be given them too on the same condition, an Isle in the Ocean, as *Besle-Isle*, *l'Isle-Dieu*, or the *Isle of Ree* : so that the *French Knights* fighting not but against the Enemies of their Country, they would make War upon the *English* as upon *Turks* ; and keep the Islands at their own charge, whereas the King is fain to keep great Garisons, and be at vast expence to do it. There is no cause to fear that they will ever give the King any trouble : for being *French*, they cannot fail of Affection or Obedience : and their Kindred, together with the Wealth they have in *France*, will be perpetual Hostages to the King, and caution for their Fidelity. This Project is just : for of ten parts of the Knights of *Malta*, no less than eight do come from the *Commanderies of France* ; and it is easie to be put in execution ; for there need be only a stopping the income of the *Commanderies* to effect it. The Order in general will find its advantages in it ; both in that there will be an addition made it of two considerable Islands : and that the King will receive the Knights into a more particular Protection than he hath done hitherto. The number of *Commanderies* may also be augmented,

mented, by giving them some Maladeries, (or Hospitals for the diseased) which are always usurped by People that have no right to them at all.

Be it observed in the last place, that it is very requisite the Office of Admiral, and Powers of the Admiralty, should be united to the Crown. It hath been an ill Policy in *France*, and a Diminution of the King's Authority, to communicate unto a Subject so much of His Sovereignty at Sea as hath been done. He must resume it to Himself, and be every way Supreme alone: Then He may appoint a select number, whose charge may be to give Him advice of the State of Maritime concerns; and hold a Council from time to time upon them in His Majesties Presence, if He please to assist. These Officers shall in this Council judge of Prizes, and other Sea-affairs; and when its necessary, be Commission'd, some of them, to visit the Ships, and make report, or send their acts in Writing concerning them. Other Officers for the Marine shall be Military: they, to execute the King's Orders, and have the conduct of Designs and Enterprizes in the usual manner. It is important to the King's Service, that the Captains of Ships and Gallies, be honoured with Dignities and Rewards. There may be created Mareschals of *France* for Armies at Sea: as there are for those at Land, with the same Honours and Prerogatives. The *Romans* decreed a Triumph for Captains who had been victorious at Sea, and called it a *Naval Triumph*. They gave also Naval Crowns, as well as Mural and Civical. These Honours would

would eminently promote the King's intention as to the Marine. There must be two Arsenals erected : One in *Provence*, in some Town upon the *Rhosen*, for what relates to Naval Expeditions on the *Mediterranean* : another upon the River *Loire*, for all occasions on the Ocean. By means of these two Rivers, it will be easie to bring out to Sea all the Vessels that are builded : and all necessary Provisions and Tackling whatever. Nor need it be feared that any Enemy should get up these Rivers : they too may be shut up by Bridges, or by Chains, or by Forts.

His Majesties Power thus strongly settled on each Sea, it will be easie to secure Commerce in *France*, and even draw the Merchants thither from all parts. I say secure Commerce : for till all this be done, it will ever be uncertain and dangerous. Now 'tis unnecessary to expatiate here, in proving what profit Commerce brings in to most potent States ; the thing is generally known, and all Men convinc'd of it. Again, I know not why it hath been said, that Trading is contrary to Virtue ; except it be, for that Merchants are incessantly busied in studying inventions to get Money, and be in a sort, Servants to the Publick. The *Romans*, the *Thebans*, and the *Spartans* admitted not any Citizen of theirs unto the administration of Affairs, unless he had for Ten whole years forborn Merchandizing : because they would not have their principal Magistrates accustomed to Gain, and expert in the means to do it. These kind of inclinations being blameable in persons, who being destined

destined to great Employments, ought to be above all Considerations of private Interest.

Commerce in every Common-wealth ought to take its measure from the temper of the People, from their strength, their wealth, the fertility of their Grounds, and the situation of their Country. Therefore Order must be taken, that things traded in be useful, and in a manner, necessary. For it is a rule in Oeconomie, that a Man spend not his Money in what is pleasing, though he needs it, but only in what is absolutely necessary. But necessity is stated by the Birth, the Dignity, and the Estate of Persons; as for example, noble Furniture is necessary for a great Lord; not so, for every meaner Gentleman: and thus in othes cases, proportionably still to the rank and fortune of Men. It must be studiously prevented, that Commerce introduce not into a State, Superfluity, Excess and Luxury; which are often followed with Ambition, Avarice, and a dangerous corruption of Manners. And forasmuch as it is not sufficient to Commerce, that there be people to Sell, but Merchants must be had to buy, otherwise no Wares can go off; in which all the advantage of Trade doth consist: it is meet, that Traders furnish themselves, with necessaries, rather than with things that meerly tend to Ease, or Magnificence. Among necessaries, those make up the first rank, which do sustain Life it self; the second is of them that are for convenience; others are also necessary to preservation from Diseases, the injuries of Time and violence of Enemies, as Medicinals, Dwelling, Arms.

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There is every where a twofold Commerce, which is visible in *France*, more than in any other part of the World. The First is for things ordinarily found in the Country, some of which are spent by the Inhabitants themselves, and others transported. The Second, for Foreign Merchandises. We have in *France*, Wines, Corn, Linnen and Salt, in so great a quantity, that we send them into the neighbor Kingdoms; and the quality of them is so excellent, that strangers cannot forbear to come and carry them out of our Ports. We have Cattle, Skins, Wooll, Tallow, Oils, and other things necessary for Man, of which Forreiners export very little, but our selves do in a manner spend them all: and this is the great wealthiness of *France*, that we have enough to serve our turn without Foreign Merchandises; but Forreigners cannot do well without ours. We receive from other Countries, Minerals, Pearls, Precious Stones, Silks, Spices, and what seems to be matter of Luxury. Order should be given, that in *France*, the Commodities we have be made use of, before any Foreign Merchandises be employed: because this Order followed would bring in the people Money, and take off their Commodities; which would incline every one to fall to the work of his Calling, and the whole Kingdom be thereby hugely benefited.

It hath been a question offer'd to debate; Whether Traffique in *France* should be managed by the Subjects, or by Forreigners? Many Reasons might be produced in the case, upon each hand; but to make a short decision;

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'Tis evident, that Foreigners must be allowed to gain by our Merchandises, if we would have them take them off. For if we carry them home into their Ports, we shall make less sales, and be at greater cost, than if they came to fetch them. Yet that our Merchants may share in the profit, they may enter into Partnership with them, or be their Commissioners here, or freight them themselves, provided, they sell at somewhat cheaper rates, and so be content with moderate gain; or take in payment, and exchange, the Foreign Commodities.

By means of Commerce, as well as by War, there may be *French Colonies* planted abroad, and so the dominion of the King extended, even to far distant Countries. All the Nations of the Earth are intermix'd, and may be termed Colonies, some of one People, some of another: Of as many as are known, few can be affirmed to be originally of the places they inhabit. But to plant Colonies out of danger, they must be seated in as much nearness still as is possible: For if they be separated at too great a distance, it will be difficult to relieve them: and perhaps they may revolt, or some one or other make himself Master of them; and so the State will be in danger to lose its Subjects. Secondly, it is necessary, that Colonies be placed in such Countrys as are able to maintain the Families, that are design'd to make them up: otherwise Provisions, and Money it self, must be carried to them, which would cause loss and damage to the Common-wealths that send 'em. In the third place, the Country should bear things that may yield profit to the State,

State, which erects the Colony. - Fourthly, the Scituation should be such, as the State may have succour, and forces from them, both for War, and for Commerce. In the fifth place, the Country should not be so Fertile, and so much profit to be there made, that the ancient Subjects should be drawn thither, and the State drain'd of People, as hath happen'd to Spain, by means of the *West-Indies*. In fine, for prevention of the inconveniences, I have mention'd, means must be used to have always Hostages from those of the Colonies, that they may be kept in their duty, and in the greater adherence to the interest of the State.

CH A P. XIII.

1. *Of the Education of Children.* 2. *At what age it is expedient to Marry them.*

Nature gives us the first fundamental dispositions for Arts, and all sorts of Professions; and we feel a certain propension leading us to one kind of life, rather than another. Some say, this impression comes from the Power of the Stars, which by secret influences from our temper; others affirm, that we derive our inclinations from our Ancestors. However it be, 'tis certain, we have movings, the Principles whereof are in our selves; we bring them into the World with us, and cannot quit them: 'tis true, rules may be applied to them, and they corrected, when faulty, but

to change the quality of them, is impossible. This regulation, or amendment, is effected by discipline; which can only give an after perfection to the works of Nature, keeping to her foregoing draughts, and designs, and completing what she hath begun.

A principal point then, in reference to Children, is to know their Genius, that they may not be put out of their natural order, but employ'd in things to which they are Originally bent. The Philosophers, to make known the difference of capacities; have told us, that as for Souls, some are of Gold, others of Silver, other of Iron; and that as a good Essayor must not mistake himself, in distinguishing these three Metals; so a good Politician should not fail, in the judgment he makes, of the Children that are in the State: it's a piece of his profession to discern, what each of them will be proper for, that the intentions of nature may be fortify'd, and polish'd by precepts.

There are no Common-wealths, but have in them Priests, Judges, Counsellors of State, Soldiers, Sea men, Merchants, Artificers, Husbandmen; Children must be educated for these different Professions, and timely enabled to discharge them. 'Tis fit, that in the case of the younger sort, Three Ages be distinguished. The First, from their Birth, to the end of the Seventh year. The Second, from that Seventh year to the Fourteenth. The Third, from Fourteen unto one and twenty. Childrens first Five years should be spent in their Nursing up; and they not disquieted with any higher documents. 'Tis good, to put them upon
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some gentle exercise, as they are growing, and cause them to endure cold; they will have the more Vigour, by that means. There are some Nations, that plunge their Children into running Water, and give them slight Clothing in the midst of Winter: so the ancient *Gauls* are noted to have done. The bodies of Children must be plyed to the acting of all kind of Postures, and Motions; this will get them a facility and dexterousness for any thing. After the age of Five years, unto Seven, 'tis convenient to tell them stories, that may raise in them a desire to do well in that profession to which they shall be destinated. From Seven years, unto Fourteen, those that are intended to be given to the Church, or to the affairs of Justice, or those of the State, should learn Latin, and Greek, because in those Languages, they have the source of all the Doctrine they will be obliged to profess: as likewise after Fourteen, unto One and Twenty, they shall be taught Rhetorique, Philosophy, Theology, Law, or Politicks: which must be continued also, after that Age in the usual manner. It is very necessary that Seminaries for Priests be erected in every Diocess, and our Lords the Bishops ought to take all possible care in it. The young Persons, that are intended for the Wars, may be taught Italian, Spanish, and High Dutch: they that are design'd for Trade, should know somewhat in those three Languages: but such as are thought on for Commerce, in further distant Countrys, ought to Learn the *Arabic*, or the *Sclavonian*, or some other of the general Tongues that are current in *Asia*, or in *Africa*,

Africa, as the Latin is in *Europe*. There must be publick Professors for these Languages, as there are for Latin, and Masters places endowed at the Publick charge. After fourteen or sixteen years of Age, the Youths should be dispos'd of unto places, where they may learn the Art of Traffick. As for those that are destin'd to the Wars, whether Gentlemen, or Plebeians, they should be sent at fifteen or sixteen years unto Garisons, and the skill of serving on Horseback or on Foot, there taught them; and they exercised once a week constantly; which would most conveniently be done on Sundays and Holy-days. They shall be taught to handle the Pike and the Musket, the use of the Sword, the Halbard, Partisan, Broad-sword, and other Arms; they shall be put to Run, and Leap, and Wrestle. The *Lacedemonians* ordinarily exercis'd their young People; which was very providently done of them. For Strength and Expertness is not attained but by long and daily exercise. In the Garisons shall be taught Fortification, the Mathematicks, Dancing, Vaulting, Ridiug; and it would do well, to take away Academies and Masters of Exercise, from places not Garison'd, that the Garisons may be the Academies, as I may term them, where these things are learnt. Yea, to the end, that all sorts of Persons might betake themselves to the Garisons, it should be ordained, that no private Masters shall take any Apprentices, but in Garison'd places; and that no one keep a Shop, or exercise any Trade, in any City of the Kingdom;

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without a Testimonial from the Governor, that he hath serv'd his Apprentiship in a Garrison Town: as we see, that no Physicians, or Advocates, are admitted to practise, but such as have studied in some University.

Order must be given, that Masters cause their Lacquies to learn a Trade, and that for this, they give them, after four years service, 200 *Livres*, and a suit of Cloaths; or if they serve less time, a sum proportionable after that rate. Nor must it be suffered, that Lacquies have wages given them as is done: because they are ill husbands, and lay up nothing. Their Reward-money must be put in a Publick purse, or into some Merchant's hands, who will be responsible for it. The share of Lacquies that die, will serve for other Youths that shall be chosen. This would prove an excellent means, for the having of Soldiers: For the Apprentices would serve in their turn, on Military occasions: they would go upon the Guard, &c. nor would this take them off from perfecting their skill in the Calling they had chosen. It would too, be profitable, that poor Soldiers have skill in one handicraft or other, and be made to work at it, whenever they are not on the Guard; by this means, they would avoid idling, and get Money for a subsistence.

The Parishes both in Town, and Country, might be obliged to set forth and maintain each of them a Soldier or two in Garrison, giving also a sum for their being taught a Trade at the same time. There would be Parishes able to maintain a Man and half, others half a Man,

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the rest in proportion to the number of communicants in each of them. So the King would have 50000 Men well-nigh in Garison, and a Nursery of Soldiers, without its costing Him a Quardecu; for none must have pay, but old Soldiers: its by taking this course, that the *Turks* raise their *Fanizaries*, and they become their best Men, and most Warlike.

When the young Men have been a while in Garison, that is, two or three years, they shall be sent to the Army, if there be War on foot: and all recruits shall be rais'd out of the Garisons: by this means they will be rais'd without any expence at all: for instance, if there need a recruit of 4000 Men, each of the Governors shall be ordered to send, one an hundred, another two hundred: and the Men being drawn out of the Garisons, new supplies shall be put in, taken out of the Parishes, which sent the former. Thus the Armies would be alway compos'd of none, but expert Soldiers; which is a matter of exceeding great consequence. I will not prescribe, in what Towns, or in how many places, it is fit to settle Garisons; because this depends on the Kings Will and Pleasure: and Towns, to be chosen for this purpose, need not be nominated; the most commodious, and best scituated are known.

As to those that should be destin'd for Sea-service, they might be taken out of the same Garisons; and should be taught principally Navigation: but it would be better, to breed them up in the Ships themselves, that they might be accustomed to the Sea. It is fit that

they should understand all the practise of Mariners; and also be Handicrafts-men, as well as Soldiers: it would be very good, that some of the number were Carpenters, or at least each of them somewhat skilled in use of the Axe and Adice. If Soldiers both at Sea and on Land were Artificers, their Captains, or others might cause them to work. They should be paid for what they made, and the Person that employed them might sell their work, either in gross or by retail: as Garments, Shooes, Cloth, Hatts, Gloves; and this would prove hugely beneficial; all the Soldiers would find content in it, & hardly one of them fall into debauch.

When the Youngsters have been some time in Garison, and are not needed for recruits, they should be sent home with their Discharge and Certificate. Hereupon they may set up the Trade they have learned, or addict themselves to Husbandry, as they should think most commodious for them. The Country Youth, not chosen by the King's Commissioners for the Garisons, should abide in their Parishes, to learn the Art of Husbandry, and be exercised in it.

A like course, as is to be taken with young Men, should also be taken with young Women. There must be School-Mistresses in every City, publickly pay'd, who may teach them all kind of works: the Maids giving them too, something for a reward. It would do well to use means, that Women, and even those of highest rank, might count it a shame to be unskilfull: work would notably fix their thoughts, and busy them to excellent good purpose.

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Of Women I had not yet spoken; nor will I say, of them, ought more: herein I shall Imitate *Lycurgus*, and besides him *Aristotle*; who both conceiv'd it not possible, to give them any Rules, and that their temper was so imperious, that they could not endure to be restrained by Law: this is more to be excused in *French* Women than in others: 'tis their due to be Mistresses; since they may Glory, upon better Title than the *Lacedemonian* Dames, that they give birth to Men, who are capable of rendring themselves, by their Valour, Conquerors of all the Earth

It seems to me a fault, that Maids should be suffer'd to Marry at Twelve, and Males at Fourteen, at which Ages the too too indulgent Laws have fixed the Puberty of the Sexes. For, as to Nature, it is not possible but persons of those years only must extremely prejudice their Health by Marriage, and spend their strength before they have attain'd it. 'Tis the making of young Trees bear Fruit before the time: the Children are without doubt the less vigorous for it, How can the Parents give them, what they as yet have not themselves? Again, Morality and the Laws are concerned in the case: the truth is, when a Girl is put so young into the possession of a Husband, she hath the less of bashfulness and Modesty; nor is Virtue so well secured for her. Besides, at this age, neither Man nor Woman is of understanding to know their Duty: and hence it comes, that the Marriages of persons so young are ordinarily attended with no very sure Fe-

licity and Success. Finally, how can the one or the other, take care of the Affairs of an House, being altogether unexperienced? or duly govern their Children, needing Government themselves, and having not, by allowance of the Laws, power to dispose of any thing? So that it must be ordained, they shall not be capable of making a valid contract of Marriage till they have attained, Females, the age of Eighteen years compleat, and Males of Twenty.

C H A P. XIV.

1. *How France should act with Forreign Princes, and First with the King of Spain, and King of Portugal.*
2. *With the Pope, with Venice, with the Princes of Italy.*
3. *With the Swisses, with England.*
4. *With the Emperor and Princes of Germany.*
5. *With the Hollanders, the Crowns of Denmark, Sweden and Poland.*
6. *With the Turks, and King of Persia.*
7. *With the Kings of the Coast of Barbary, and the King of Morocco.*
8. *With all remote Princes; as the Emperor of the Negroes, Prestor John, the Great Mogul. The other Kings of the Indies, of China, and of Tartary.*

HAVING treated in the precedent Ceapters, of things Internal to the State: I think it reasonable to speak of Externals and what course

course is to be taken in them. For to promote the happiness of People, and govern them discreetly, 'tis not enough, that you regulate their Lives, and their comportment at home, but their ease and well-being must be secur'd against strangers abroad, and principally against their Neighbors. Now Interest being the prime motive unto all States, we ought to consider other Nations, either in quality of Friends, or in that of Enemies; ever accounting of them, according to the advantage we may receive from them, or the damage they may do us. As they on their part take no thought of us, but in proportion to what they fear, or to what they hope for from our Arms. Besides, to treat safely with Forreigners, it is necessary that we know their Designs, their Strength, their Alliances, their Temper, and their Country. Forasmuch then as *Spain* shareth with us, at this time, the Concerns of all *Europe*; and there is not a Power in Christendom, but hath Alliance with the one or the other of these two Crowns, it is meet we examine in the first place, what measures we are to observe with the *Spaniards*.

The Council of *Spain* proceeds with a great deal of slowness; but always with a great deal of Evenness: and since the House of *Austria* put it in their head to get the Dominion over all *Europe*: the said Council hath continually steered the same course. The end which these States-men have propos'd to themselves, has been Tyrannical and Unjust; and the means they have made use of to attain it, bad, de-

structive, and ill-adjusted, which the declining of their Affairs doth evidently demonstrate. Our Enemies are always Allies of theirs, either covertly, or openly and declared; just in like manner, as they who chuse the King's Protection, and to be interess'd with *France*, will be Enemies of *Spain*.

The Emperor is Leagu'd with the Catholick King by Consanguinity, and moreover, by reasons of State. For We are cause of fear to the Empire on the North, and towards *Germany*, as We are to *Spain* on the South, and towards *Italy*. Of all the other Princes, the Duke of *Bavaria*, seems fastest knit to the House of *Austria*; and the Pope would, perhaps, be of the Party, did not his Dignity, of being the common Father of Christians, withhold Him; and if He, as a Temporal Prince, did not also apprehend some Irruption on our part.

Spain is a Country yielding little increase; either for that the Ground is barren; or because the Inhabitants neglect to cultivate it. The discovery of the *West-Indies*, and the expulsion of the *Moors* have dispeopled it. *Flanders*, and the places in *Italy* are a charge to *Spain*, in time of War: and what is rais'd there doth scarce suffice to maintain the Armies and Garisons.

Their Government is hard, and ill to be endured; because they are inflexibly severe; and the Monks, (whose depravation is there at the highest pitch) and Inquisitors, do under pretext of Religion, exercise incredible grievances.

grievances. The *Spaniards* are valiant for their Persons: but Men of Quality despise the Military Profession, as heretofore the *Carthaginians* did: and the name of Soldier is, in a manner, ignominious with them. They are Idlers, and prefer Pleasure, and a Gallantry, before any thing, be it ever so important, or of greatest consequence.

The King of *Spain* hath little Money, and much expense to defray. The vanity of the Viceroys and Governors of His places, doth spend Him above measure. The *Spaniards* are presumptuous, haughty, and provided there be Honour done them, you may treat advantageously with them. *Charles V.* had reason to say, that the *Spaniards* seem to be wise; but are not. Their Forces are not at all to be feared; we ruin'd them in the late War; and the Affairs of *Portugal* have hindred their recovering them. The Minority of their King, the Discontent of *Don John*, and the pretensions of some Lords upon the particular Kingdoms, which compose the *Spanish* Monarchy, augment its weakness. *Sicily* might easily make Insurrection. The *Neapolitans* upon a pretext of Liberty, such a darling in *Italy*, would set up for themselves, if they had succors; and perhaps a new Pope would favour our designs there, if he were made to see, that it would be no impossibility for him to make some person of his Family King of *Naples*, or joyn that Kingdom to the State of the Church, of which he is possess'd already.

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If ever the *Spaniards* be attacked, it must be done with force, and all at once, in *Flanders*, in *Italy*, in *Spain* it self, on the Sea, and on the Coast of *Portugal*. This is the best method for the *French*. Such a general effort would produce two effects. The First is, that the *Spanish* Partisans would be astonish'd, having no Forces ready to make resistance. The Second, that all their Enemies would resume Vigor, and might set on foot again their pretensions against them. If a through Conquest be intended, we must not do as was done in the last War: must not make it our business to take all their fortifi'd places, one after another, or to keep them when taken. But this is a matter fit to be discours'd of by it self.

As for *Portugal*, it's a State, yet under age, and not thoroughly settled: to us, a perpetual instrument for weakning the *Spaniard*. *France* hath nothing to fear on that side. It would do well, to convey covertly some Troops, or sums into the Country: and above all, give secretly great hopes unto the *French*, that are in service there, if they made any important enterprises upon *Spain*, which would divert their Forces. It would, I say, do very well to order some Soldiers thither, and 'twere to be wish'd, there were so many *French* in *Portugal*, that the Partisans might not dare to make a Peace with *Spain*, for fear of having those same *French* for Enemies. The Queen of *Portugal*, who is *French*, both by Birth, and by Affection, may bear up this Interest; and She may be told, that there is a necessity of it on

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Her part, and that Her Fortune depends upon it.

It must be accounted on in all Treating with the *Spaniards*, that they are every whit as foolish as they seem to be.

The Pope, the *Venetians*, and all the Princes of *Italy*, are of one and the same temper. The *Italians* are wise and circumspect: nor should we, but very seldom, enter into Negotiation with them. To reduce them to our intentions, we must work by down-right force, they are weak, and (as I have said) Wise: they are people for Pleasure; their Country is the beautifullest, and best in the World; consequently they love it, and know their Interest; they are able to foresee, and fear the ill that may betide them. The Pope will ever consider *France*, by reason of the County of *Avignon*, of the consequences of the Concordat of 1618. and because of the *Jansenists*.

The *Venetians* are weakned by their War with the *Turk*; the Dukes of *Mantua*, of *Modena*, and of *Florence*, and the *Genoese* can do nothing that's considerable. The Duke of *Savoy* must never separate from *France*. We have the entrance into his Estates: and a War with us, but of 3 Months, would utterly ruin him: He may be induc'd to hope, that he shall be reinstated in the Principality of *Geneva*. If War be made in *Italy*, the *Italians* must not have time given them to look about them. As they are the Wisest, so when inur'd to War, they are the bravest upon Earth. In one word, they are the Masters of the Universe.

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The *Swisses* are Mercenaries, who will always serve the King for his Money.

As for matter of the *English*, they have not any Friends: themselves be a sort of People without Faith, without Religion, without Honesty, without any Justice at all, of the greatest levity that can be, Cruel, Impatient, Gluttonous, Proud, Audacious, Covetous, fit for Handy strokes, and a sudden execution; but unable to carry on a War with judgment. Their Country is good enough for sustenance of Life, but not rich enough to afford them means for issuing forth and making any Conquest: accordingly, they never conquered any thing but *Ireland*, whose Inhabitants are weak, and ill Soldiers. On the contrary, the *Romans* conquer'd them; then the *Danes*, and the *Normans*; in such a manner too, that their present Kings are the Heirs of a Conqueror. They hate one another, and are in continual Division, either about Religion, or about the Government. A War of *France* for three or four years upon them, would totally ruin them. So, it seems reasonable that we should make no Peace with them, but upon conditions of greatest advantage for us; unless the King think meet to defer the execution of this Project to another time; or that His Majesty, prels'd with the love He hath for His own People, do incline to prefer their ease, before so fair hopes. One had need be a Monarch, to know what it is to love Subjects; as be a Father, to know how Children are loved.

In fine, if we had a mind to ruin the *English*, we need but oblige them to keep an Army on foot: and there is no fear that they should make any invasion upon *France*; that would be their undoubted ruin, if they be not call'd in by some Rebels. Now if they have an Army, they will infallibly make War upon one another, and so ruin themselves. You must put them upon making great expences; and for this end, raise a jealousy in them for the Isles of *Jersey* and *Guernsey*, of *Wight* and *Man*, for the *Cinque-Port*, and *Ireland*: and by that means, oblige them to keep strong Garisons in all those places: this will create a belief in the people, that the King formeth great Projects against their pretended Liberty; and while He is in Arms, His Subjects will hate Him.

They must be wrought to distrusts of one another, by writing Letters in Cypher to some particular persons, and causing them to be intercepted. For (being suspicious and imprudent) they will soon be perswaded, that the Letters were seriously written. Some Forces should be landed in *Ireland*, and in other parts. The *Irish* may be induced to revolt, as having a mortal hatred for the *English*. The *Scots* also will not neglect to set themselves at liberty. Factions must be rais'd, and the Sects favoured against one another; especially the Catholicks, among whom, the Benedictine Monks in particular, should be secretly promis'd, on the King of *England's* behalf (wherein it will be easie to deceive them) that they shall be restored to all the Estates, which they once possessed

possessed in the Island, according to the *Monasticon* there Printed. Upon this, the Monks will move Heaven and Earth, and the Catholicks declare themselves. The rumor, which hath already gone abroad, that the King of *England* is a Catholick, must be fortifi'd, and so all will fall into utter confusion, and the *English* Monarchy be in case to be divided.

On the other hand, our League with the *Hollanders* should be renew'd, and they put into a belief, that we will give them all the Trade still: because they have a through Knowledge of it, and are proper for it; whereas the *French* have no inclination that way, and Nature cannot be forced. They must be told, that now they are come to the happy time for advancing their affairs, and ruining their Competitors in the Sovereignty of the Northern Seas. Beside these particulars, if the King give *Belle-Isle*, or *L'Isle Dieu*, or the Isle of *Ree*, to the Knights of *Malta*, as I have said before, these Knights will make irreconcilable War upon the *English*, redemand the Commanderies of their Order, and by their courses, and Piracies, oblige them to keep great Fleets at Sea; which will ruine them, by ruining the profit of their Trade. Mean time, the King shall increase His Strength at Sea; and then finding His Enemies weakned, consummate their Depression, and Subversion.

It is not difficult, to make defence against any enterprises of the Emperor; for He cannot make War upon *France*, though He would: such a War would be too costly for Him; and and to make any progress in it, He must needs bring

bring into the Field excessive great Armies. But if He armed Him so potently, the Princes of *Germany* would grow jealous of Him, and make Levies to oppose Him, and to hinder His passage through their Territories: beside, His Hereditary Countreys would be disfurnish'd of Men, and so expos'd to the inroads of the *Turks*: so that there is no cause to apprehend any thing on the part of the Emperor. On the contrary, He hath intentions to give the King content; because He may receive great succors from Him, in Wars with the *Turk*, as happen'd of late Years.

The Princes of *Germany*, whether Catholicks or Protestants, have an equal interest to keep themselves in the King's Protection: for the reasons I noted afore in the Chapter of the *Huguenots*; so that they will always oppose the Emperors growing greater, on the side of *France*: as it may be, they would oppose the designs of the King; if He should carry His Arms too far up into *Germany*. 'Tis the interest of lesser States, that the Kings their Neighbours be equal in Power, that the one may maintain them against the others.

To conclude: the King hath no Allies, whom He should so highly esteem, as the *Germans*; there is not a braver Nation, a Nation more open, more honest. Their Original is also ours; They have no Vices; are Just and Faithfull: there is among them an inexhaustible Seminary of good Soldiers: their generosity put *Alexander* the Great into admiration for 'em; and wrought affection and confidence in 'em,

'em, in the first *Cæsars*; who by committing their Persons to the virtue of these People, entrusted them with the quiet of the Universe.

The *Hollanders* will never attempt any thing against *France*; but keep themselves in our Alliance, as much as possibly they may. They are Rich, and interested as Merchants commonly are. If the King had relinquish'd them, their State would have sunk. (which yet by the rules of Policy, cannot last long; Democracies being subject to changes.) It would be expedient, that the King do interpose in their Affairs, and some division be raised among them. We can hope for little from their Armies; and they would always be a charge, and expence to us.

The King of *Denmark* is a Prince, whose State is but of small extent; His whole Strength consists in the King's Protection, who upholds Him against the *Suedes* his Enemies.

Sueden will never break off from the Interest of *France*. It's a Country unfertile except in Soldiers; but there being little Money in *Sueden*, and they far of, they can of themselves make no considerable War: they are feared and hated in *Germany*. So, we ought to consider them, as Instruments, which for our Money, we may make use of, to avenge our Quarrels, either against the Emperor, or the *German* Princes; or to divert the *English* and the *Holland* Forces, when His Majesty makes any enterprize which pleaseth them not.

Poland and *Muscovy* are of almost no use to

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us, except it be to serve us in stopping the enterprises of the Emperour. Furs may be had from them; and Cloth, and Silk-stuffs sent them.

The Friendship of the *Turks* is good for *France*, to be made use of on occasion against the Emperour; and that of the King of *Persia*, to be made use of against the *Turks*. The one and the other may favour our Commerce.

There must be no reliance upon the promises of the Kings of *Tripoly*, *Tunis*, and *Algier*; they are Pirates, that take a Pride in breaking their Words, and have no Faith at all. Whenever occasion serves, War must be made upon them, and they attacqued home to their own doors in their Harbours, but with considerable Forces. They may be ruin'd in time, by hindring their courses at Sea, and by causing the Tributary Princes to rise against them by Land: as I have observed afore. Upon this, the King, as the *Carthaginians* did, might employ the *Numidian* Troops, so much magnified by the Ancients.

The Emperor of *Fez* and *Morocco* is a Potent Prince, who's Alliance may be use'ful to the King against the *Spaniards*, and for Commerce. He is a Mahometan; and I would not have too much trust put in His Oaths.

In fine, when occasions for it are offered, we must not fail to compliment the *African* Kings, as the Emperors of the *Negros*, and of the *Abyssins*, then the Great *Mogol*, and the other Kings of the *Indies*, of *China*, of *Tartary* and *Japan*: letting them know by Presents, the Virtue, the Greatness and Magnificence of the King.

The Conclusion.

Such are the Political Maxims, by which I have judged, that the Subjects of this (*French*) Monarchy might attain to the possession of a true, and stable felicity; and so, the Heroick labours of the King be Crowned with immortal Glory, and *France* enjoy in all its parts the highly beneficial Virtue of its incomparable Monarch.

FINIS.

REFLECTIONS
ON THE
Fourth Chapter
OF THE
POLITICKS
OF
FRANCE,
Which Treats of the
CLERGY.

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Thomas Bassett*, at the *George*, in
Fleetstreet, 1691.

REFLECTIONS
ON THE
Fourth Chapter
OF THE
POLITICS
OF
FRANCE,
Which treats of the
CLERGY.

LONDON:
Printed by Thomas Bland at the Grange in
St. Martin's Lane.

TO

Monfieur P. H. Marquels
of C.

S I R,

I Took so great Satisfaction in the
reading of those your Reflections up-
on the Roman Clergy, that I have
thought I could not better employ my
time, than illustrating them with a large
Comment; and though sometimes I improve
upon your judgment, and make bold to push
on somewhat farther than you are pleased to
go, yet shall you not find that I have gloss'd
upon your discourse, as some Monks have
done on the Bible, for I have faithfully
confirm'd your Opinion by the History of
our France, and by the wise sayings of the
best Authors. And if by their help I let
you see that your Maxims carry you to much
higher enterprizes than your Counsels aim
at, this is not to Contradict, but to Assist
you, and peradventure to say for you, what
you would have been content to have said

The Epistle Dedicatory.

your self. After having thus fought under your Banners, the interest of my Party, which in your Fifth Chapter you are so hard upon, obliges me to engage in their defence. And I know you are too generous, Sir, to take this ill. But I bestow not above a Third part of this Discourse on that Subject, that you may clearly perceive I have more than double the pleasure in following your steps, than I find in opposing you. To return then to my chief design, which is, to espouse your quarrel, and take your part against the Usurpations of Rome, I will shew you what more remains to be said on that occasion, there is a pretty Book called An Examination of the Powers of Cardinal Chigi, then when he came in the quality of Legat to His Majesty. A Book furnish'd with invincible Reasons, and a profound knowledge of Antiquity, especially for what concerns our France. And from thence I acknowledge to have received some of the Authorities that I alledge. As in those two Chapters, where you speak against two contrary Parties, you consider not Religion otherwise than as it affects the Policy of France, I likewise have confin'd myself within the same bounds, and have not examin'd this, or the other Religion, and the Professors, farther than the State has

The Epistle Dedicatory.

has or may have damage or benefit by them in Temporals. I shall throughout this Discourse forbear to say what I now only mention at parting, viz. That the Interest of God ought to be dearer to us than that of the State; and that these two Interests accord so well, that where Truth and Piety Reign, Peace, Justice, and the State can never fail to Flourish. God of his Goodness grant such happy times to France, this is the Prayer of

Your most Humble, and
most Obedient Servant,

De L'Ormegeigny.

(172)

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

Fourth Chapter

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Politicks of France,

Which Treats of the

CLERGY.

France is much oblig'd to my Lord the Marquess of C. for having mark'd the many *Usurpations* of the Court of Rome, upon the Rights of our Kings. He has wisely observ'd, *That the Churchmen have attempted, on several occasions, to render themselves Masters of all the Temporal Jurisdiction. That their obstinacy has proceeded so far, that making advantage of troublesome times, they have forced our Kings to Declare in their Favour upon very unjust Conditions, and to yield to them the Rights of Mortmain and Indemnity for the Lands they possess. Whereby the State is so much the weaker as they grow in Strength, and that the conceipt of these Priviledges is so full*

in their Heads, that to this day they can hardly acknowledge the King's Sovereignty. That the multitude of Monks is an abuse so sensible, that the King can dissemble it no longer, and that 'tis high time seriously and effectually to apply some remedy. That their blind subjection and dependance on the Pope's Will, makes a Foreign Monarchy even in the very bosom of France. And that they seduce the silly credulous People, which is a matter of pernicious consequence. That this Policy is founded on the abusive and destructive Maxims of Rome, which are meerly Politick. That those particular Vows of Obedience to the Pope, and the name of Religion in this case, is only a Bugg and vain pretence laid hold on by the Court of Rome, for promoting their Temporal Power, and making their Creatures in every corner. That the shiftings of the Monks, and their rambles from one end of France to the other, serve only to debauch them with an universal acquaintance. All these Observations are true and judicious. But the fear that my Lord Marquess shews of offending the Court of Rome, or at least, the Complement he had made, That it is the Glory of a King to Honour the Holy See, hinders him from founding the bottom of the Evil, and from presenting the necessary remedy. For it may be said of the wholesome Rules that he prescribes for reducing the Clergy to their Duty, and for preventing of Fraud in matters of Benefices, that this comes to no more, than the paring a Man's Nails when his Skull is broken, and ought to be trepann'd. The great Honour, and the great Interest of the King indeed, would be to think of a way, how he may roundly

ly shake off this infamous and tyrannical Yoke of the *Roman Court*, which my Lord Marquess calls the *Holy See*. And deliver himself from this buzzard Superstition which rides even our very Statesmen, *viz.* That there can be no Religion Catholick, but in submitting to the Spiritual Jurisdiction of the *Holy See*.

Is it because the Pope is the Vicar of Jesus Christ, His Majesty has a number of Bishops within His Realm, who, if they understand, and do their duty, are the Vicars of Jesus Christ? So that we need not travail over the *Alps* to seek one. Instead then of *providing a French Secretary of Conscience, who may make a Bank in the Court of Rome, by which means we might know what Money passes from France to Italy*, which is the advice of Moun^t. the Marquess, He should rather break the Bank in *France*, and give order that no more Money pass out of *France* into *Italy*; for this Bank is a continual Pump which draws away the fairest Cash of *France*, which fattens a stranger with our Kingdoms Treasure, which carries much away, but returns nothing.

I know all these Tributes and Respects are paid to the Pope, because he is suppos'd to be the Head of the Church; and his Flatterers tell us, That the Church can no more subsist without the Pope than the Body without the Head. But that great Chancellor of the University of *Paris*, *John Gerson* was not of this Opinion, for he writ a Book expressly *De auferribilitate Papa ab Ecclesia*. That is to say, to prove that this same head might very well be quite taken away, and the Church yet be
never

never the worse, nor take any harm. The Cardinals have sometimes continued more than two years before they could agree about their Choice of a Pope. During all which time the Body of the Church was without a Head. The Churches of *France* and *Germany* did not at all feel the want of it, and matters went still on there as they were wont. Which puts me in mind of the Man of Wood, that being mounted on Horse-back, and coming under a Tree, a bough struck off his head to the ground, yet the heart of Oak kept the Saddle, and trotted on with the company nothing dismaid, for that the head was not essential to the rest of the body.

It is too soft an expression to call the Pope an unprofitable Head of the Church, he is absolutely pernicious to it. I pass by the Spirituals, suiting my self herein with the humour of Moun^r. the Marquess, who considers the Catholick Religion little farther than as it makes for the interest of *France*. But what greater mischief can the Pope do to the Church, than to render the Power of the Church suspected to Sovereign Princes, as a pure politick device to invade their Rights, grind their Subjects, and form even an Empire within their Empire.

The Marquess endeavours with great reason to make the King jealous of the Popes Temporal Monarchy over his Subjects. He might with as good reason have mov'd him to be jealous of that Spiritual Monarchy, which is in effect purely Temporal. For he has well observ'd, *That the name of Religion is a false pretence*

sence us'd by the Court of Rome to advance his Temporal Power. And that the Popes having begun with Letters of Recommendation to the Chapters, to have an Eye on such an ones mirit to be chosen Bishop. Have after in process of time turn'd these Letters Recommendatory to Bulls and Decrees to dispose of the Bishopricks of France at their pleasure; which is a Tyranical invasion of the Rights of the King, and of those of the Church.

Glaber, who liv'd in the times of *Hugh Capet*, relates *lib. 3. cap. 4.* how Pope *John* sent a Cardinal into France to Found and Consecrate a Monastery within the Diocess of *Tours*; and that the Prelates of France and *Hugh* Archbishop of *Tours* opposed him, and said roundly, That the Bishop of Rome having a Diocess to himself, ought not to meddle with the affairs of another Diocess, nor send his Commands to their Bishops, who are his fellow Bishops and Colleagues.

The Doctors of the *Sorbon* in their *Rescriptum* publish'd at the time of the Appeal, concerning the abuse about the Breviary of *Anjou*, by the Bishop of *Engers*, and his Injunction to the Church of the Trinity, to use that of *Rheims*, amongst other Propositions declare, That the other Bishops have the power of Government and Ordination within their Diocess, as fully as the Bishop of Rome has within his.

Therefore in the time of *St. Cyprian*, and even in *St. Augustin's* days, the Popes did write *Ad Coepiscopos Gallie & Collegas*. Now Colleague imports equality of Power.

And

And if the Bishops of Rome have not any power over the Bishops of France, they can much less pretend to any over our Kings. Pope Leo VI. promised Lotharius, *dist. 10. c. 9. can. 10. to obey his Edicts both at present and for the future.* Pope Pelagius to the like effect to Childibert, *The Holy Scriptures, (says he) command us to obey Kings, and to be subject to them.*

The Popes were always humble Subjects of the Roman Emperors so long as that Empire continued. And 'tis but the other day that they got free from the Emperors of Germany. Onuphrius *de varia Creatione Pontif. l. 4.* testifies, That even then when they were look'd upon as the Successors of St. Peter, their Authority reached no farther, but only to maintain and defend the truth of the Doctrines of Faith. And for the rest were wholly subject to the Emperors, who ordered all things according to their wills, and were wont to create the Popes.

It is a notable Observation the Marquess has made, *That the Tables were put into the hands of Moses, and not into the hands of Aaron, and that it is the part of Secular Princes, that the People be instructed in the Laws of God.* He was entrusted with the first Table as well as with the second, to teach us that the care of the Service of God belongs as much to the Authority of the Prince, as that of Justice and Civil Government.

Those Expressions of the Marquess, *That Secular Princes are the Protectors of the Church, of its Doctrine, and of its Canons,* are intended by him in a more liberal and ingenious sense, than they meant, from whom he takes them.

For

For they are the ordinary terms of those who make the King subject to the Pope, and who own not the King for the Sovereign of the Church, but only for its Protector, and to execute the Commands of his Holiness, and for that his CANONS be observed. This is the Stile of my Lord Bishop of Montauban. *Peter Bertier* in his Remonstrance made to the King in the City of Rheims, June 8th, 1654. where after he had term'd his Sovereign Power a true resemblance of the Deity, he sinks it again not only below the Pope, but even below the Bishops, who are the Kings subjects, saying, That the Bishops are the Head to govern, and the Mouth of the Church to speak, but that the King is its arm, and its right hand to execute its Decrees and Ordinances. This Scholar of the Jesuits speaks like his Masters; for all the Jesuits harp on the same string, which *Becanus* in *Pref. ad Reg. Jac.* Kings are only to execute the Popes Commands. What is the duty of Kings (says he) in relation to the Church and to Religion? I will tell you in one word; they ought to guard and defend it, not as Lords but as Servants, not as Judges but as Executioners.

And why, I pray, has not the King the same Sovereignty in France, that the Emperor *Constantine*, and the Emperor *Charlemagne* enjoy'd? under whom the Canons of the Synods were none other than counsel and advice, till these Emperors had examin'd and authoriz'd them. Did not these Sovereigns altogether call and dissolve those Synods of Bishops at pleasure? and wherefore shall our Kings be rob'd of that Power? Our great King who surpasses all his
Prede-

Predecessors in Glory and Magnanimity, shall he suffer a stranger Bishop to snatch from his Crown this essential Right, of governing the Church of his Kingdom, and He of a King become a Serjeant to put in execution the Commands of that Bishop, and those of the Bishops his Subjects.

The world is well chang'd since Pope *Adrian* in his Letters, inserted in the second Council of *Nice*, express'd himself to the Emperor *Constantine* to this effect, *We beseech your Clemency with ardour of Spirit, and as though we were present, we cast our selves at your knees, and lie at your feet, I with my Brethren.* Then it was that Popes kiss'd the Feet of Emperors, whereas now Emperors kiss the Popes Toe.

In the Year 679. the Pope *Agathon* pray'd the Emperor *Constantine* to discharge the Tribute which the Bishops of *Rome* pay'd Ordinarily to the Emperor for their Conservation. Very far from compelling the Emperors, the day of their Conservation, to lay a sum of Money at the Popes feet for Tribute, as a token of subjection, which afterwards the Emperors of *Germany* have been oblig'd to do.

Gregory the First gave a good Example for our Popes at this day, how they should demean themselves towards the Emperor, for he speaks thus to the Emperor, *l. 3. Ep. 6. I am the unworthy Servant of your pity. And in the same Epistle, Whilst I speak thus before my Masters, what am I other than Dust and a Worm. And l. 2. Ep. 61. I am subject to your Commands.*

I might bring many Examples how anciently the Christian Emperors, and the Kings of *Italy* created

created and depos'd the Popes, commanding them, and deposing them at their pleasure.

Not to go farther than our *France*, there we may see what Power our Kings of the first Line exercis'd in the Government of the Church. The History of *Gregory of Tours* may furnish us with many examples, l. 4. c. 5. King *Glotharius* speaks thus to the Inhabitants of *Tours*, *Have not I commanded that the Priest Cato be made a Bishop? Why are my Commands slighted?* and Chap. 18. *Pascentius* is made Bishop of *Paris*, *ex jussu Regis Chariberti*, by the Command of King *Heribert*. The same King being provok'd, because *Emerius* had been turn'd out of the Bishoprick of *Xaintes*, caused him to be beaten, who came to signifie to him that deposition, and made him be drawn upon a Cart loaden with Thorns, into banishment, and restor'd *Emerius* to his place from whence he had been cast out, l. 6. c. 27. *Felix* Bishop of *Xaintes* being deceas'd, *Nonnichius Consobrinus rege ordinante successit*. His Cousin *Nonnichius* succeeded him by the King's Order, C. 39. King *Guntram* created *Sulpitius* Bishop of *Bourges*, rejecting the Presents offer'd him for promoting another, and saying, *It is not our Custom to sell the Priesthood for the price of Money*, l. 8. c. 22. are these words, *Then the King commanded that Gundegesil be made a Bishop, which was done accordingly*. And C. 39. *Evantius* Bishop of *Vienna* died, and in his place was substituted *Vitus* a Priest, the King chusing him.

In all these passages we find no mention of the Pope, nor of *Annates*, nor of Letters of Investiture. For in those days the Bishops of

Rome

Rome meddl'd not at all with the Election of the Bishops of France. Above all is memorable the *Francique Synod*, to be found in the Third Tome of the Councils of the Edition of *Cologne*, Pag. 29. Where *Carloman*, who stiles himself Duke and Prince of the French, thus speaks, *By the advice of my Priests, and of the chief of the Realm, we have appointed Bishops for the Towns, and have set over them Boniface Archbishop.*

Pope *Adrian* the First, by a Council, made this Law to pass, *That Charlemain should have the Right and Power to choose the Pope, and to govern the Roman See.* Which Constitution is inserted in the *Roman Decretal*.

The Council of *Mayence* held under *Charlemain*, an. 813. dist. 63. *Can. Hadrians*, begins thus, *To Charles August, Rector of the True Religion, and Defendor of the Holy Church of God.* And the Second Council of *Mayence*, under *Lewis* the *Debonnaire*, to *Lewis* the most Sovereign Rector of the True Religion. At this day these Titles would be counted wicked.

Now for all that *Charlemain* and *Lewis* the *Debonnaire* have advanc'd the Pope out of measure, yet his Authority, even in Spirituals, was no better than precarious, and subject to those Kings that were Emperors. For proof of this, *Hincmar* relates l. 55. c. 20. That the Emperor *Charlemain* did convoke a general Synod in France, whereby the worshipping of Images was condemn'd; and the Second Council of *Nice* which defended them, was rejected as a false Synod, tho the Pope had approv'd it. And tho at this Synod, convoked by *Charlemain*,

the Authority of the Pope was admitted. For the History of those times teaches us, *That Charlemain, who had advanced the Pope, made use of the Authority given him, to his own advantage, even against the Pope himself, when he had a mind.* Inſomuch that he was not content to make the Popes Opinion be condemn'd in this Synod aſſembled (*pro forma* at leaſt) by order of the Pope; but he ſent to the Pope a Book, which he writ againſt the Second Council of *Nice*, and againſt Images, which we have ſtill to this day.

After that *Charlemain* had rais'd the Pope, in giving him a good ſhare of the Country, which he had taken from the *Lombards*, the Popes began to be puſt up extreamly, and by little and little made themſelves formidable, taking upon them the Figure of Judges and Correctors of the Actions of Princes throughout *Chriſtendom*, by Excommunications, Interdictions, and finally, by the Depoſition of their Crowns. Now 'tis very remarkable, that whereas, by their imaginary Arms they have laid at their feet the Emperors of *Germany* and the Kings of *England*, and brought their Eſtates into a miſerable confuſion, yet had they never the like ſucceſs againſt *France*, they never have been able to Depoſe our Kings; never could prevail to have any Interdict receiv'd in their Kingdoms, which ſo often as they attempted, they were mock'd, their Officers beaten, and their Partifans ruin'd. But alas, the Submiſſion which *Henry* the Great made to the Pope (the only Inſtance that we can be reproacht withal) is a cooling caſt in our way.

Under

Under *Lewis* the *Debonnaire* was held at *Paris* a Council against Images, that is to say, against the Pope who maintain'd them. Of which Council we have all the Acts entire. And in the beginning of his Reign *Claudius* Bishop of *Turin* broke down all the Images he could find within his Diocese, and list'd himself against the Bishop of *Rome*, who stood for their Adoration, and writ a Book against Images, and the Pope durst not be angry, because this Bishop was supported by the Authority of *Lewis*.

Gréat Troubles being stirr'd in *France*, *Gregory* the Fourth confederates with the Sons of this *Lewis*, too *Debonnaire*, who had engag'd in a wicked Conspiracy against their own Father. *Sigebert* about *an.* 832. testifies, That Pope *Gregory* came into *France*, and took part against the Emperor with his Sons. And the *Annals* written at the same time, *Bochel. Decret. Eccl. Gall. l. 2. tit. 16.* and the continuer of *Aimoinus*, a Religious of *St. Benet*, writes, That the resolution of the *French* Bishops was, that they would by no means yield to his Will, and that if he came to Excommunicate them, they would Excommunicate him again.

After this, Pope *Nicholas* the First Excommunicated King *Lotharius*, (for in those days Deposing was not talkt on) to make him leave *Waldrade*, and take again *Thetherge* his former Wife. Whereupon, the Articles drawn up by the *French*, and which may be seen in *Hincmar* Archbishop of *Rheims* import, 'That the Bishops hold that as the King ought not to be Excommunicated by his Bishops, so can he not be judged by other Bishops: because

‘he ought to be subject to the Empire of God
 ‘alone, who alone could establish him in his
 ‘Kingdom. Then also, the Clergy of *France*
 ‘writ to the Pope Letters full of hard words,
 ‘related by *Aventin* in his *Annals of Bavaria*, in-
 ‘somuch as to call him Thief, Wolf, and Ty-
 ‘rant.

The Popes growing in Insolence, *Adrian*
 II. took upon him to command King *Charles*
the Bald to leave the Kingdom of *Lotharius* en-
 tirely to his Son *Lewis*. The same *Hincmar*,
 a Man of great Authority in his time, writ
 several Letters to him, containing many Re-
 monstrances on this occasion, and amongst
 other matters, informs him, ‘That the Church-
 ‘men and the Seculars of the Realm assembled
 ‘at *Rheims*, have said, and say by way of re-
 ‘proach, That never was such a Command
 ‘sent from that See to any of our Predecessors.

He adds, That Bishops and Secular Lords
 us’d threatnings against the Pope, which he
 dares not repeat. And for the King’s part,
 see how little he valued the Pope’s Com-
 mands; amongst the Epistles of the said *Hinc-*
mar, are to be found the Letters of *Charles the*
Bald to Pope *Adrian*, wherein, after having
 charg’d him with Pride and Usurpation, he
 adds, ‘What pit of Hell has vomited out this
 ‘preposterous Law? What Infernal Gulf has
 ‘disgorg’d it from the black and dismal Dun-
 ‘geons, quite contrary to the way that is set be-
 ‘fore us by the Holy Scripture. And he for-
 bids the Pope to send any more such Com-
 mands to him, or to his Bishops, unless he would
 be content to meet with contempt and dishonor.

Pope

Pope *Urban* excommunicated *Philip* the First, and set his Kingdom under an Interdict. *Inno-cent* the Third did as much to *Philip* the August. But nether of their Thunderbolts had any effect, and were only receiv'd with Mockery. Which agrees with the relation of *Mat. Paris*, that after the Pope had declar'd to *Philip* the August by the Cardinal *D'Anagnia*, that he would set his Land under an Interdict, unless he would reconcile himself with the King of *England*; the King answered, That he was not at all afraid of his Sentence, seeing that it was not founded upon any just cause: adding moreover, that it belong'd not to the Church of *Rome*, to pronounce Sentence against the King of *France*, the which *Du Tillet*, Clerk of the Parliament, tells us, was done by the advice of his Barons.

But what was ever more memorable in History than the truly Royal Courage of *Philip* the Fair an. 1302? *Boniface* VIII. that Monster of Pride, was irritated against him, because he held Prisoner the Bishop of *Pamiers*, who had spoken defamatory words against him: and moreover, for that he assum'd to himself the Collation of Benefices. The Pope then commands him to release the Bishop, and writ him the following Letter.

"Fear God, and keep his Commandments:
 "We will that thou take notice, That thou
 "art subject to us in Spirituals and Tempo-
 "rals; that no Collation of Benefices and Pre-
 "bends belongs to thee; that if thou hast the
 "keeping of any that are vacant, thou reserve
 "the profits for the Successors; if thou goest

“about to make any such Collations, we De-
 “cree them void, and so far as in fact they are
 “executed, we revoke. Those who shall be-
 “lieve otherwise, we shall count Hereticks.
 A Legate came to *Paris* with these fine Letters,
 which were torn from him by the King’s Peo-
 ple, and thrown into the fire by the Count of
Artois. The answer of *Philip* to the Pope
 was this :

“*Philip*, by the Grace of God, King of the
 “*French*, to *Boniface*, that calls himself *Sove-*
 “*reign Pontifex*, wisheth little health, or ra-
 “ther none at all. May thy great sottishness
 “know, That in Temporals we are subject
 “unto none, that the Collation of Churches
 “and Prebends belongs to us by our right of
 “Royalty; and also to take to our selves the
 “profits during the Vacancies. That the Col-
 “lations made by us, and to be made, shall be
 “strong and good, and that by vertue there-
 “of we will defend those in possession cou-
 “rageously. Those who believe otherwise we
 “count Fools and Mad-men,

The Pope thus provok’d, Excommunicates
 the King, but no body durst publish the Ex-
 communication, nor be the bearer of it. Never-
 theless the King assembles at *Paris*, his Knights,
 Barons, and Prelates, and demanded of them,
 of whom they held their Fiefs, and their Church-
 Temporalities. They answered, That they
 hold them of the King, and not of the Pope,
 whom they accus’d of Heresie, Murder, and
 of other Crimes. In the mean while, the Pope
 made it his business to stir up *Germany* and the
Low-Countrys against *France*. But the King
 sent

sent into *Italy*, *William de Nogaret*, who, assisted with the advice of *Sciarra a Polander*, took the Pope at *Anagnia*, and having mounted him upon an hurdle, carried him Prisoner to *Rome*, where he died of grief and anger. Observe, that this Pope who thundered against Kings, had so little Power at *Rome*, and so little love of the People, that not a *Roman* stirr'd a foot to deliver the Bishop of *Rome*, so rudely treated even in *Rome* it self. For all this the King had immediately from the Successors of *Boniface* rare Bulls, for abolishing the memory of all these Transactions; as may be seen in the *Extravaganta Meruit* of *Clement V.* where this King is prais'd as a Religious Prince, who had deserv'd well of the Holy See. For the Popes are of the nature of *Spaniards*, who will lick their Masters feet when they have soundly bang'd them.

In the Year 1408. Pope *Benedict XIII.* angry because *Charles VI.* had express'd the exactions and pilferings of the Popes Court, which drain'd *France*, sends into *France* a Bull of Excommunication against the King and his Princes. The University of *Paris* Order'd, That these Bulls be torn in pieces, and that the Pope *Benedict*, whom they call'd *Peter de Luna*, be declar'd Heretick and Schismatick, and Disturber of the Peace. And these Bulls were torn by the Sentence of the Court, *June 16. 1408.* and ten days after, the Court being risen, at Eleven a Clock in the Morning, two Bullbearers, who had brought this Excommunication, made their honourable Amends upon the stairs of the Palace, and after were carried

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back

back to the *Louvre* in the same manner they had been brought (being drawn on two Sledges, adorn'd with Coats of Painted *Canvas*, and Miters of Paper on their heads) with the sound of Trumpets, and the publick Laughter. So little did they care for the Popes thunder. And what would they have done, if these Bulls had brought the Sentence of Deposition against the King? *Charles de Moulin* in his Treatise against the *Peitres Dates*, relates a pretty Sentence of the Court against the Pope under *Charles VI.*

From the same vigor of the *French*, to defend the Dignity of the Crown of their Kings, are risen these customs which have been observ'd many Ages, that a Legate of the Pope is not receiv'd in *France*, nor any Rescript, nor Command of the Pope, without the Kings leave, and without that the Legate communicate his Powers to the Kings Procurator-General, and that they be view'd and verified in the Court of Parliament, who modifye and and restrain them to Masters that do not derogate from the Rights of the King, the Liberties of the Church, nor the Ordinances Royal. Against which ancient form Cardinal *Balui* being come into *France* an. 1484. and there acting as a Legate without the Kings permission, the Court, at the request of the Procurator-General, decreed a Commission for an Information to be brought against him by two Counsellors of the Court, and did forbid him to use farther any Faculty or Legantine Power, on pain of being declared Rebel.

An. 1510. the Gallican-Church being assembled at *Tours*, it was concluded, That the King *Lewis XII.* might with a good Conscience dispise the abusive Bulls and unjust Censures of Pope *Julius II.* and might by Arms oppose his Usurpations, though the Pope should go on to excommunicate, or to depose him. Which is more, by a Council held at *Pisa*, he declar'd himself fallen from the Papacy, and caus'd Money to be coin'd with this Inscription around it. *Perdam nomen Babylonis.* There is some reason to believe he would have made good his word, had he been 30 years younger. And we hope that God has reserv'd this Glory for another *Lewis* in our days, who with the vigour of a flourishing Youth, has the prudence of an old *Caro*; as also the courage and fortune of an *Alexander*.

When *Lewis XII.* and his Adherents were depos'd, *John D'Albert*, King of *Navarre*, was entangl'd with the same misfortune, whose Kingdom by this Pope *Julius II.* was given to *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon*. And this is all the Right the *Spaniard* has to that our great Kings Hereditary Kingdom.

In the Year 1561. on Friday 12th of December, Master *John Tanquerel*, a Batchelor of Divinity, was condemn'd by a Sentence of the Court to make confession publicly, that he had indiscreetly and rashly held this Proposition; That the Pope is Vicar of Christ, having Power spiritual and secular, and that he may deprive of their Dignities the Princes that rebel against his Commands. And notwithstanding that *Tanquerel* protested, that he had propos'd
this

this Doctrinaliter tantum & non juridice; that is to say, not for affirming it as true, but as a Subject for dispute in the Schools, was he compell'd to make this acknowledgment.

During the Wars of the League *an. 1591.* were sent from *Rome* Bulls monitory of Pope *Gregory XIV.* by the which King *Henry* the Great was declar'd incapable of the Crown of *France*, as an Heretick, and a Relapser; and his Kingdom was expos'd to prey. Whereupon the Court of Parliament assembled at *Tours*, made this Decree.

The Court having regard to the conclusions of the Kings Procurator-General, have declared, and do declare the Bulls monitory given at *Rome* the first of *March 1591.* null, abusive, damnable, full of impiety, and impostures, contrary to the holy Decretals, Rights, Franchises, and Liberties of the *Gallican-Church.* Do Order that the Copies sealed with the Seal of *Marsilius Landrianus*, under-seal'd *Septilius Lamprinus*, be torn by the Executioner of High-Justice, and burnt in a Fire which shall be kindled for this occasion, before the great Gate of the Palace, &c. which was executed *August 5th* of the same year.

I verily believe that many good *French* men read not these Examples with pleasure, and reckon it no glory that the Pope has never set his foot on the neck of a King of *France*, as Pope *Alexander* the Third did to the Emperor *Frederick*, nor kick'd off his Crown with his foot, as *Celestine II.* to the Emperor *Henry VI.* nor brought our Kings to yield homage to the Pope for their Kingdom, as other Kings have done,

done, and do to this day. Without doubt they will laugh at the just punishment which *Boniface VIII.* had for his Insolence from the Officers of the generous King *Philip the Fair*, and to see how after this treatment the Popes Successors of *Boniface*, did compliment him with a many Commendations, and Apostolick Benedictions.

Without doubt also these good *French-men* are well satisfied with the pragmatick Sanctions whereby our Kings have repress'd the Exactions of the Court of *Rome*, and have appropriated the Collation of a number of Benefices; and think we are well helpt up in that the King, the Magistrates, and the Sorbonne will own no other Superior to the King but God, for what concerns Temporals.

But I pray to what end is all this briskness in our Kings, in our Parliaments, and in the Sorbon against the Usurpations of the Pope in Temporals, but to yield him the Spirituals, and to confirm his pretensions even in Temporals? Grant him the Spiritual Power, and he will be Master of the Temporal without contradiction, and he shall bring under his Jurisdiction all secular Causes under the colour of a Sacrament, of an Oath, of Charitable Uses, or of matters of Conscience.

The Concords of our Kings with *Rome*, and their pragmatick Sanctions about the Collations of Benefices, what have they come to? Is not this to come in for a share with the Robbers, who had seiz'd the Royalties, and by solemn Articles to make them a Title, which they had no pretence to before their Invasions? And what other do our Kings, in acknowledg-
ing

ing the Spiritual Power of the Pope, but own themselves his Subjects in Temporals? for the one hooks in the other of necessity. The experience of six ages has prov'd this truth. 'Tis the voluntary Subjection of Emperors and Kings to the Spiritual Power of the Pope, that has given him the liberty to Excommunicate them, for this belongs to the Spiritual Jurisdiction. And the very same Jurisdiction has authoris'd him to exempt their Subjects from the Oath of Fidelity, for the keeping of an Oath is a duty of Religion: so that if the Pope be obey'd by a discontented and factious People, you see an Emperor or King is depos'd by the Spiritual Jurisdiction: and the Pope may spare the other Power that he pretends to over the Temporalities of Kings, seeing that his Spiritual power all alone is sufficient to ruine the poor Prince.

And if that the *Christian* Princes, that are of his Communion, own him for the Vicar of Jesus Christ; let the Kings understand it in what sense they please, he will make them know, when-ever their weakness shall give him an opportunity, that he takes himself for the Vicar of the Secular Power of Jesus Christ, as well as of the Spiritual: And that to him, as to Christ whom he represents, all Power is given in Heaven and on Earth. This is what the last Council of *Lateran* attributes to him, and applies to him that Prophecie of *Psalms* 72. particular to Jesus Christ. *All Kings shall be prostrate before him, and all Nations shall serve him*

The Kings that prostrate themselves the most humbly before him, are those he throws

as

at his Feet. Witness the Treatment he gave our good King *Henry the Third*, who Ador'd him: and yet he Thundered upon him, and persecuted him even to death, and beyond death. For after he was Assassinated, in pursuance of his Excommunication and Deposition, by his Creatures of the League, and particularly of the House of *Guise* that he favour'd: He would not at all suffer any Obits or Services to be made for him at *Rome*, as if he had a mind to have him Damn'd, after he had caus'd him to be Murder'd. Particularly he extoll'd, in a Publick Harangue, the execrable Parricide *Jacob Clement*, and compares his Fact to the Mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God.

The design of this persecution drawn out so at length against the King, the Princes of the Blood, and against all the Kingdom, is to be seen in the Memoirs of the Advocate *David*, intercepted at *Lions*, *An. 1577.* as he was upon his return from *Rome*, where he had been Secretary to the Bishop of *Paris*, the King's Ambassador with the Pope. This Bishop of *Paris*, a Creature of the Duke of *Guise*, being at *Rome*, *An. 1576.* instead of serving the Interests of the King his Master, who had sent him to make an excuse, by reason of the necessity of the King's Affairs, for the Peace he had made with the Duke *Alençon* his Brother, and with the Princes of the Blood that were Protestants; He apply'd himself wholly to the Interests of the Duke of *Guise* and the Pope, who had then plotted together their devilish design of the League. For the Pope,

whose

whose custom it is to build his Greatness upon the weakness of Kings, and the troubles of their States, seeing the Royal-House declining, despis'd, and drawing to an end, and *France* harass'd with Civil Wars; was easily wrought upon to favour the House of *Guise*, which aspir'd manifestly to the Crown by the exclusion of the Princes of the Blood. So upon the whole matter, the Duke of *Guise*, a Prince well made, and of high undertaking, powerful in Friends, lov'd and ador'd by the People, promised to give him all the Sovereignty in *France*, which he counts himself debarr'd of, by the pragmatick Sanctions, and by the Liberties of the *Gallicane-Church*.

Then during the stay of this Ambassador at *Rome*, *An. 1576.* an Agreement was drawn between the Pope and Duke of *Guise*, whereby the Pope Declares, That *Hugh Capet* had seiz'd the Crown of *France*, which of Right belong'd to the House of *Charlemaign*. That he and his Race had render'd the *French* refractory and disobedient to the Holy See, by that damnable Error which they call the Liberties of the *Gallicane-Church*, which is none other, (says he) but the Doctrine of the *Valdenses*, *Albigenses*, the Poor of *Lyons*, *Lutherans* and *Calvinists*. That it is this Error which makes the Arms of the Kings of *France*, in defence of the Holy Church, unfortunate, and that they never will prosper, so long as the Crown shall continue in this Line.

In order thereunto, an opportunity was now offer'd by reason of the present Divisions, to labour in good earnest the Restoration of the
Crown

Crown to the true Successors of *Charlemaign* who had always constantly obey'd the Commands of the Holy See. And who had in effect shew'd themselves the lawful Heirs of the Apostolick Benediction upon that Crown, though depriv'd of their Inheritance by fraud and violence.

That 'tis plain, the Race of the *Capets* are wholly deliver'd over to a reprobate Sense; some being possess'd with a spirit of Mopishness, Stupid, and of no Valour. Others rejected by God and Men for their Heresie, proscribed and shut out from the Communion of the Holy Church. Whereas the Branches of *Charlemaign* are fresh and flourishing, Lovers of Virtue, vigorous of Body and in Mind, for the execution of high and laudable Enterprizes. He goes on and Prophecies for them, that as War had been the means whereby they lost their Degree, so Peace shall do them the service to restore them to their ancient Heritage of the Kingdom, with the good Will, the Consent and the Choice of all the People.

Afterwards follows a Lesson of the Conclave, for the execution of this Design, well worthy to be read. For it is the whole plot and project of the League, which was exactly observ'd all along, even to the very last Act with the States of *Blois*, when the Theatre on a sudden fell upon the Actors Heads, and that the Tragical death of two of the Principals broke the great design ready to be accomplisht; which was to shut the King in a Monastery, and the Queen in another, and to put to death all the Princes of the Blood, to make way for Monsieur
the

the Duke of *Guise*, to whom immediately the Crown was to be given.

For the Conclusion of this Accord, his Holiness requires of the Duke of *Guise*, that he shall cause to be acknowledg'd the power of the Holy See, by the States of the Realm, *without any restriction or modification*: abolishing the Priviledges and the Liberties of the *Gallican-Church*, the which he shall promise and swear to do before he take the Crown.

The Pope enrag'd to see his great design quash'd, that he had laboured and push'd on with so much Artifice, by the execution made by the King upon the persons of the Duke of *Guise*, and of the Cardinal his Brother, Excommunicates and Deposes the King, who, for all that, lost not his Crown, till he lost his Life; also, being assassinated by *James Clement*, a Dominican-Monk: who being immediately kill'd by the King's Servants there present, had undoubtedly been Canoniz'd by his Holiness for his Heroick Act, if the business of the League had prosper'd: for we have have seen and read with horror the *Legend* of St. *James Clement*, Printed and Dispersed through *France*: and his execrable Paracide has been defended as a just and meritorious Action by the Jesuit *Guignard*, who has written a Book expressly on that Subject. Even *Bellarmino* condemns highly those that kill'd the Monk who murdered his King, because, (says he) they kill'd *Sacratum virum*, a Man consecrated, accounting this detestable Monk more Sacred and more inviolable, than the Sacred Majesty of the King.

Henry

Henry the Great having inherited the Crown of Henry the Third, the Pope prosecutes the League against him with a re-doubled Zeal. So that besides the open War, there followed three several attempts upon his Person, by Villains instructed, and posted in convenient places for their design by the Jesuits, who for this reason, were banish'd out of France, and a Pyramid was erected close by the Palace, with an Inscription which declar'd the cause of their banishment.

Now, for all that His Majesty professed the Roman Catholick Religion, yet would not the Pope of a long time receive him into the bosom of the Church, because as yet his Party was but weak. But when his Holiness saw that the Interests of the League declin'd, and that good Cities and whole Provinces treated with the King, then the Holy Spirit suggested to him, that he might receive into his fold of the Church this straying Sheep; out of fear, least France, provoked too far, should, in the end, come to do what has been often threatened, that is, to make a Patriarch of the Gallicane Church.

And yet in this Reconciliation, the Pope made appear so much Pride and Rancor, this great King could not but in the Person of his Ambassador, lying on the Ground at the Pope's Feet, receive a bitter Cup of Repentance.

Never had a King of France made the Pope the like submission. The Pope has taught our Kings a Lesson to take advantage in their turn of his Necessities, to make him bend or break. And I am full of hope that our Great and Glo-

rious King will have a deep resentment of so great an Indignity done to His Heroick Grandfather. Especially might His Majesty be pleas'd to consider, that the Court of *Rome*, notwithstanding that Reconciliation, never pardon'd him; keeping near his Persons Confessors that conspir'd against his Life, causing Seditious Sermons to be Preacht in *Paris*, and censuring at *Rome* in full Consistory the Sentence of the Court of Parliament against *John Castel*, executed for having struck with a knife at this Great King, in order to cut his Throat. And this censure was made at *Rome* four Months before that this excellent King was kill'd, to prepare their Spirits for this execrable Assassination.

Thereupon, when *Ravaillac*, who perform'd what the other Martyrs of the Pope had attempted, was examin'd, and asked why he undertook this detestable Parricide, he answered, *That there needed no more than to have heard the Sermons preached in Paris the last Lent, to inform any body of the Motives; for the rest that the King was preparing to make War against God, in that he would make War against the Pope, and that the Pope is God.* In short, one might find in this Wretch the sparks of that fiery Zeal, and blind Devotion for His Holiness, and the desperate Spirit of the League, which the Pope, by the means of the Jesuits, industriously fomented in *France*, to produce this horrible and dire Effect.

When it was represented to these Bigot Parricides, that the King having been Excommunicated, was afterwards Absolv'd and Reconcil'd

cil'd to the Pope; they answer'd, That his Conversion was feign'd. And they who attempted against his Person, before this Reconciliation, might shield themselves with the Canon *Excommunicatorum* of Pope Urban, which speaks thus, *We count them not Murderers, who shall happen to kill any Excommunicated Persons, out of an Ardour of Zeal, for the Catholick Church their Mother.*

Observe then, that all they whom the Pope taxes for Heresie, they that Appeal from the Pope to a future Council, and they that levy Taxes upon the Clergy, are Excommunicated by the Bull *De cæna Domini*, which the Pope pronounces every Thursday absolutely: a many Kings and Princes are involv'd in this Excommunication, and the Kings of France amongst the rest: no Heresie being more Criminal at Rome, than the asserting of the Liberties of the *Gallicane-Church*, and the not owning the Terrestrial Empire of his Holiness. It concerns then those to make good provision for the securing of their Lives, who are by this Canon expos'd to all those who shall be pusht on to kill them by an ardor of zeal for the Catholick Church.

He was much deceiv'd, who thought that the pope, and the Jesuits, his Emissaries, take it very ill any should represent to the World, that by the Doctrine, and by the Censures of Rome, Subjects are instructed to kill their Kings, as often and as many as it shall please the Pope to Excommunicate; and that the Murder of our two last *Henries* ensued thereupon. I think the quite contrary, they are

well content that in laying to their charge these furious Executions, which have plung'd our *France* in a gulph of Miseries, we serve their design, which is to scare our Kings and Princes, and render them tame Slaves to the Court of *Rome*, by the fear of Excommunication, Deposition, Rebellion, Knife and Poison.

But this is not to be fear'd save where the People are bigotted with a sottish Zeal, and believe in the Pope, instead of believing in God, and obeying the King. *France* at this time is pretty well purg'd of this Zeal. And by the Grace of God, and the wise Conduct of His Majesty, there is no longer now any ambitious Prince within the Kingdom to rob him of his Peoples Affection, or that may dare to make any Alliance with the Pope, to tumble him from his Throne, and share the Crown.

We have this good fortune, that we may set out to the life the ill aspect of *Rome* upon our Kings, and that dangerous vigilance over *France*, without any danger of abating the Courage of our Great King ; but on the contrary, were his truly Royal Courage capable of an increase, it would yet swell the higher, from the consideration of the Evils that *Rome* has done, and will yet do to *France*, if he do not heartily oppose the Usurpations she exercises, with impunity in all the parts of his Kingdom.

The honest *French men* that have the Honour to be near his Person, might represent to Him the danger of this Doctrine maintain'd by the Popelings of His Kingdom, That *Jesus Christ* committed to St. Peter, as well the earthly as the heavenly Empire, which are the very

worls

words of Pope *Nicolas*. Therefore Cardinal *Bellarmino*, Ch. 27. against *Barclay*, holds absolutely, That the Pope may dispose of all the Temporals of the World. I affirm (says he) with confidence, That our Lord *Jesus Christ*, the time he was Mortal, might dispose of all Temporal things, and deprive the Kings and the Princes of their Kingdoms and Dominions, and that without doubt he has left the same Power to his Vicar, to be employ'd, when he shall judge it necessary for the good of Souls.

The Pope *Pius V.* displays this Power with great Ostentation, in his Bull against Queen *Elizabeth* of England; wherein after that he calls Himself *Servant of Servants*, he declares, That 'God has establish'd the Bishop of *Rome* 'Prince over all Nations and Kingdoms, to 'take, destroy, disperse, consume, plant and 'build, and in the Power hereof he does Anathemize, degrade, and depose this Queen, absolves all her Subjects from the Oath of Fidelity that they had made her, and forbids them absolutely to give her Obedience.

Gregory XIV. set out such another Bull against our Great *Henry*, declaring him incapable of the Crown, and exposing His Kingdom to prey. But both this and the other Bull were torn and cast into the fire by the hands of the Hangman.

Observe that the Pope exerciseth this Power over the Temporalities of Kings for the good of Souls, and as a *Spiritual Prince*. So that our French Statesmen may cease to have their Eyes wilfully seal'd up by that distinction of Spiritual power, which they allow him, and Temporal power that they deny him. For that it

is by virtue of the Spiritual Power, that he exerciseth the Temporal. See what Cardinal *Bellarmin* says, *De pont. Rom. l. 5. c. 5.* 'The Pope may change the Kingdoms, take them from one, and give them to another, as a Sovereign Spiritual Prince, when it shall be necessary for the good of Souls. And of this necessity he shall be the only Judge, as the Sovereign Spiritual Prince. For 'tis thus the Cardinal argues, *Apol. pro Garnet p. 84.* 'If the Church (that is to say the Pope) had not the power to dispose of Temporal things, she would not be perfect, and would want the Power that is necessary for the attaining her end: for (says he) the wicked might entertain Hereticks, and go scot-free, and so Religion, be turn'd upside down. This reason charges imperfection on the Church in the Apostles time, for that had no power over the Temporals.

These horrible Principles so strongly maintain'd by the Court of *Rome*, were of fresh memory found so prejudicial, both to the safety of our Kings, and to the Peace of *France*, that those of the third State *an. 1615.* were mov'd to propose to the General States an Article, contraining the means to dispossess, the people of that Opinion, that the King might be depos'd by the Pope, and that by the killing of Kings one might gain the Crown of Martyrdom.

Cardinal *Du Perron*, in the name of the Clergy, oppos'd this Article, and employ'd all the strength of his Eloquence and Learning in two fair Speeches, the one before the Nobility, the other before the third State, to persuade

swade them that our Kings may be depos'd by the Pope, offering himself to suffer Martyrdom in defence of this Truth. The Lords of the Nobility, to their great shame, joyn'd with the Clergy, for the putting their Kings Crown under the Miter of the Pope; much degenerating from the vertue of their Ancestors, those French Barons, by whose advice Philip the August declar'd to the Cardinal D'Anagnia, the Popes Legat, that threatned him, that it did not at all belong to the Church of Rome to pronounce Sentence against the King of France. But the third State held firm to their Article that maintain'd the Dignity of their King, and the safety of his Person; and could never be won by promises, nor affrighted by threatnings to depart from it, shewing themselves in this more noble than the Nobility.

It is no wonder in this case that the third State shew'd more affection to their King than the Clergy, seeing that the Clerks hold, That they are not the King's Subjects; for in effect they acknowledge another Sovereign out of the Kingdom. And who can think it strange if they labour to heighten that Monarchy of which they make a Party? But that the Nobility, the Kings right arm, that they should be so base to strike their Head, and lay it at the feet of an Italian Bishop; this is that which after Ages will reflect upon with astonishment and indignation, and which Historians shall blush to relate, and be vex'd that they cannot let pass in silence.

So the Nobility being joyn'd with the Clergy, the Article of the third State was censur'd

and rejected. Whereupon the Pope writ Triumphant Letters to the Clergy and the Nobility, who had been faithful to Him in this Cause, glorying in His Victory, and exalting the Magnanimity of these generous Nobles. But in truth, the Deputies of these generous Nobles deserv'd to have been degraded from their Nobility, and they of the third State to have receiv'd their Titles.

The minority of the late King, and the easiness of the Queen-Mother, render'd them expos'd to these injuries, and apt to be circumvented; insomuch that this Harangue made to the third State was printed, with the Privilege of the King, and the Pope gain'd his point.

The false dealing of the Cardinal, who made this Speech, is remarkable; namely, that he had a long time followed King *Henry* the Great, even then when he was of a contrary Religion, and depos'd by the Pope: and that a little before, in an assembly held at the *Jacobins* in *Paris*, he had resisted the Popes *Nuncio*, who would that this Doctrine of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope might be held for an Article of Faith. But in these two Harangues, the Cardinal made a kind of a Recantation, and pronounc'd himself his own condemnation. Ungrateful wretch! to have thus abus'd the tender Age of the Son of his King, and his great Benefactor: and to have basely betray'd the Rights of the King, to oblige the Court of *Rome*.

But this may not seem so strange, if one consider, that he got the best part of his preferment for certain Services of pleasure, that do not much bind the Conscience of him that receives

receives them, nor that of him who is recompens'd for them. And in truth, those diverting Services that he and Monsieur *De la Ravenne* render'd to King *Henry* the Great, deserve that Posterity should erect for them Statues crown'd with Myrtle.

God be thank'd that *France* now has a King vigorous both in Age and in Virtue, who is the terrour of *Rome*, having shewn himself sensible of its Usurpations upon *France*, beyond all his Predecessors; and of whom we have good occasion to hope that he will shake off this *Italian Yoke*, and banish all Foreign Jurisdiction out of his Kingdom.

We also ought to bless God, for that the *French Nobility* at this day is much of a different temper from that which in the full States submitted the Crown and life of their King to the Popes Tyranny 56 years ago. And that is ready to cover their Fathers faults by generously assisting their King, to make Him the only King within his Kingdom.

To effect this, above all things, those pretended Immunities and Exemptions must be taken from the Clergy, which indeed are revolts from the Kings Authority to that of the Popes. 'Tis in truth very reasonable, that they who have the charge of Souls, should be discharg'd from many publick Services, by reason they are vow'd and reserv'd to the Service of God; but however, not that they and their Lands should no longer depend on the King, and be subject to another Sovereign.

This is what was represented to King *Henry* the Great, by that illustrious Personage *Achilles*

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de Harley, first President of His Court of Parliament at Paris, in a Speech he made to him, to dissuade him from recalling the Jesuits, he Remonstrates to him, That according to their Doctrine, he who has taken the lowest Orders of the Church, could not be guilty of High Treason, whatever Crime he committed, for that the Clergy are no longer the Kings Subjects, nor belonging to his Jurisdiction. In such manner that the Churchmen (if one would believe them) are exempt from Secular Powers, and may, without punishment, attempt against Kings with their bloody-hands; and that this Doctrine they maintain in their publish'd Books, *Thuanus* l. 130. *ad an.* 1604.

To this effect, the Jesuit *Emanuel Sa* holds, That the Rebellion of a Clerk against the Prince is not the Crime *læse Majestatis*, because he is not a Subject of the Prince. Words that have been left out in the Edition of Paris, but remain in that of Cologne, and that of Antwerp.

Bellarmin, that has not been purged, says the same thing. He affirms, *De Cl. C.* 28. That a Clerk cannot be punished by the Civil Judges, or in any wise brought before the Judicial Seat of a Secular Magistrate. He likewise says, That the Sovereign Pontifex having deliver'd the Clerks from the subjection of Princes, Kings are no more the superiors of Clerks. The Pope then by his reckoning is the King of Kings, if he can deliver whom he pleases from their subjection due to their Princes by their birth, by making them Clerks; and it will be in his Power not to leave in France any Subject to the

the King, if all his Subjects will but accept of the meanest Orders.

This Body of the Clergy has its Judges and Officers apart, and Prisons apart. Their Causes will not bide the Trial before the Kings Judges, but fly to the *Rota*, or to the Consistory at *Rome*. There may be found an incredible number of Persons in *France*, who, under the Title of the Clergy, have shaken off the Yoke of the Kings Authority; and a third part of the Land of the Kingdom is in the Church-mens hands, for which they will neither render Homage nor Service to the King. And though the lods and vents, the quints, requints, and other Rights of Lordship belong to the King; all these Rights are lost after that the moveable goods are enter'd into the possession of the Clergy. The King also loses his Rights *D'Aubainir*, of Confiscation, and of Deforence, the Clergy being a Body that never dies, yet mortifies the Inheritances; new Donations falling to them every day, but none goes from them. A famous Writer said pleasantly, That as the Arms and Thighs dwindle, when the Belly swells to excess; so in the Body of a State the Nobility and People that are as the Arms and Legs of a Commonweal, are impair'd by the fatning of the Clergy.

I am of those who wish the Clergy may have those means, and that Dignity which may lift them above Contempt and Oppression, and render them respected even of Kings. But because I love them, I wish their Riches may not be so excessive, as to create in Kings a jealousy, that may cause them to be taken away, as has happen'd

pen'd in *England*, and in other places.

'Tis therefore a great imprudence of our Lords, the Clergy of *France*, who possess the best part, and the fat of the Kingdom, enough to cause jealousy in the Seculars, and the avarice of Sacrilege; to add, yet this unjust pretension of immunity from all Charges, both for their persons and for their goods; and defend themselves with the Popes Authority, which exempts them. Which, in effect, is to tell the King, That they are another Kings Subjects, who has Power to Command Him, to dispose of the Lands under his Obedience, and to limit his Authority over the Persons of the Native *French*.

If for this they alledge a long Custom, we may say, That the Popes to settle their Usurpations in *France*, have ever embroil'd our Kings in Troubles, and oblig'd them to think of somewhat else, besides the repelling the blind encroachments of a stranger Kingdom that crept into their Realm; and that they had to do with weak Princes, or such as had their hands full other ways. But now that God has given *France* a King, wise, powerful, flourishing, and who has leisure to have an Eye on all his Interests, will these Gentlemen expect that he will suffer long that a third of his Kingdom lie unprofitable to him, and even that it be reserv'd to fortifie a Foreign Monarchy? and though natural reason requires that they who live at ease should comfort those who fight for their preservation; all this while that the Nobles and the third State oppose the invasion of Strangers, all this while that

that the King is fortifying his Frontiers, entertaining Garisons, setting Officers both for the State and for the War, Why do not the Churchmen, who are thereby maintain'd in the quiet enjoyment of so great plenty, contribute one Mite towards the defraying of publick Charges? Why shall their increase be a diminution to the strength of the King, who is kept waking for their repose and preservation?

Shall not the King who is so clear-sighted, see what an impoverishment it is to his Kingdom, that *France* be tributary to a Stranger, under the Title of Annates, Offerings, Dispensations, Absolutions, and Causes Matrimonial?

Against these Depredations, our ancient Kings had provided some remedy by the pragmatick Sanctions, vext to see the fairest Revenue of the Kingdom pass over the *Alps* by a Religious spoil, and go into the Purles of those who laugh at our simplicity.

But what reason is there that they who pay so willingly Tribute to the Pope, should make so great difficulty in paying to the King? Is it not because they believe they owe all to the Pope, and nought to the King? *St. Paul* teaches them to pay Tribute to the Higher Powers, *inasmuch as they are Ministess of God*. And *St. Chrysostom* commenting upon this Text, tells them who are *these higher Powers*. If (says he) the *Apostle* has establish'd this Law whilst the Princes were Pagans, how much more ought this to be done under Princes that are Believers? And he had said before, *The Apostle commands this to all, even to the Priests*, Which

is more, he adds, *though thou art an Apostle, though thou art an Evangelist, or a Prophet, or what ever else thou art.* From St. Ambrose we have the same Lesson in his Oration of delivering the Temples, *If Tribute be demanded, refuse it not, the Lands of the Church pay Tribute.* Even Pope Urban and the Roman Decretal say, *That the Church pay Tribute of its exterior Goods.* Also, *That Tribute must be paid to the Emperors, in acknowledgment of the Peace and Repose, in which they ought to maintain and defend us.*

The right of Kings and Truth must needs be very strong, that could draw from the Pope and his Canonistical Doctors this acknowledgment. For the Canon Law was not founded for any other end, but to supplant the Civil Laws, and establish the Popes Jurisdiction throughout. This is a Body of Foreign Laws, that have their Tribunal apart, and that depends on a Foreign Prince, and where the King has nothing to do but look on; I mean till such time as he shall please to take cognizance of so unreasonable an Usurpation. And forbid that any Cause be judged in *France* by other Authority than His, and much less any Cause commenc'd in *France*, be appeal'd to *Rome*. And, in truth, he is but a King by halves, till he alone possess all the Jurisdiction exercis'd within his Kingdom.

This is what *Charles du Moulin* said in an Epistle to *Henry II.* where he writes freely against the Empire that the Pope has set up within our *France*, where the Pope has Subjects that submit not to the Laws of the King,
but

but to those of the Pope, which are the Canon-Law, and the Constitutions that come from Rome.

But (some may object) Would you have the King judge in Spirituals? I Answer, That if the King ought not to be Judge, it does not follow that the Pope must. The King has his Bishops that may and ought to judge of matters purely Spiritual; but of nought without being authoriz'd by the King; and there is no need of an Authority out of the Kingdom for this.

I will say more, That the Ecclesiastical Government is a part of the Office of a King. For so it was in the Kingdom of *Israel*. And who would believe that in this Age, and in *Spain*, where the Inquisition Reigns, King *Philip IV.* assum'd to himself the Sovereign Power of Churches within his Dominions? For this purpose he apply'd that excellent passage of *Isodore*, which is attributed also to the Council of *Paris*, *That the Secular Princes should know, that they ought to give an account of the charge of the Church committed to them by Jesus Christ; for whether that the Peace or the Discipline receive improvement by believing Princes, or that they are impair'd: He who committed the Church to their Power, will demand an account.*

O the excellent passage! O the Holy Lesson! God give all Christian Kings the Grace so well to learn it, that they may never leave this Charge of the Church which Jesus-Christ has committed to them upon the hands of Strangers; and when they have taken it into their own hands, to acquit themselves worthily, and render a good account.

Alas!

Alas! Alas! Have Kings Eyes to see their Rights, and have they no hands to maintain them? Are they quick-sighted enough to perceive that the Government of the Church is committed to them, and that they are to render an account to God; and have they not the courage to rescue them from unjust and strange Hands that snatch them away? Think they to acquit themselves of this great Account, of the Government of the Church of their Kingdoms, by saying, That the Holy Father has discharg'd them of it, when they have in their hands the power to discharge Him from his Usurpations?

In Truth, they will never be in condition to Govern the Church committed to them; they will never be but Kings by halves, till they have banisht from their Territories this pretended Spiritual Jurisdiction, which destroys the Civil, and which will draw under its Cognizance all sorts of Causes, there being none, wherein there is not some matter of Conscience, or some kind of Transgression of Gods Commandments, and that by consequence belongs not to the Jurisdiction of the Pope, if He must be own'd the Sovereign Spiritual Judge in *France*.

The Popes themselves inform our Kings of their Right to Govern the Church. *Leo IV.* writing to *Lewis* and to *Lotharius*, did not he own that the Investiture of the Bishop comes from the Emperor, and the Pope has only the Consecration? Did not He beseech the Emperor to invest a person he had recommended? and does he not acknowledge, that the Metro-
politan

politan dares not Consecrate him, without the Emperors consent? And Pope *John X.* in his Epistle to *Hereiman* of *Cologne*, about the business of *Heldwin* of *Tongres*; does he not observe, *That the old Custom has this force, that none ought to confer a Bishoprick upon any Clerk, save the King, to whom the Scepter has been given of God.*

The Council held at *Thionvil*, under *Lewis* the *Debonnair*, *An. 835.* gives us this good Maxim, That the Pope ought to be call'd Pope and Brother, not Father and *Pontifex*: and that *Lewis* had more Power in the Government of the *Gallicane* Church, than the Bishop of *Rome*, as *Agobard* Bishop of *Lions* has it in his *Treatise of the Comparison of the Two Governments*, related by *Bossellus* in his *Decretals*.

Gregory Turonensis does furnish us with more than Ten Examples of the right of Investiture belonging to our Kings before the Empire fell into their hands. In the times of *Clouis* they held the Royal Right of the Investiture of Bishops. They had also a Right which they call'd *Regal*, which was the Power of enjoying vacant Bishopricks and Prebends, and the moveables of Bishops dying without a Will. And it is very easie to prove, that under the first Line of our Kings, and a long while under the Second, the Kings of *France* were the Sovereigns as well in Spirituals as in Temporals. And though they had lost their Sovereignty about the end of the Second Line, and under the Third by their negligence, and by the cunning of the Popes, watchful for their advantage; nevertheless an infinite

of Persons, in those times, both of the Clergy and of the Law, took notice of, and Taxed the Usurpations of the Popes upon the Rights of our Kings. Amongst others, *Aegydius Romanus*, Archbishop of *Bourges*, in the time of *Philip the Fair*, this Archbishop, for the Reasons Registred in the Court of Parliament, remonstrates, That the *Gallicane-Church* has that Right, and that Liberty to provide for its occasions by Synods of the Bishops of the Country, without that the Pope ought to meddle, unless by way of exhortation.

Cardinal *D'Offat* (Letter 90 to the King) shews, That the Pope ought not to meddle at all with the Election of the *French Bishops*, and this he proves by the Ordinance of *Orleans*, *An. 1560*, and saith, That since the Popes have reserv'd to themselves the provision of Bishopricks, they have been very ill serv'd.

The excellent Archbishop of *Paris*, *Peter de Marca*, in his agreement of Empire and the Priesthood, has wisely and boldly Remonstrated; That since the Pope would hold the same Degree in *France*, that the Sovereign Sacrificer held in the Synagogue, he ought not to pretend to more Authority in our *France*, than the Sovereign Sacrificer had in the Kingdom of *Israel*, where he was the Kings Subject: his Person, his Jurisdiction, the Affairs of the Church, the Order of Ceremonies were within the Kings Jurisdiction: who depos'd the Sacrificer, and set another in his place, out of his pure and full Authority. God be prais'd for that in these later times, where the Throne

of iniquity, the Papal See is so much adored, he has rais'd up such brave Assertors of our Christian Liberty, which would bear up again, and for which we want only to shake off the Yoke.

What is alledg'd the most specious for the necessity of a Pope to superintend the Christian Kingdom, is, that the Kings need an Arbitrer of their Differences, that may be generally respected, and whose Dignity and Sanctity may oblige them to Submission and Veneration.

But if this general Arbitrer, instead of making Peace amongst Princes, foment their Differences, and embroil their Affairs, to fish in troubl'd Waters, they shall do wisely to let him alone, and yet more wisely to rid themselves of him.

There's no question but that when a general Peace is for the advantage of the Pope, that then he will set himself seriously about it. But it rarely happens otherwise, then that the good of one party shall be disadvantageous to the Pope, and then 'tis ill trusting to his Arbitrement.

France has more reason to stand upon its guard than any other Nation, for the Court of *Rome* has always sought its ruin: has favour'd its Enemies, or rais'd them up anew. When the *English* made War against us, *Rome* abetted their quarrel, and aided them with Spiritual Weapons. I cannot let pass the ridiculous assistance sent to *Henry V. of England*, when he levied an Army to go into *France*: this was a Ship loaden with Consecrated Apples,

which were distributed to all who would List themselves for this War: and they list themselves with a good Will, having scambld for the Apples with Greediness and Devotion, and were well satisfied in Conscience of the Justice of this Expedition by these Apples Apostolical.

The Pope employ'd more powerful means against us, when *France* was weak, and the *Spaniard* powerful, whom he assisted with all his Forces Spiritual and Temporal. What a strong League did he make to destroy both King and Kingdom? What Evils did he heap on *France*? and after the injury done us, how much praying did he require before he would be appeas'd?

Thomas Campanella speaks thus of this Judge of differences, *Who shall carefully read History, shall find that the Popes have made more Wars amongst Christians, than they have quieted. Let France mark what he adds, So far have the Popes been from opposing himself, Hispanis Imperiorum helluonibus, to the Spaniards unsatiable devourers of Empire, that the Pontifical Authority has lent pretences to their Voracity: Witness Navarre and France in the times of Henry III.*

For this last hundred years, all the Popes (except *Urban the VIII.*) have favour'd the *Spaniard*. And what reason can we have to expect better from them, seeing that the greatest part of the Cardinals are born Subjects to *Spain*, in the Principalities of *Milan*, of *Naples*, and of *Sicily*; and that the Court of *Rome* is inclos'd within these Principalities? Judge what confidence we can have in such Arbiters.

France

France loses plainly both Money and Pains, sending Ambassadors to these Gentlemen, courting them, and enriching them, when they are assembled for the Election of a Pope. The fear they have of *France's* Power, may gain some respect, but it is a respect without Friendship; and when *France* has gain'd it, I do not see what *France* has gain'd.

They have reason to fear the King, knowing that this Great Prince is sensible of their Usurpations; and they have no great reason to love his Subjects, because they are no great purchasers of Indulgences. And the less the King cares for them, the more will they fawn upon him; but we may assure our selves, they employ all their strength, and set to work all their Art and Subtilty to put a stop to his Progress, and to pull down his Greatness.

That agreement of the Pope with the Duke of *Guise* ought never to be forgotten. What rancour did he testifie against the Royal Line that Reigns at this day? what Pains did he take to disinherit and destroy it? Into what combustion did he cast the poor Kingdom, that he might have a King of his own Choice, who might abolish the Liberties of the *Gallican* Church, and make *France* a Fief of the Court of *Rome*. Let us for our experience learn the truth of that Character given by *Æneus Sylvius*, who was afterwards Pope *Pius II.* That there was never any great Slaughter in *Christendom*, nor any great Calamity happen'd either of Church or State, whereof the Bishops of *Rome* were not the Authors. *Hist. Austria.* And as much is said by *Machiavel* in his History of *France.*

And if we consider that the great Evils done by the Pope to Kings, were done under the colour of com-promise; we shall find that 'tis the surest way to decline his kindness, and to have nought to do with him; and that he always comes better off that affronts him, than he that flatters him.

The Marquess after he has wisely consider'd, that the name of Religion is a false pretext laid hold on by the Court of *Rome*, thereby to encrease their Temporal Power, and raise them Creatures every where, the abuses he would have retrench'd after the example of *Charlemaign*, and of many more great Kings.

But to compass this, it is not adviseable to appear in it barefaced, for (says he) *That would be to bring upon us the Clamours and importunity of all the Monks and their followers; this would be to bring Rome upon our back, which might give us trouble.*

I confess that no good can be acquir'd without trouble. But I cannot conceive that it would be much trouble to deliver *France* from the Usurpations and the Exactions of *Rome*. To forbid that there be in *France* no more Courts depending on the Pope; nor Money carried from *France* to *Rome*, or any Cause removed thither by Appeal. And that no provision of Benefices be receiv'd from thence. This, in truth, would be to bring *Rome* on our backs; but not one Sword would be drawn in the Cause either within the Kingdom or without. Should the Emperor do the same within his Principalities, our King would not stir; nor would the Emperor any more be concern'd if the King should

should set back the Jurisdiction of the Pope to beyond the *Alps*.

When King Henry VIII. of *England* did the same in his Kingdom, what Prince undertook the quarrel against him: How easily would the People accustom themselves to be free from the Papal Exactions: and how vain and idle were the Attempts of the Popes Partisans in *England* to restore his Authority? that Prince hack'd and harass'd what he had a mind to in the Ecclesiastick Estate, and the clamours of the Monks, which the Marquess is affraid on, frighted not him, though he treated them courselly.

Nor are we at all to fear least the Monks take up Arms, as the Chiefs of the League forc'd them to do; which would serve only to make them be laught at, and gave a subject to the *Painters* for those antick and ridiculous Portraits that they have left us. Or if any little broil should be rais'd by some of the Bigots, how soon must it fall before a great King who is never without an Army.

Who shall read over all the Book of the Marquiss, shall find that he proposes Reformati-
ons in the State far more hard to be effected, than the banishing of the Canon-Law and Papal Jurisdiction out of the Kingdom. For he would perfectly melt down the Justice and Policy, and cast them all anew. He has truly made it appear, that he understands the Malady of the State, and yet his Projects to remedy them cannot be put in execution, without bringing to ruine and despair many active Spirits that live on their Professions, which is very dangerous to attempt in a State.

Whereas the expulsion of the Canon-Law out of *France*, and the reduction of all Causes thereon depending to the Civil Magistrate, and of all persons acknowledging the Pope to the Obedience of the King, would not at all be any dangerous Innovation. To discontent the regular Ecclesiasticks that are unactive, as bred up in the shade, and in contemplation, or in idleness, can be no great danger: especially leaving them their Revenues, at least for life,

I neither have the wit nor the presumption to give a model of what Orders should be prescrib'd the Church after the Papal Jurisdiction is banisht the Kingdom. And I shall go no farther than to say, that I see no vigour in the *Roman* Jurisdiction, and their Partisans in *France*, that may hinder the King from cashiering them absolutely, and making himself Master at home. Even the Excommunications and Interdicts that would follow, would strengthen him, being of no other effect but to provoke the Parliaments, and to animate the People against the Pope. The greatest part of the Clergy would submit to the King, and would cast off all Foreign Domination: and the dissenting Clergy would be inconsiderable, would be dispers'd, and vanish before the Rays of the Authority Royal.

And, I pray, a King of *England*, could he accomplish this Work, to free himself from the Papal-Yoke, though carried thereunto more by passion than prudence? And our Great King, so Vigorous, so Powerful, so Wise, shall not he dare to undertake it, for fear of vexing the Pope and the Monks? Shall he be scar'd with an imaginary Monarchy, that has
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neither force nor foundation, save in the Opinion of those that fear it, and establish it by their sottish fear?

What is most considerable in this Example, is, That the Pope continues banisht out of *England*. For though restor'd by *Queen Mary*, and his Power own'd for the space of five years; *Queen Elizabeth*, and the Kings her Successors, found themselves so much at ease in being deliver'd from the *Roman-Yoke*, and in being acknowledged Supreme, under God, in all Causes, and over all Persons, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil; that they have maintain'd, and do yet maintain this Authority essential to their Crown.

This Authority is no less essential to the Crown of our Great King; and 'tis this that the good Prince, *James* King of *England*, represents to all Kings and Princes of *Christendom*, in the Remonstrance he has made them, touching the Rights of their Crowns. They have not hitherto been so happy to listen to it, but let us hear what he says to them.

If you that are the most Powerful, come to consider in earnest with your selves, that well-nigh a third of your People and of your Lands belong to the Church; will not the Thoughts of so great a loss move you, which withdraws from your Jurisdiction so many Men, and so much of your Lands in such manner, that every where they plant Colonies and Provinces for the Pope? What Thorns and Thistles suffer you to grow in the Country under your Subjection, so long as so powerful a Faction flourishes and spreads over so much good Soil within your Kingdoms, openly maintaining that they are exempt from your Power, and that they
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are by no right subject to your Laws, and to your Judgments? insomuch, that whereas formerly the Clerks desir'd no more but their Tiths, and liv'd thereon content; at this day the Pope, chief of the Clerks, is not content with less than a third part of your Subjects, and of your Lands.

These words of a King, our Neighbour, happily enjoying a Sovereignty independant of the Pope, of which his Ancestor robb'd this Robber an hundred and forty years ago, ought to move in our Kings a virtuous Emulation to recover, and after to maintain the Rights proper to their Crown. And the example of so flourishing a success ought to encourage them to so just and so noble an Undertaking.

From this great and principal acquisition, that the King shall be the only Sovereign in his Kingdom, other advantages will arise. These stranger Courts being put down (that are the Mills whither every one brings, and where the Moulture goes all to Rome, or to their Creatures) the Money they drain from the Kings Subjects shall stay in France; and seeing that this employs a great number of Officers, that only do harm to the State; when this Gate shall be shut, the young Men will seek out other ways to make themselves valued by, and the Arts and Commerce of the Kingdom will be more considerable.

We shall likewise save the Treasure, that is spent unprofitably in the Embassies to Rome, and in courting the good Graces of the Cardinals at the Elections of Popes, and in the Reception of Legates and Nuncio's; by all which France does nought else but profess and encrease her Slavery, without the return of the least advantage.

vantage. For what-ever Compliments, what-ever Expence *France* may make, yet the Catholick King is the Minion of *Rome*; and the Subjects of *Spain* are the Chapmen that buy most of their Wares, and that have most blind Devotion for the Holy See. And in truth, seeing that the Politicks of *France* (by the Marquess) and Monsieur *Silbon*, and before them Cardinal *D'Offat*, have testified their little satisfaction with *Rome*, and publish'd her Cheats, in so far that as we know that *Rome* does not at all love us; in like manner *Rome* well knows, that we care not for Her: and I cannot understand to what end serve all our Civilities to the Court of *Rome*, but to puff them up the more, and provoke the Gentlemen to laughter, who without doubt receive a wonderful pleasure in seeing their profess'd Enemies come to kiss their feet.

'Tis true, that so long as *France* suffers *Rome* to dispose of many Benefices, we must always have occasion to deal with them; and as the Pope, to preserve his Credit, amuses the Princes with com-promises and treaties which he draws out at length, deporting himself as the Judge of Differences, whereas he creates more than he decides. So very often Princes contribute to his Inclination by their delays, and inserting before his Council-board Affairs that they have no intention should be concluded. And whatever their Inclination be at the bottom, he is courted and caress'd as the Arbiter, which pleases him extremely. And why should it not please him to have at his Court the Ambassadors of the Empire, of *France*, of *Spain*, of *Poland*, of *Portugal*, and other Princes that bring him Authority by their difference,

ference, and bring gain to his Court and his Citizens, by their Liberalities, and by their Expences, suitable to the Dignity of their Masters? The great Men and the Sages of Council to His Majesty may, when they please, consider what good comes to our Kings, by their keeping the Pope in this humour, of his being their Judge, and in letting him enjoy his pretended Rights in *France*. And whether it is not better, and a shorter way, for *France* to do its own business without him, and to take from him what does not at all belong to him in our Kingdom, that we may have no more to do with him.

The King has been pleas'd to declare, That he desir'd to re-unite his Subjects in their Religion. This so Christian and Royal Design cannot be executed, so long as the Pope shall have any Power in *France*; for this Re-union cannot be made, unless the Parties mutually yield some matters either in the Doctrine or in the Discipline; 'tis certain that the Pope will never consent, at least not to be own'd the Vicar of Jesus Christ, that has all the Power which Jesus Christ had upon Earth; and that on the other hand, the Protestants who have quite another Opinion of him, and such an one as all know (though they make it not an Article of their Faith) they can never submit to his Authority. But if that *France* were not govern'd in Spirituals, save by the King and his Bishops, an half of the way to this great Work were already over; it being most certain, that most of the Points in difference are not maintain'd by the Theologians, vow'd to the Popes Service, farther than as they serve his Interests.

REFLECTI-

REFLECTIONS

UPON THE

Fifth Chapter

OF THE

Politicks of France,

Which Treats of the

HUGUENOTS.

I Have Treated my Lord, the Marquess of C. with all the Respect that was possible for me in my Reflections upon his Chapter of the Clergy. I could not do more to comply with him and serve him, than by approving his Judgment, and confirming it with Authorities, adding only what he durst not venture, and (may be) had a mind to say.

Upon his Chapter of the *Huguenots* I shall keep my self within the same Respect. But I would hope from his Ingenuity, that after I have taken some pains in commending and defending the judgment he has made on the *Roman* Clergy, he in recompence would give me the liberty to oppose that which he has given, upon those he calls *Huguenots*, and to complain

complain of the Treatment he would have dealt to them.

But because I take great delight in according with him as far as is possible, I embrace the advice he gives at the entrance, *That a King cannot have a more noble Object of his care, than to preserve in his States the Religion he has receiv'd from his Ancestors.* For though this Proposition be not universally true, I will understand it in his Sense, supposing that he means the True Christian Religion. And 'tis that His Majesty has receiv'd of His Ancestors; the which I presume he will not limit to two or three Descents of his next Predecessors; but as he has drawn from three Stocks the lawful Succession of our last Kings, and affirms, That they are *Branches sprung from the same root*, he cannot take it ill that we go back to the First and Second Race, to find the Religion that His Majesty has receiv'd of his Ancestors. Therefore as the Noble Marquess in his Second Chapter, speaking of the pretended Exemptions of the Clergy, appeals for that matter to the old Kings and Emperors, who own'd no such thing, and says, *That the Clergy cannot take it amiss if His Majesty reduce things to their Primitive state.* In like manner the Marquess cannot take it amiss, that Religion be reduc'd to its Primitive state, at least to the state it was left in at the time when our Kings were Emperors. Now I have shew'd in the foregoing Chapter, that the Emperor Charlemaign, one of His Majesties Ancestors, Convok'd a Synod, in which the Worship of Images was condemned, and that he himself made a Book against

against the Second Council of Nice, and against Images, which we have preserv'd to this day; and that under *Levin the Mild*, his Son, another Synod was held at *Paris* against Images, all the Acts of which we have entire. This Doctrine is a principal Point of the Religion that our Kings receiv'd from their Ancestors, and which we profess. And as much may be said in point of the Holy Sacrament, of which so much noise is made at this day, that we willingly refer our selves to what was believ'd in the times of His Majesties Ancestors.

I should stray from my Subject, should I enter upon Controversie; the Marquess obliges me to stand upon another Guard, employing his Eloquence in treating us as Rebels and Enemies of the State.

I am far from justifying the evil Actions of our Party. But since we are to deal with Men of such a spirit, that display the Evil and suppress the Good, that insult over us for Actions forc'd by the despair of a few, and protested against by the greater Party; and that will not acknowledge the signal Services we have done for the Crown, which ought never to have been forgotten, so long as the Race of *Henry the Great* shall Sit upon the Throne. I think my self oblig'd to represent truly what is most considerable in their condition, and in their actions since the last return of the Purity of the Gospel into *France*.

I say the last return, because that it has been, and has flourish'd there two or three hundred years before, and the Professors remain'd there skulking, and yet in great numbers, after long
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and cruel Persecutions. For we dissemble not, but own that this Holy Doctrine came to us, and was planted by the remains of those poor *Valdenses* and *Albigenses*, the destruction of whom is rank'd by the noble Marquess, amongst the good Works of the first Rates. The Character that *Reinerius*, their cruel Inquisitor, gave them, is very remarkable, and may satisfie those who ask, where was our Religion before *Luther*, c. 4. *Contra Valdenses*. This, says he, of all Sects, is the most pernicious, for three Reasons. First, because of its long duration, for some say, that it has continu'd since the time of Pope *Sylvester*; others hold, that it began even in the Apostles time. Secondly, because of all Sects, this is the most general, there scarce being any Country where this Sect has not taken root. In the Third place, by reason that all contrary to other Sects that become abominable, by the enormity of their Blasphemies against God, these People seem very Godly, for they live justly before Men, have a sound belief in all things, and of God, and of all the Articles contain'd in the Apostles Creed: only this, They Blaspheme against Rome. An admirable Testimony from the Pen of a Mortal Enemy, that deserves to be Writ in Letters of Gold. Let us joyn hereunto that of good King *Lewis XII.* the Father of the People; He was much importun'd by those of the Clergy, who pray'd him to root out the Inhabitants of the *Cabrieres*, and of *Merindol* in *Provence*, that were of this Profession, and some remainders of the *Albigenses*. But this just King, afore he would grant that bloody Request, would see their Confession of Faith, which having read, He swore they

they were better Christians than he and his People, and preserv'd them from the rage of their Enemies. But these Enemies obtain'd what they desir'd of King Francis the First, and made an horrible slaughter of those poor Christians.

If these *Albigenses* be Hereticks, because they *BlaspHEME* against Rome, Is not the Marquess one, and all the Men of Politicks in France, who declaim so openly, and so generously against the Pope's Usurpations, that makes of Religion a pretence thereby to invade the Rights of the King, and make himself Universal Monarch of all the World?

These Gentlemen would abate much of the hatred they bear us; would they be pleas'd to consider that the Pope and Roman Clergy hate us, for a Cause that is common to us both. For it is not upon the account of any Controversies about the Holy Sacrament, the Invocation of Saints, and the Prayers for the Dead; but it is because we oppose boldly the Usurpations of Rome; it is because we *BlaspHEME* against Rome, as the *Albigenses* in *Reinerius's* days, That we are call'd (as he calls us) *A pernicious Sect*. This is the great Heresie for which we have been made Objects of the Publick hatred, and for which the Devotion of the People is made to consist in a bloody Zeal to burn us, and Massacre us.

In the Year 1520. the Light of the Gospel shin'd throughout all the parts of France. And the Queen of Navarre, Sister of King Francis I. who was enlighten'd therewith, was a great Rampire against the fury of the Roman Clergy, that labour'd to extinguish this Holy Light by

Persecution : However, she could not hinder, but that much cruelty was exercised. But after her decease the Persecution grew hot again, and continued during the Reign of *Francis I.* and *Henry II.* For the space of Forty years, those that were converted, maintain'd their Holy Profession, by a constancy in their Sufferings, in imitation of the *Christians* of the Primitive Church. Notwithstanding this Vigor, many of the Princes, and of the best Families of *France*, as the Princes of the Blood of the House of *Bourbon*, embrac'd the Reform'd Religion.

Under the Reign of *Francis II.* the Princes of the Blood, debarr'd of their Rights by those of the House of *Guise*, the Queens Uncles, form'd the design at *Ambois*, to banish those from the King's Person, that held them at distance. This attempt failing, was call'd a Crime of High Treason, and charg'd on them of the Reform'd Religion, though *Renandy* the chief of the Plot, was a *Roman* Catholick, and this Party was compos'd of Noblemen and Gentry of both the Perswasions. Whoso understands the Priviledges of the Princes of the Blood in *France*, will never accuse these Undertakers of the Rebellion. *Thuanus* testifies in their Favour, *Hist. l. 24.* That not one of them was prov'd to have attempted against the King, or against the Queen, but only against Strangers that Govern'd all at Court in a Tyrannical way: For then the House of *Guise* was still lookt upon as a Stranger in *France*.

Francis II. being dead, his Successor *Charles IX.* being a Minor, the Princes of the Blood had more Right than afore to be admitted to the management of Publick Affairs, at least joyntly

joyn'tly with the Queen-Mother. But when they saw themselves excluded, and their Persons in danger, they Levy'd Forces for their Preservation.

When the King came of Age, the Princes seeing Him much incens'd against them, and that He was of a dangerous and implacable Nature, they retir'd, and stood upon their Guard. The several Affronts they receiv'd, and the frequent Massacres, occasion'd two or three little Wars.

To rid himself of them all at one blow, the King set his Sister for a bait, to draw in and to destroy the whole Party of the Princes, giving her in Marriage to the Prince of *Navarre*, who was afterwards our *Henry the Great*. He and his Cousin *Germain* the Prince of *Conde* were imprison'd, and the Principals of their Party slain in their Beds, having Danc'd at a Ball the Evening before. Never were Dancers at such a Wedding.

Pope *Gregory XII.* had a hand in this execrable Action, his Predecessor *Pius V.* refused to consent to this Marriage, because (said he) the Prince of *Navarre* is an Heretick. But when the Cardinal of *Lorrain* told his Successor *Gregory XII.* that this Marriage was a trap to catch the Hereticks, he then dispatcht the Dispensation, and encourag'd the Design.

The Prince of *Navarre* having sav'd himself at *Rochel*, was immediately assisted by a great Party that had escap'd the Massacre, and the War broke out afresh. Thereupon was form'd that Faction of the League, to destroy the Princes of the Blood, under the colour of Religion, and particularly, to destroy the King

Henry III. as appear'd afterwards. During these long Troubles, what refuge found the King of *Navarre*, whom God reserv'd for the Crown of *France*, but amongst these of the Reform'd Religion? These were they that aided, that defended, and even nourisht him in his long and cruel Adversities.

And after, in the end, when the League had pull'd off the Mask, and had driven the King from *Paris*, and besieg'd him at *Tours*, came not they to his Relief under their brave Chief-tain, and did they not deliver him from the utmost danger, though he had sent his Armies against them, to extirpate them?

I would gladly ask the Noble Marquess, Where were then the honest *French*? and where were the Rebels? Would he find the honest *French* amongst the fiery Zealots and Bigots of the League, *Who have shed so much Blood to beat down this dangerous Sect*, as he is pleas'd to brand us? With your good leave, Noble Marquess, which of the two is this dangerous Sect, that which teaches that the Persons of Kings are inviolable, and that exposes their Lives to defend those Kings that had persecuted them; or that which holds, That a King Excommunicated by the Pope, may be justly kill'd by any body; and which, out of zeal for Religion, plunge their Bloody Hands into the Bowels of their Sovereign, as *St. Jacob Clement* did, and as *John Castrel* and *Peter Barriere* attempted, and as *Ravaillac* perform'd? Where is the *Huguenot* that ever offer'd any thing of this Nature, during all the Persecutions of their Party? Or where is the Minister that ever broacht such Doctrine to his Flock,

to kill their King, which your Spiritual Fathers have so often done? I would also ask the Marquess, Where he finds *that term of near four-score years spent in quelling this dangerous Sect*, which is the title he is pleased to give us? Would he take in to these 80 years, the 38 after the death of *Francis II.* till the Peace of *Amiens*, in which time the Reformed Party were the constant, and the only support of the Great *Henry* for near 30 years? Will he venture to say, That those Arms which defended the hope of after-Ages, and the fortune of *France*, were unjust?

Let him also say if he please, Whether by the zeal *that has been to reduce the Hereticks to their duty*, he means that Butchery of the *St. Bartholomews*, and the Massacres in every Town of *France*, at that time and before, which are reductions of a strange nature.

And because he may Object, That their defence of the Princes of the Blood was only a pretence for the *Huguenots* taking up Arms, and their unjust resistance against their Sovereign. It will suffice to answer, That their Arms were necessary for the Preservation of that Great Prince, whom God reserv'd for the blessing of *France*; and that when He came to the Crown, they were judg'd worthy of a Reward. I would beseech also all indifferent persons to consider them simply as men, that are neither Angels nor Devils, and to tell us, if they think it strange that men, the Relicks of Fires and Slaughters (which were the only arguments employ'd for their Conversion for so many years) take the course at length that Nature teaches them, to defend themselves against force with

force. This to take it at the worst, is all the Rebellion can be objected against them in all that past Age, till the quiet settlement of *Henry the Great*.

But the good Providence of God has well clear'd them from the necessity of that excuse, having set them out an Employment so just, and so fortunate for their Arms, that all who love, and who shall for future Ages love the Prosperity of *France*, and the Greatness of the Royal Family, will have perpetual reason to bless the timely succour of this Party, and to praise God, who rais'd them for the everlasting good of the Kingdom.

Let us come to their condition, after that *Henry the Great* was establish'd on His Throne. The King being turn'd *Roman* Catholick, and seeing his Party of the Reformed Religion discontent, and in trouble, as expos'd afresh to what they had afore tried, gave them Places of Security for about twenty years.

This was the Ground-work of all their Miseries, and I am much inclin'd to believe that this was procur'd for them by those who projected their ruine. For their Enemies might well think, that a King that understands his Interest, would not long suffer in the heart of his Kingdom places assign'd for Protection, against Himself in effect, and to make resistance, in case he kept not all his promises. That these Places would be retreats for all discontented Persons, and Incendiaries that would trouble the State. That Strangers seeing in *France* a Party strengthen'd with Garisons, and holding themselves in perpetual defiance, would never leave bidding them to cock up, and fomenting
their

their discontents. That this thorn in the foot of *France* would always hinder it from advancing; and after all, that this would be a kind of dangerous Discipline in a State; to accustom Subjects to represent their Grievances with Sword in Hand.

On the other hand, they might well fore-see, that the Reform'd being seiz'd of these places, would not quit them at the end of the term assign'd, imagining that the enjoyment of their Religion, of their Goods, and of their Lives, depended all on their keeping of these Places; and that by their refusal, they would oblige the King to win them by force; which would make them Criminals, odious, and objects of the Justice and Vegeance of an incens'd Master.

And even so it happen'd. For their term for holding these places being expir'd, the King demands them again, and having at their instant request prolong'd their term for three or four years, at length wisely resolv'd to force them; this gave occasion for the Assembly of *Rochel*, where most imprudently, and contrary to their duty to God and the King, they resolv'd to hold the Places by force; a resolution of despair ill-grounded. For though the King shew'd himself favourable to his Subjects of the Religion, after he had taken these Places by his Arms, he would have been yet more favourable to them, had they render'd the Places humbly and peaceably at his demand.

When the Assembly of *Rochel* began, was held the National Synod of *Alaix*, in which the famous *Du Moulin* was President. In that Country where many of these Places of Security were, he apply'd himself seriously to consider

the posture of the Affairs of his Party, to sound their Inclinations, and to give them good counsel. And he found that *the greatest and the best part* was dispos'd to render their Places to the King, and did not at all approve of the proceedings of the Assembly of *Rochel*, of which matter he thought himself oblig'd to inform that Assembly; and having return'd home, he writ them an excellent Letter, a Copy whereof I have procur'd, which is as follows:

S I R S,

I Write not to you, to pour my Sorrows into your Bosoms, or entertain you with my particular Afflictions. I need no Consolation on that account, thinking my self greatly Honour'd, that in the publick Affliction of the Church, it pleases God to set me the foremost. I should account my self very happy, if all the Storm might fall on my Head. So that I might be the only Sufferer, and the Church of God continue in Peace and Prosperity. One Care more pressing, has mov'd me to write to you, and has forc'd Nature, which was ever averse from meddling with Publick Affairs, and acting beyond my Calling. For seeing the Church generally in eminent danger, and upon the brink of a Precipice, it was impossible for me to hold from speaking. Nor can I be silent in this urgent necessity, without making my self guilty of insensibility, and of cruelty towards the Church of God. And, I hope, in speaking my Thoughts about Publick Affairs, my Domestick Affliction will deliver me from jealousy in your Opinion. And if I be not believ'd, at least I may be excus'd.

I confess indeed, it does not become me to give Counsel to an Assembly of Persons, chosen out of
all

all the Kingdom, to bear the weight of Publick Affairs in a time so full of difficulty; but I think it for your advantage to be inform'd rightly what is the Opinion, and what the Disposition of our Churches, from persons that have a particular knowledge of them.

The question then being, whether you ought to break up your Assembly, in Obedience to His Majesty, or continue to hold together, in order to provide for the Affairs of the Churches; I am bound to tell you, that it is the general desire of our Churches, that it might please God we may continue in peace, by obeying His Majesty. And that seeing the King resolv'd to make himself obey'd by force of Arms, they assure themselves, that you will to your power endeavour to avoid this Tempest, and rather yield to necessity, than engage them in a War that will most certainly ruin the greatest part of our Churches, and will plunge us in troubles, whereof we well see the beginning, but know not at all the end. By obeying the King, you will take away their pretence, who incense his Majesty to persecute us. And if we are to be persecuted, all they who fear God, desire that this may be for the Profession of the Gospel, and that our persecution may truly be the Cross of Christ. In a word, Sirs, I can assure you, that the greatest and the best part of our Churches desire your Assembly may break up, if it can be done with safety to your Persons: and even many of the Roman Church, love that Publick Peace are continually about us, praying and exhorting us, that we may not, by throwing our selves down the Precipice, involve them in our ruin.

On this occasion I need not represent to you the general consternation of our poor Flocks, who cast
their

their Eyes upon you as Persons that may procure their quiet; and by yielding to necessity, may divert that storm so ready to break upon their heads. Many already have forsaken the Country, many have quitted their Religion, from whence you may judge what a distraction there will be, should these troubles go on farther.

Nor need I more recommend to you, to have a tender care for the preservation of our poor Churches, knowing that you will rather chuse Death, than draw upon you the reproach, that you have hasten'd on the persecution of the Church, and destroy'd that which the zeal of our Fathers had planted, and brought this State into confusion.

I am not ignorant that many Reasons are alledg'd to perswade you to hold on your Assembly. As that the King has permitted it; but for this permission you have not any Warrant, nor any Declaration in Writing; without which, all Promises are but Words in the Air. For Kings believe they have Power to forbid what they have permitted, and to revoke what they have offer'd, when they judge it expedient for the good of their Affairs. And there is none of you that having sent his Servant any whither, or given him leave to go, does not think you have power to call him back again. Above all, Sovereign Princes keep not willingly their Promises, when they have been extorted from them.

There are also represented to you many Grievances and Controventions to the Kings Edicts; which Complaints to our great sorrow, are but too true: yet, without alledging that we our selves have given the occasion of many of these Evils; the difficulty lies not in representing our Grievances, but in finding redress. Consider then, whether the

continuance

continuance of your Assembly may heal these Maladies, whether your Session may put our Churches under shelter, provide necessaries for a War where the Parties are so unequal, Levy Forces and make a Fond for Payment; if all the good your Session is capable to produce, shall be equivalent to the loss of so many Churches that lye naked, and expos'd to the wrath of their Enemies; whether when they are beaten down, you can raise them again; whether in the manifest division that is amongst us, you have the power to bring together all the scatter'd parts of this divided Body, which were it well united, would yet be too weak to maintain it self on the Defensive.

Pardon me, Sirs, if I tell you, that you will not find all those of our Religion dispos'd to obey your Resolutions; and that the fire being kindl'd all about you, you will remain feeble Spectators of the ruin that you have made to tumble upon your heads. Besides, you cannot be ignorant that many amongst us, of the best quality, and most capable to defend us, condemn openly your Actions, imagining and expressing that to suffer for this Cause, is not to suffer for the Cause of God. / These making no kind of resistance, and opening the Gates of their places, and joyning their Arms to those of the King, you may easily gather what the loss will be, and what a weakning of your Party. How many persons of our Nobility will forsake you, some by Treachery, others through weakness? Even they that in an Assembly are the most vehement, and that to appear zealous, are altogether for violent courses, are most commonly those that revolt, and that betray their Brethren. They hurry our poor Churches into the greatest danger, and there leave them, and run away after that they have set the House on fire.

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If a Fight, or the Siege of a Town should happen, whatever might be the event of the Fight or Siege, it would prove a difficult thing to contain the People animated against us, and to hinder them from falling upon our Churches, that have neither Defence or Retreat. And whatever Orders the Magistrates of the contrary Religion should give, it will be impossible for them to take effect.

I might also represent to you many Reasons arising from the State of our Churches, both within and out of the Kingdom, to let you see that this Commotion is altogether ill-tim'd, and that it is to sail against Wind and Tide. But you are wise enough to see and consider the posture of our Neighbours, and from whence you may hope for succor, and whether amongst you the Virtue and the good Agreement, and the Quality of your Chiefs is augmented or diminish'd. Certainly this is not the time when the troubling of that Pool will bring us a Cure. And it is plain, that if any thing can help us amidst so much weakness, it must be the zeal of Religion, the which, in our Fathers time, did support us, when we had less Strength and more Virtue. But in this cause you will find that Zeal very cool, because the most part of our People believes that this Evil might have been prevented, without making a breach in the Conscience. Assure your selves, there will always be Divisions amongst us, when we shall stir upon civil accounts, and not directly for the Cause of the Gospel.

Against all this, 'tis Objected, That our Enemies have resolv'd our ruin. That they undermine us by little and little, and that we had better begin presently, than attend longer.

'Tis very true, he must want common Sense, that

that doubts of their ill-will. Meantime, when I reflect on our several Losses, as that of Letoure, of Privas, and of Bearn; I find that our selves have contributed thereto: and we are not at all to wonder if our Enemies are not much in pain to set us right, and if they joyn with us to undo us. But herein it does not follow, that we should throw the Helve after the Hatchet, and set fire to our own House, because others are resolv'd to burn it, or undertake to remedy particular Evils by means weak for that end, but strong and effectual for the general ruin. God, who so often has diverted the Counsels taken for our destruction, has not lost his Power, neither has he chang'd his Will. We shall find that He is always the same, if we have the Grace to wait His assistance, and do not cast our selves headlong, through our impatience, and dash upon impossibilities.

Take this for certain, that though our Enemies seek our ruin, they will never attempt it openly, and will lay hold on some other pretence, more plausible than that of Religion, which we never ought to give them. If we contain our selves in the Obedience that Subjects owe to their Sovereign, we shall see that whilst our Enemies hope in vain, that we shall make our selves Criminals by some Disobedience. God will cut them out some other work, and furnish us with occasions to testify to his Majesty, that we are a Body profitable to his State, and thereby put him in mind of the signal Services our Churches have paid to the late King of Glorious Memory. But if we are so unfortunate, that whilst we keep to our Duty, the Calumnies of our Enemies prevail; at the least, we shall have this satisfaction, that we have been just on our side, and that we have testified, that we love the peace of the State.

Notwith-

Notwithstanding all this, Sirs, you can, and you ought to give order for the security of your Persons. For His Majesty and His Council having said often, That if you will separate, He will leave to our Churches the enjoyment of Peace, and of the benefit of his Edicts; it is not reasonable that your separation should be made with danger to your Persons. And when you shall require that you may separate with safety, I make no doubt but you will easily obtain your desires, provided that you insist upon what is possible, and such things as the misery of the Times, and the present necessity may admit. It remains, that whilst you are together, you advise what ought to be done, in case you may be oppressed, notwithstanding your separation. It concerns your Prudence to give order, and is not my part to suggest.

If in proposing these things to you, I have slipt beyond the bounds of discretion, impute it, if you please, to my zeal for the good and the preservation of the Church. And if this my Advice be rejected, as unworthy your consideration, I shall have this comfort, that I have discharg'd my Conscience, and retiring into a strange Country, I shall there finish the few days that remain for me to live, lamenting the ruin of the Church, and the destruction of the Temple; for the building of which, I have labour'd with more Courage and Fidelity, than with Success. The Lord turn his Wrath from us, guide your Assembly, and preserve your Persons. I am, &c.

When this Letter was read in the Assembly, which did not at all approve it, some arose immediately, went from the Assembly, and never return'd more; And all found in the end, that the Advertisements of this Holy Person were Prophecies. It

It appears then, that notwithstanding the great Temptations of Fear and Despair, that mov'd this Assembly to resist the King, their resistance was disavow'd by *the best and the greatest Party* of the Reform'd Churches of *France*, and that they were exhorted to obey the King by their Divines, who, in matters of Conscience, are the representative Body of the Church, when they are Solemnly Assembl'd. Now this was the Sense of the National Synod, of which this eminent Person came from being the President. 'Tis then wrongfully that the Noble Marquess taxes all our Party with Rebellion, when as our Theologians declar'd themselves so strongly against it; the most of those that held these Places of Security, open'd their Gates to the King; and more than three Fourths of his Subjects of the Reform'd Religion kept in their Obedience.

I cannot omit, that in the greatest heat of those who resisted, there yet remained many glances of Loyalty and Love for their King. I shall observe two: At the Siege of *Montaubon*, the most obstinately defended of all the other Sieges, the King and his Court passed before the Walls, from whence they were shooting most furiously: but when the Besieged beheld his Majesty, they left off shooting, and cry'd out with a great force, *Long live the King.*

The instance of *Rochel* is more remarkable, and it is very memorable. The *Rochellers* besieg'd, implored the assistance of *England*, which was offer'd them; but the Duke of *Buckingham* came late, so that the *Rochellers* after they had eaten the Horses, were now eating their Saddles. In this great extremity the
Duke

Duke told their Deputies, that if they would deliver the Town to the King of England, they should be assisted effectually. The Deputies refus'd, and the *Rachellers* resolv'd to undergo all the rigours that their King, provok'd, would exercise upon them, rather than deliver the Town to a stranger. This just King had notice thereof, and treated them the more mildly at the Surrender, overcoming, like a *Christian*, evil with good.

The Noble Marquess does the quite contrary, for he studies to overcome good with evil; displaying our Faults, with all the aggravation, and concealing our Services. He says, *That the spirit of the Huguenots is always ready for revolts, for Confusion and Anarchy. That there will be more than an hundred thousand men of the Kings Enemies in the bowels of his Kingdom, so long as there shall be Huguenots in France; and that perhaps they wait only an occasion to rise up in Arms.* He pretends even to know their hearts, saying, *That they have in their hearts the same hatred they had;* which are words flung out with more animosity than reason.

For 'tis but ill Logick, that they are all Rebels, because about a six part of their number took up Arms, in their defence, to keep some Places of safety; and that because they have sin'd they never have repented. If all they who have been engag'd in the Troubles of the State, within these last forty years, are to be thought the Kings Enemies for ever; His Majesty would find few Persons in his Kingdom whom he might trust; and now forty years are past since the War for those Places of safety, was ended. When the Body is in a Fever, the

the good humors are stir'd as well as the bad, and all settle again when the Disease is over. The same is in the Body of a State; it is subject to hot fits that enflame both good and bad; but all grow cool and quiet in time, by the wisdom of the Sovereign, and by the repentance of those that are honest good men. To upbraid them as Rebels and Enemies, that took up Arms against their duty, and laid them down again forty years ago; this is to violate the Laws of *Amnesty*, without which no State could subsist. Kings being the Lieutenants of God, ought to deal with their Subjects as God does with his. He forgives and forgets offences; and makes them faithful that were disobedient, through his Benefits.

The Protestants of *Languedoc* stay'd not for the Kings Benefits, till they testifi'd their Fidelity, and their Oblivion of what they had suffer'd in the reduction of the Places that they had held, than when their wounds were yet bleeding. This was when the Duke of *Montmorency* in *Languedoc*, where he was Governor, made a Party against the King, hoping to find the Protestants, who are in great numbers in that Province, ready for an Insurrection from the resentment of their late Sufferings. But he found the quite contrary; for they all joyn'd as one man with the Kings Forces, and did him excellent Service in a battel where the Duke was defeated and taken, and a Bishop with him. The old Marshall *De la Force*, who had escap'd the Massacre of *St. Bartholomew*, by hiding himself under the Carcasses of his Brothers, whose Throats were cut, was one of the Principal Commanders in this Action.

That Marquess confesses, That *in the wars at Paris, they put themselves in Arms, and with great respect protested, that they were at the Kings Service*; and their Actions would have justify'd their Protestations, if His Majesty had had occasion for their Service.

I will not loose time and pains in making Reflections upon the fourteen ways he proposes to torment us, and make us weary of our Religion, of our Country, and our Lives. Ways enough are found out, without his proposing. And now, because the King, of late years, has had much to do with the Court of *Rome*, it has been a part of the Policy of *France*, whilst they affront the Pope, at the same time to treat us with some extraordinary Severity, to prevent the suspicion of Heresie. We humble our selves under the powerfull hand of God, and under that of our Sovereign; confessing that we are justly chastis'd for our sins. For the rest, we know in whom we have trusted, and shelter our selves under the Hand that strikes us; assuring our selves, that it will protect us, and that we shall find Jesus Christ our Redeemer, and his Spirit our Comforter, both in this Life and in that which is to come.

As the Marquess is very exact in giving Instructions to ruine us, he does the same towards the end of his Book for *England*; counting it a Nation that is good for nothing but to be ruin'd. We cannot take the advantage of these Instructions given against us, to defend our selves against them, for we are a Body meerly passive, expos'd, and submitted to all that God and the King will do with us. But for the *English*, when he has disoblig'd them by
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the most odious Character that his Malice could furnish his Eloquence withall; He obliges them, in publishing all those ways that must be taken to destroy them; for it is likely, that being told of them, they will look to themselves. Mean time, his Readers will say of him, that they who tell aforehand of their cunning, are not very cunning.

Because that the noble Marquess terms us Rebels and Enemies of the State, after the humble confession of our Faults, which I have neither cloak'd nor dissembl'd; I will take the boldness to compare them with those of some of the Gentlemen of the *Roman* Clergy, especially of the Jesuits and their Disciples: and that they that are not pre-possess'd with passion may judge, whether to them rather, or to us, belongs the title, Of Enemies of the State, Let us consider the Actions and the Doctrine of the one and the other,

For the Actions, the horrible attempts against the Sacred Persons of our Kings, by Ecclesiasticks and Scholars of the Jesuits, and all the Enormities of the League, to destroy our Kings, our Laws, and our Monarchy, and to transfer it to a stranger; carry away without dispute the prize of Villany, from those who being possess'd with a fear ill-grounded, have with Arms defended the Places that were lent to them by Edict, for the security of their Religion, of their Goods, and of their Lives. Add hereto, that they had their hearts big with the sense of their incomparable Service to the Crown, and believ'd they well deserv'd what they endeavour'd to keep.

And as for the Doctrine, these never read Lectures of Rebellion and Parricide. And the resistance some of the Party made against the King, was condemn'd by their Divines, whose writings are full of Lessons of Obedience, and of Fidelity to their Sovereigns. Whereas those of the Jesuits, and their Disciples, teach the people to cast off and kill their King, so often as it may please the Pope to Excommunicate him. *France* has felt the Effects of this Doctrine during the long Wars of the League; and it was the Books and the Sermons that made the Sword be drawn, and that sharpen'd the Daggers for the Murder of our Kings, whilst the Protestants expos'd their Lives for their Preservation.

Now I am content to let pass what is past, provided the same may be done to us. Let us fix upon the present. Whom ought you to esteem the Enemies of the State, those who subject the Crown of our Kings absolutely to the Papal Mitre, and who acknowledge another Sovereign than the King; or they who own him their only Sovereign, and maintain that his Crown depends not save on God alone? What, in Conscience, is the true ground of the great hatred that is born us? is it not for that, if we are to be believ'd, there would not in *France* be any French-man that is not the Kings Subject, Causes Beneficial and Matrimonial would not be carried to *Rome*, nor the Kingdom be Tributary under the shadow of *Annates*, and the like Impositions.

And on this Subject, the Testimony of Cardinal *Perron* for us, in his Harangue to the Third State, is very considerable; when he

says, *The Doctrine of the Deposition of Kings, by the Pope, has been held in France until Calvin.* Whereby he tacitely acknowledges, That our Kings had been ill serv'd before ; and that those he calls Hereticks having brought to light the Holy Scripture, have made the Right of Kings be known, which had been kept suppress'd.

Shall they be said Friends of the State, who owning themselves Subjects of a Stranger Sovereign, dare endeavour to make themselves Masters of all the Temporal Jurisdiction? of which the Marquess complains loudly, and with good cause; and of the great resistance they have made to maintain themselves in an Usurpation so unreasonable. In this kind, those of the Church of the Reform'd Religion could never be accus'd, in the Towns where we have had some Power.

Our Religion is hated, because it combats the Pride, the Avarice, and the Usurpations of the Court of *Rome*, and their Substitutes in the Kingdom; and because we have shewn to the World that sordid Bank of Spiritual Graces they have planted in the Church, and how they have drawn to themselves a Third of the Lands of *France*, for fear of Purgatory, from silly People, mop'd with a blind Devotion, and from Robbers and Extortioners, who have thought to make Peace with God by letting these share in the booty.

'Tis an advice very suitable to the *Politicks* of *France*, to examine well the Controversies that are most gainful to the Clergy, as this of Purgatory, concerning which an old Poet said the Truth, in his way of Drollery.

But

*But if it be so,
That no more Souls shall go
To old Purgatory,
Then the Pope will gain nought by the Story.*

It would be wisely done to examine what necessity there is for so many Begging-Fryers, that suck out the Blood and Marrow of devout People ; and for so many Markets of Pardons in honour of a number of Saints of a new Edition ; and for what design are made so many Controversies. And whether it would not be a great Treasure for the Kings Subjects to Teach them to work out their Salvation, and put their Consciences in quiet at a cheaper rate.

God, justly provok'd, by the great Sins of *France*, gives us not yet the Grace of that Gospel-Truth, *St. John, Ch. 8. Know the Truth, and the Truth will set you free.* And though it shines out so clear, to let us see the Usurpation of the Popes upon the Temporals of the King, and upon the Spirituals of the Church ; yet see we not clearly enough to discover all the mystery of Iniquity, and to resolve to shake off the Yoak.

For this great design, no other War need be made by the Pope, but only take from him all Jurisdiction in *France*, all Annates, and all evocation of Causes to *Rome*. This would hardly produce any other stirrs, but the complaints and murmuring of them that are loosers. And the condition, truly Royal, that the King at present is in, will sufficiently secure Him from Insurrections at home, and Invasions from abroad. Or should any happen, behold, *more than an hundred thousand Huguenots*, that the
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Noble Marquess has found him, *in the heart of his State*, whom he is pleas'd to call *His Enemies*, but who on all occasions, and on this especially would do His Majesty a hearty and faithful Service.

The two main Interests of *France*, being to weaken the House of *Austria*, the Princes of which enclose him on both sides; and to throw off the yoke of *Rome*, which holds a Monarchy within the French Monarchy; 'tis easie to judge that amongst the Kings Subjects, the Protestants are absolutely the most proper to serve him on both these occasions. I know that amongst the *Roman Catholicks*, as well Ecclesiasticks as Seculars, there are excellent Instruments to serve the King in both these Interests. But there is need of great caution to well assure him, by reason of the multitude of Jesuits Scholars, with whom these Fathers have industriously fill'd all Professions of the State and Church; and it is for no other end that they have so many Colledges. They who have been too good Scholars of these Masters, are contrary to both these Interests, being so great Catholicks, that they espouse the Interest of the Catholick King, to advance that of his Holiness. But to find amongst the Protestants trusty Instruments for both these accounts, he need not try them; they are fitted and form'd, by their Education, for these two Uses, so necessary to *France*.

The Marquess assures His Majesty, with good reason of the friendship of the Protestant Princes of *Germany*, which they would never testifie so freely, as in serving him to ruin the Power of the Pope, who favours that of the House
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of *Austria*. For thereby they would kill two Birds with one Stone. Not to mention our other Neighbours, who have broken with *Rome*, and being disquieted by its secret practises, will be ready to contribute to its destruction.

Who shall well consider the Scheme of the Affairs of Christendom, shall judge, that all things invire His Majesty to shut out the Jurisdiction of *Rome* beyond the Mountains; Right, Honour, Profit, Liberty, Facility, his Duty to his Crown, to his Subjects, and to his Royal Posterity; and that many Aids smile upon him, both within, and out of his Kingdom, for so fair and so just an Enterprize.

This is the warm desire of the honest *Frenchmen*. And none there are who better deserve that Title, than they, who, with the most Indignation, resent that their Kings should kiss the Feet of that Prelate, who ought of Right to kiss their Feet, for having receiv'd his Principalities from Kings of *France*; and who, in recompence of their good Deeds, have plotted, and plot continually their ruin.

When the King shall have deliver'd Himself and his People, from this strange yolk, he will find the enmity amongst his Subjects, for matter of Religion, greatly diminish'd; and the way open to a re-union. And were the difficulties about the Doctrine overcome, the Protestants would not stick much at the Discipline.

God, who is the Father of Kings, and the King of Glory, protect and strengthen our Great King, to accomplish the Designs that turn to the general good of His Church, to the greatness, and to the respect of his Sacred Person, and to the Peace and Prosperity of His State.

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